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P r e f a C e
Among the articles collected under this cover, the earliest was 
written in 1996 and the latest, a couple of months ago, in 2016. 
Consistency is not what one would expect from such a long stretch. 
I did not select articles according to a certain plan—just ones 
available in English and ones I was not exceedingly ashamed of, 
from today’s perspective. Many of these texts were triggered by the 
desire to react to the most recent cultural irritants, and although 
English tends to quench most flammable emotions, these articles 
can hardly pretend to offer an objective history of the given (and 
worse, contemporary) period in Russian culture.
Nevertheless, I was surprised to detect at least two themes 
that seem to thread through this motley assemblage. One of 
them is the cultural crisis that we, for lack of a better word, call 
postmodernism. This is why I included in this collection an 
article about Lolita—a seminal novel that, in my opinion, marked 
the crisis of the transcendental cultural paradigm. Next to it 
I placed two articles discussing the culture of the Soviet scientific 
intelligentsia of the 1960s, which, as I try to argue, signified the 
crisis of the posttotalitarian Enlightenment project. Articles about 
Vladimir Sorokin and Pussy Riot, as well as about the “misuses” of 
postmodernism in post-Soviet popular culture, naturally belong to 
the same analytic thread. Nowadays, Fredric Jameson, the foremost 
theorist of postmodernism, says that “it would have been much 
clearer had I distinguished postmodernity as a historical period 
from postmodernism as a style” (Jameson 2016, 144; emphasis in the 
original). I also accept this distinction. Postmodern crises do not 
necessarily require postmodernist poetics for their manifestation—
for example, all the films that I address here can hardly qualify 
as postmodernist by their aesthetics; yet they are undoubtedly 
postmodern, as they all display discursive discordances resulting 
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from multiple breakdowns of cultural communication and 
the collapse of stable binaries. These are the characteristics 
of postmodernity, but they are also central to postmodernist 
aesthetics (which also necessarily includes deconstruction of 
binaries).
Any attempt to reflect on recent cultural phenomena cannot 
help relating—directly or not—to the political context surrounding 
the works under analysis. The articles in this collection are not 
about politics (obviously not my field), and yet inevitably they 
are. I didn’t plan it this way, but the twenty years between 1996 
and 2016 include at least three distinct periods in contemporary 
Russia’s history—the anarchic 1990s, the “stabilized” 2000s, and the 
repressive 2010s. Recently, I can’t help writing about the cultural 
reasons behind the failure of the perestroika aspirations for a new, 
liberal Russia and the recent turn toward a new yet old (or vice 
versa) nationalist, imperialist, conservative, and isolationist Russia. 
There is also the question of the liberal intelligentsia’s responsibility 
for today’s state of affairs. Another painful question concerns the 
relationship between postmodern crises and today’s crisis of Russian 
society, with its notorious 86 percent of the public supporting 
Putin’s political course and the marginalization and repression 
of everything subversive, critical, and countercultural. Strangely 
enough, I believe that this “signified” can be detected not only in 
texts written after the failure of the anti-Putin protests but also prior 
to these events. This is certainly an aberration in perception, but 
I prefer to stick with it.
Such a collection also offers the wonderful chance to thank from 
the bottom of my heart all the friends and colleagues who tirelessly 
improved my ungainly English by editing, proofreading, and 
sometimes (re)translating my texts. My gratitude goes to Helena 
Goscilo, Birgit Beumers, Eliot Borenstein, Vladimir Makarov, Dirk 
Uffelmann, Tine Roesen, Klavdia Smola, Irene Masing-Delic, Helen 
Halva, Yana Hashamova, Lacey Smith, Julia Gerhard, and, of course, 
my oldest, strictest, and most sarcastic editor—Daniil Leiderman. 
Ben Peterson has done a lot of work to smooth the stylistic differences 
between disparate texts in this collection, for which I am very grateful 
to him.
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I am also profoundly grateful to Birgit Beumers, Natascha 
Drubek, Ingunn Lunde, Helen Halva, Irene Masing-Delic, Williams 
Stephen Matthew, Marina Mogilner and Ilya Gerasimov, and 
Benjamin Kloss for their permission to reprint articles that first 
appeared in the following publications:
“The War of Discourses: Lolita and the Failure of the 
Transcendental Project.” In Набоков/Nabokov: Un’eredita 
letteraria, edited by Alide Cagidemetrio and Daniela Rizzi, 
49–66. Venice: Universitá Ca’Foscari Venezia, 2006.
“The Poetics of ITR Discourse: In the 1960s and Today.” 
Ab Imperio 1 (2013): 109–31.
“The Progressor between the Imperial and the Colonial.” In 
Postcolonial Slavic Literatures after Communism, edited by 
Klavdia Smola and Dirk Uffelmann, 29–58. Postcolonial 
Perspectives on Eastern Europe, vol. 4. Frankfurt am Main: 
Peter Lang, 2016.
“Cycles, Continuity and Change in Contemporary Russian 
Culture.” In Russia’s New Fin de Siècle, edited by Birgit 
Beumers, 29–45. Bristol: Intellect, 2013.
“Fleshing/Flashing Discourse: Sorokin’s Master-Trope.” In 
Vladimir Sorokin’s Languages, edited by Tine Roesen and Dirk 
Uffelmann, 25–47. Slavica Bergensia, vol. 11. Bergen: Bergen 
University Press, 2013.
“Pussy Riot as the Trickstar.” Apparatus 1 (2015):  
http://www.apparatusjournal.net/index.php/apparatus/
article/view/5.
“The Formal Is Political.” Slavic and East European Journal, vol. 60, 
2 (2016): 185-204.
“Post-Soc: Transformations of Socialist Realism in the Popular 
Culture of the Recent Period.” In “Innovation through 
Iteration: Russian Popular Culture Today,” special forum 
issue, Slavic and East European Journal 48, no. 3 (Fall 2004): 
356–77.
“War as the Family Value: Failing Fathers and Monstrous Sons in 
My Stepbrother Frankenstein.” In Cinepaternity: Fathers and Sons 
in Soviet and Post-Soviet Film, edited by Helena Goscilo and 
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Yana Hashamova, 114–36. Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 2010.
With Tatiana Mikhailova. “In Denial,” review of Alexander 
Veledinsky’s The Geographer Drank Away the Globe. 
Kinokultura 43 (2014):  
http://www.kinokultura.com/2014/43r-geograf-MLTM.
shtml.
“Lost in Translation.” Review of Mikhail Segal’s Short Stories.” 
Kinokultura 50 (2015):  
http://www.kinokultura.com/2015/50/fifty_rasskazy.shtml.
Many thanks to Mikhail Segal for the kindest permission to use 
takes from his film Rasskazy and for sharing with me high-quality 
photographs of the selected scenes. Last but not least, my warmest 
gratitude goes to Igor Nemirovsky, Kira Nemirovsky, and Faith 




t h e  Wa r  о f  D i s C o u r s e s :  
L o L i t a  a n D  t h e  fa i l u r e  
o f  a  t r a n s C e n D e n t a l  P r o j e C t
In Lolita (1955), perhaps for the first time in all his works, Nabokov 
transfers unto his hero all the traits of the author-narrator. Similar 
forms of discursive organization have appeared before in the 
novel Despair (1934) and the novella The Eye (1930). In these and 
all other previous works, however, we are presented with the 
narrating character’s inner monologue, whereas in Lolita the 
reader faces a text, written by Humbert before his death in prison. 
Thus, the protagonist is here situated in the space-time of writing 
(“creative chronotope,” to use Bakhtin’s term), which Nabokov, by 
all indications, believes to be the sole realm where freedom of the 
self may be realized. In this respect, Lolita lends its voice directly to 
the metafictional tradition: it is a narrative of the creative process, 
though one that extends beyond the flatness of the page and into 
life—a narrative in which the hero becomes the author. At the same 
time, and as related in his own words, this introspective narrative 
details Humbert’s attempt to realize his artistic vision in life itself, 
reminding us that the author-creator is not eclipsed by the hero-
narrator or even by the hero-author. In the greater scheme of the 
evolution of modernism, however, this sentiment appears waning 
in importance: H.H. is truly the creator sui generis, and in his life he 
leads to the absolute extreme all that was distinctive in Nabokov’s 
favorite characters.
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One of the defining traits of Humbert’s novel-spanning 
confession is its inner paralogy, structured on the polemical 
intertwining of two separate codes of aesthetic world-modeling. 
One of these codes extends from Nabokov’s perennial topic of 
banality and totalitarianism (poshlust), though here it adopts a new 
form through association with mass (that is, pop) culture. The other 
is entirely monopolized by Humbert himself and lies at the basis of 
his personality, his philosophical and aesthetic self-definition; this 
code is identifiable by the literary intertexts of Humbert’s confession.
A literary scholar, H.H. blueprints his artistic project through 
dialogue with numerous traditions of world literature, from Ovid 
and Catullus to Russian symbolists and Joyce.1 If one judges by 
the frequency of allusions, the paramount positions in Humbert’s 
model are held by Edgar Allan Poe (“Annabel Lee”) and Prosper 
Mérimée (Carmen), followed by Shakespeare and Dante, then Blok,2 
Dostoevsky, Flaubert, Verlaine, Rimbaud, Baudelaire, and Joyce. 
What do these writers have in common, aside from being part of 
the canon of “high literature”? Of most likely significance to Lolita, 
it is that they all are somehow linked to romanticism—whether as 
its forebears, its classics, or its modernist progeny. On the whole, 
we can state that the romantic tradition, as the predecessor and 
foundation of the modernist sensibility, formulates Humbert’s 
consciousness and project. Moreover, we can say that its influence 
is something of a double-edged sword.
First, romanticism endows Humbert (as well as Nabokov’s 
other “creative” characters) with a well-developed discourse 
of transcendence. The narrator’s transcendental fixation is 
initially visible in the intensive allusions to Edgar Allan Poe, and 
particularly to his poem “Annabel Lee,” wherein the full scope of 
Humbert’s love is established. His passion for Lolita becomes one 
link in an endless chain of surrogates and analogies: Lolita finally, 
after repeated failures, “replaces” Humbert’s lost childhood love 
“Annabel,” who in turn is reminiscent of Poe’s Annabel, who in 
1 For more detail, see Proffer (1968) and Appel (1991).
2 Blok’s intertexts in Lolita are analyzed by Senderovich and Shvarts (1999).
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turn reminds Poe of his youthful dead wife, Virginia. All these 
recursive substitutions serve as metaphors for transcendental 
escape beyond the boundaries of reality, beyond time and death. 
Poe’s love for Annabel transcends her passing; for Humbert, the 
mythical nymphets are so unlike merely pretty girls that they exist 
on an “intangible island of entranced time” (Nabokov 1977, 21).3 
It is not lust that moves the hero but in essence a desire to surpass 
the passage of time and to return to the heavenly garden of eternal 
childhood.4 “Ah, leave me alone in my pubescent park, in my mossy 
garden. Let them [the nymphets] play around me forever. Never 
grow up” (ibid.), he proclaims at the beginning of the novel, inciting 
a theme that blossoms steadily throughout the text.
Before their first “rendezvous,” Lolita appears in the famous 
“davenport scene” with Humbert, holding in her hands a “banal, 
Eden-red apple” (58), and while she sits in his lap, H.H. writes, 
“Lolita was safely solipsized. . . . What I had madly possessed was 
not she, but my own creation, another fanciful Lolita; overlapping, 
encasing her; floating between me and her, and having no will, no 
consciousness—indeed, no life of her own” (60, 62; emphasis mine). 
The imagery harks back to the motif of daydreaming, a device as 
characteristic to romanticism as it is to modernism, symbolizing 
escape into a transcendental dimension. (Nabokov himself used 
it before in The Luzhin Defense; King, Queen, Knave; The Gift; and 
Invitation to a Beheading.) Humbert achieves a transcendental reverie 
in the davenport scene—if not daydreaming, then a sort of in-
between dream and reality—which is accompanied by the erasure of 
Lolita, the deprivation of her own will, consciousness, and even life.
At many points in Lolita, particularly throughout the novel’s 
second part, such romantic dreaming seamlessly morphs into 
a waking nightmare. The termination of transcendental endeavors 
in reality produces for Humbert grim and surreal effects. It is telling 
3 All further quotations from the novel refer to this edition.
4 There is an obvious parallel between this project and Nabokov’s habitual 
idealization of his own childhood. Notably, Lolita was written immediately 
after Nabokov’s Russian autobiography, Speak, Memory, in which this 
idealization reaches its highest point.
L i t e r a t u r e16
that the indications marking this transition from transcendental 
exercise to psychological plague arise immediately after Humbert 
attains his desired goal: the sexual possession of Lolita, without 
resorting to violence or subterfuge but rather at the girl’s own 
initiative. Humbert’s state of mind is far from satiation, despite his 
success: “Why then this horror that I cannot shake off?” (135), “an 
ashen sense of awfulness” (137), “a paradise whose skies were the 
color of hell-flames” (166). This arc culminates in Quilty’s murder, 
which Humbert carefully adorns in the trappings of the romantic 
tradition: the hero, all in black, comes to kill his twin and reads 
the verdict in white verse—the scene is practically a quotation 
from Poe’s “William Wilson” or Lermontov’s The Masquerade. Yet 
Humbert’s authorial fancy is insufficient: throughout the murder 
scene, the tone of a nightmare (“a daymare”) overshadows any 
feeling of romantic grandeur.
The second feature of romanticism to be actualized in Humbert’s 
narrative is one linked with the romantic discourse of chaos—with 
the romantic abyss. This aspect emerges in the forbidden and 
transgressive nature of Humbert’s desire. An intertextual parallel is 
formed by the appearance of Mérimée’s “Carmen” as a trivialized 
but still distinctively romantic theme of criminal desire—or, rather, 
desire that provokes crime. (Another important parallel in this 
context is Flaubert’s Madame Bovary, though the role of that intertext 
is much more complex.) Humbert’s confession continues to incite 
argument over the morality or immorality of the novel to this day, 
resurrecting the romantic-chaotic thread of moral ambivalence. 
From the perspective of morality and law, the protagonist’s 
infatuation with an underage girl is repulsive and criminal, but 
Nabokov, having given Humbert the power of his own oratory 
and having fixed his composition in the context of the romantic 
tradition, not only makes this passion aesthetically appealing but 
compels the reader to sympathize with the criminal hero, and ever 
to wish him luck in his efforts to seduce a twelve-year-old child. 
(This dynamic persists at least until the first chapters of the book’s 
second half.)
More broadly, though still molding to the notion of the 
romantic abyss, Lolita presents us with a story of destructive and 
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self-destructive love, in which love inevitably predicates death. 
Given that we are told in the very first pages that he has already 
died in prison, Humbert’s fate comes as no surprise. The device 
of the confession at death’s door, although it is not known what 
crime brought him there, is deeply rooted in romanticism. With 
this criminal motif intertwines that of madness—not only in terms 
of Humbert’s frequent visits to the mental hospital before his 
introduction to Lolita but also in his characterization as a romantic 
lunatic, or a “demented diarist,” in the words of John Ray. Madness 
is perhaps the most typical manifestation of the abyss in romantic 
and modernist culture; tellingly, the motif persists throughout the 
text of Lolita.
In the davenport scene, Humbert sees himself “suspended on 
the brink of that voluptuous abyss” (60), associating this abyss with 
escape into the transcendental dimension. A comparable sensation, 
that of “the teasing delirious feeling of teetering on the very 
brink of unearthly order and splendor” (230), accompanies Lolita 
playing tennis, a scene that Nabokov categorized with several other 
episodes as the book’s nervous system (“the nerves of the novel,” 
316). In direct relation to this description of the “brink,” the novel 
invokes an ironic paraphrase of two classical quotations (Poe plus 
Dostoevsky): “Winged gentlemen! No hereafter is acceptable if 
it does not produce her as she was then, in that Colorado resort, 
between Snow and Elphinstone” (230). The abyss and its promised 
transcendence, then, are linked in this case with admiration of 
Lolita’s beauty. However, the abyss opens again before Humbert 
when Lolita flees from him with Quilty: amid the ringing of church 
bells in Elphinstone, he comprehends how he has wronged her and 
finds himself on the edge of the “friendly abyss” (307; another of the 
book’s “nerves”). His chase after Lolita formerly transported him 
to the verge of this abyss, causing at once unearthly pleasure; now, 
the bliss has vanished, and all that remains is to fall madly into the 
yawning chasm.
One can find virtually innumerable manifestations of the 
romantic abyss in Humbert’s autobiography. His curse (an appetite 
for nymphets), his self-destruction, and the ruin Humbert brings to 
his beloved—Annabel, Charlotte, Lolita (only Valechka manages to 
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evade him; is that why he has such vehemence for her?)—all of these 
signify the void opening before H.H. and finally consuming him. 
Given the context of romantic discourse through which Humbert’s 
literary sensibilities lead him to intersect his own story, this abyss is 
in essence the binary opposite of transcendence, and the toll for it.
If the presence of romantic motifs is so prominent here, why is 
it that in the famous afterword “Оn a Book Entitled Lolita” (1958) 
Nabokov responds with no little umbrage to a comment from critic 
John Hollander declaring Lolita a “record of a love affair with the 
romantic novel”? Perhaps Nabokov’s reply is meant to remind us 
that the romantic code is but one aspect of the discursive spectrum 
of Lolita, and to reduce the whole novel to these terms alone is, in 
principle, a faulty approach.
In accordance with the logic of Nabokov’s style, Humbert’s 
“literary” code is not contrary to that of “life” but rather to the 
“cultural” code—to an entire bouquet of like codes. These codes 
are crude and pseudoromantic and belong to a sphere of popular 
or mass culture—or, in Nabokov’s terms, the sphere (or rather the 
discourse) of poshlust. Humbert presents in the most excruciating 
detail a whole host of pop-culture gibberish, from the Youth and 
Young Homemaker magazines to the fictional Campfire Girl (whose 
author bears the familiar name “Shirley Holmes”). He invents a pop 
song about “little Carmen,” recreates scenes from a Western, and 
burrows into the tourist subculture, complete with its fake fetishes 
and seductive brochures. In describing family life with Charlotte, he 
does not fail to admit that “the two sets were congeneric since both 
were affected by the same stuff (soap operas, psychoanalysis and 
cheap novelettes) upon which I drew for my characters and she for 
the mode of expression” (80). Pop literature’s sentimental clichés 
clearly resound in Charlotte’s letter to Humbert, and even when 
H.H. himself, especially in the first half of his narrative, proclaims 
on occasion, “All New England for a lady-writer’s pen” (49). In the 
course of banal codes, an honored place is afforded to Freudianism 
(which Nabokov mocked with succinctness and consistency). 
Humbert’s resentment of Freudianism is quite understandable, as 
psychoanalysis mocks and overturns the romantic worldview: if 
Humbert negates the “lower” with high poetry, then psychoanalysis 
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contrarily divines a sexual complex behind all poetry, thus denying 
any transcendental values.
Lolita, too, is a product of this culture. The many pedagogical 
institutions to which she is subjected all manufacture the banal, from 
Charlotte’s by-the-book child-rearing efforts, to “Camp Q” with its 
cabins named after Disney creatures and sex games under the guise 
of water sports, to the “good old Beardsley School,” whose director 
presents an entire curriculum of mass-cultural education, following 
the thesis that “we live not only in a world of thoughts, but also in 
a world of things. Words without experience are meaningless. What 
on earth can Dorothy Hummerson care for Greece and the Orient 
with their harems and slaves?” (178). Later, Humbert explicitly 
defines his beloved as аn exemplary demographic and consumer 
of pop culture: “She it was to whom ads were dedicated: the ideal 
consumer, the subject and object of every foul poster” (148).
A particularly important position in the book’s pop culture 
discourse is held by all things associated with Hollywood, as 
Alfred Appel discusses in Nabokov’s Dark Cinema (1974). Films, real 
and imagined, watched by the heroes of the novel (not excluding 
Humbert) occupy many of the novel’s pages. Charlotte, like 
her daughter, carefully imitates film stars, even on the surface 
resembling a “weak solution of Marlene Dietrich” (37), and she 
fashions her relationship and even dialogue with Humbert after the 
patterns of movie love. Humbert dispenses astronomical degrees of 
sarcasm in his exposure of the inconsistencies, or even the blatant 
idiocy, of Hollywood characters and plots, in which “real singers 
and dancers had unreal stage careers in an essentially grief-proof 
sphere of existence wherefrom death and truth were banned” (170). 
It is little wonder that Clare Quilty, the popular playwright, “the 
American Maeterlinck,” who has authored fifty-two Hollywood 
scripts, whose cigarette-commercial portrait seems to hang on every 
surface (including the wall in Lolita’s bedroom), who stands at the 
epicenter of the world of banality, is the one to steal Lolita from 
Humbert.
The unlikelihood of the events on the silver screen (as well as 
those described in tourist booklets, magazines for girls and women, 
etc.) is clearly juxtaposed to analogous situations within the lives 
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of the novel’s characters (the collision of the rebellious daughter 
seeking her freedom in show business and the doting father, crime 
and punishment, a battle with an adversary away from civilization). 
In most cases, the lives of the heroes carefully emulate expectations 
cultivated by Hollywood. However, nothing turns out quite as 
sleek and pretty for them as it does in the movies, and the novel’s 
characters suffer far more than their models do. To some degree, 
the interplay between the ideals promoted by mass culture and 
the events of the novel reveal the paradox later explored by Jean 
Baudrillard in his Disneyland example: “Disneyland is presented 
as imaginary in order to make us believe that the rest is real. [. . .] It 
is no longer a question of false representation of reality (ideology) 
but of concealing the fact that the real is no longer real, and thus of 
saving the reality principle” (Baudrillard 1994, 13–14).
The delusive indistinguishability of life and film is exemplified 
not only by Charlotte and Lolita but also by many passing 
characters and even by Humbert himself. (Quilty is excepted, as he 
understands the price of these illusions.) The Hollywood “dream 
factory” is the first significant enterprise of the “hyperreality of 
the simulacrum,” which is why the earliest of its “products” is not 
the imaginary but rather the real. Of course, even the romantic 
discourse to which Humbert belongs and from which he derives his 
facetious attitude toward Hollywood, is also a “dream factory” in 
a sense. It is apparently not the dreams themselves that aggravate 
Humbert, but their careful insulation of the consumer from grief and 
pain, abysses and tragedies. In absence of this threshold, the two-
dimensional flatness of inevitable happiness precludes the need for 
transcendence. For instance, in “Annabel Lee,” an obvious precursor 
to Humbert’s transcendentalism, love acquires its full transcendental 
meaning only after the beloved’s death. Likewise, only the death of 
his “Annabel” permits Humbert to glimpse the abyssal dimension 
of his passion. Later, the death of Lolita, obfuscated in John Ray’s 
prologue, imparts the highest romantic intensity in Humbert’s self-
judgment and final profession of love for Lolita. All such feeling is 
impossible in the void of the flat simulacra of life and love shaped 
by Hollywood. In this sense, Humbert shares Nabokov’s point of 
view: he, like his creator, rejects poshlust, here represented by the 
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discourse of pop culture as traitorous in its appeal, a beguiling, 
disorienting simulacrum of transcendence.
In this lies the greatest problem of Lolita: by handing the reins 
of authorship to Humbert, Nabokov does not allow us to accept one 
aspect of Humbert and reject another. We cannot agree with him 
on, for example, his disdain for mass culture and his faith in the 
transcendental qualities of love, and simultaneously reject, say, the 
practical realization of his philosophical-aesthetic program.
Despite the contrasting nature of the romantic-modernist 
discourse and the discourse of pop culture, the intertwining of 
Lolita’s motives and images demolishes the implied dichotomy of 
poetry and poshlust. To be more precise, while Humbert strives to 
enforce just such a dichotomy, the subtleties of the text repeatedly 
demonstrate the futility of such an undertaking. The artistic optic 
of Lolita is multidimensional, and nearly every image and every 
plot device illuminates the symbol system of high culture and the 
context of mass culture as its doppelgänger.
These codes interweave most noticeably in relation to Lolita 
herself. It is essentially this duality, according to Humbert, that 
yields the greatest mystery of the nymphets: “What drives me insane 
is the twofold nature of this nymphet—of every nymphet, perhaps; 
this mixture in my Lolita of tender dreamy childishness and a kind 
of eerie vulgarity, stemming from the snub-nosed cuteness of ads 
and magazine pictures [. . .] and then again all this mixed up with 
the exquisite stainless tenderness seeping through the musk and the 
mud, through the dirt and the death” (44). As we can see, vulgarity 
and poshlust, directly traced to their source, pop culture (“the snub-
nosed cuteness of ads and magazine pictures”), intersect here with 
transcendental motifs of unearthly innocence, eternal childhood 
(“tender dreamy childishness,” “exquisite stainless tenderness”), 
and the abyss (“the musk and the mud, through the dirt and the 
death”).
This is exactly why Lolita becomes the subject of dispute in an 
invisible battle between two antipodes: Humbert and Quilty, the 
poet and poshlust incarnate. H.H. and Lolita’s first kiss, imagined 
as an elevated moment in Humbert’s code, turns out to be a “bit of 
backfisch foolery in imitation of some simulacrum of fake romance” 
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(113). Even the longed-for copulation transpires on Lolita’s—that 
is, teenagers’, which means pop-cultural—not Humbert’s, terms. 
When Lolita, “at a kind of slow-motion walk” (120) or as if in 
a dream (passage into the transcendental dimension), attends to 
the gifts brought to her by Humbert, the romantic discourse subtly 
morphs into stereotypical falsity: “She crept into my waiting arms, 
radiant, relaxed, caressing me with her tender, mysterious, impure, 
indifferent, twilight eyes—for all the world, like the cheapest of cheap 
cuties. For that is what nymphets imitate—while we moan and die” 
(120; emphasis mine). А romantic dream becomes a selection of 
pop culture stereotypes, a Hollywood simulacrum. This is precisely 
why Humbert is unable to take advantage of Lolita’s dream: his 
traditional romantic chronotope does not possess, as is discovered 
in the course of the plot, the expected autonomy over banal, pop-
culture-saturated reality.
For the very same reason, Humbert fails miserably in the 
various operations of his transcendental project, be they to resurrect 
Annabel in Lolita by copulating on the shore of the sea, or peacefully 
to observe nymphets playing in the school yard opposite the house 
at Beardsley (“On the very first day of school, workmen arrived and 
put up a fence some way down the gap. . . . As soon as they had 
erected a sufficient amount of material to spoil everything, those 
absurd builders suspended their work and never appeared again”; 
179). It is then no surprise that the poetically charged roster of 
Lolita’s class transforms in her own retelling into a rogue’s gallery 
of “low” pleasures; thus the “Shakespearean” Miranda twins “had 
shared the same bed for years,” and Kenneth Knight (chivalry 
indeed!) “used to exhibit himself wherever and whenever he had 
a chance” (137).
In a similar fashion, the Enchanted Hunters Hotel—its name 
romantic as well as evocative of Humbert’s pursuit of the nymphet—
appears initially in Charlotte’s memory as a symbol of bourgeois 
comfort, then becomes actualized as a destination, where H.H. 
spends his first night with Lolita. It is significant that in this hotel 
Humbert unknowingly crosses paths for the first time with Quilty, 
who has come there to compose his play “The Enchanted Hunters.” 
Lolita will later be cast in a school production of this very drama 
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as a “little nymph” (the nymphet), will grow intimate with Quilty, 
and finally will elope with him, abandoning Humbert. Even more 
poignantly, the story of the play, per Humbert’s retelling, reads 
much like an unconscious parody of his own confession.
Humbert himself falls under the spell of what may be called 
the “enchanted hunters” effect—a turn that reveals just how rare 
it is that an element of Lolita’s poetics belongs solely to either the 
romantic-transcendental discourse or the mass-culture discourse, 
a combination or shuffling of both being most commonly the case.5 
Humbert’s appearance is, at first glance, cloaked in a romantic 
aura, though many of these same descriptions inspire quite banal 
associations: for instance, “dark-and-handsome” (188) or “first 
time I’ve seen a man wearing a smoking jacket, sir—except in 
movies, of course” (189). Humbert’s behavior, too, can be matched 
to the conventions of the criminal love story, evincing such tropes 
as the corrupter and the seduced, the fortunate competitor, the 
elopement, vengeance brought on the thief, and so on. On the 
other hand, Humbert unwittingly prophesizes the outcome of his 
story by ironically improvising to the tune of a pop song: “Drew 
his .32 automatic, I guess, and put a bullet through his moll’s eye” 
(62). H.H. will put a bullet in a rival rather than some “moll”—but 
it’s the gesture that counts. Humbert’s brawl with Quilty nearly 
qualifies as a spoof of a Hollywood shootout: the hero’s recitation of 
the verdict of death, in verse, to his nemesis—is this not drawn from 
melodrama? Humbert’s capability “of shedding torrents of tears 
5 The applicability of Freudian interpretation to Humbert’s psychological 
development is another example of such double encoding. Jenefer Shute 
argues, “Almost every possible interpretation of Humbert’s predicament 
has been anticipated, planted in the text, and wired to explode at the first 
Viennese advance. Thus the first problem to confront a psychoanalytical 
reading is not the absence of recognizable analytical configuration but the 
fact that such configurations are in no sense ‘latent’: they constitute a system 
of signifiers in their own right rather than any ultimate signified of the text” 
(1995, 417). Later she adds, “Psychoanalytic economies of desire are invoked 
only to be denied, named only to be negated, but on the other hand they 
remain essential to the disposition of the text. The psychoanalytic structure 
is inscribed and then effaced by parody, yet it remains intact, in place, and 
wholly legible” (419).
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throughout the other [sexual] tempest” (207) could potentially be 
read as an extension of the romantic code of the nineteenth century, 
but in the twentieth such imagery has been universally annexed by 
sentimental pop culture.
Considering his abyssal lust and romantic transgressivity, it is 
no surprise that H.H. fits with such precision the characteristics of 
the demonic hero and the specifics of demonic eroticism. Alongside 
these features in Humbert’s depiction, there are hints of a prominent 
archetype of romantic mythology: the vampire Dracula—who, 
coincidently, had already been thoroughly exploited in popular 
culture by the 1950s. It is not only the more blatant references to 
this archetype that are worth noting; for instance, just after their 
first night at the Enchanted Hunters Hotel, H.H. writes of Lolita, 
“Nothing could have been more childish than her snubbed nose, 
freckled face or the purplish spot on her naked neck where a fairytale 
vampire had feasted” (139; emphasis mine). Like Dracula, Humbert 
commands a colossal erotic force. Like the vampire’s victim, Lolita 
“freezes” in the same state as she was first “bitten” by Humbert. She 
does not turn into an adult woman and, in essence, dies a nymphet-
adolescent.
If one is inclined to accept the principle of the Beardsley 
School, then the discourse of pop culture operates through things, 
whereas romantic transcendentalism is limited to a circle of ideas. 
The discourse of the commercial corresponds best to things, while 
transcendental ideas manifest most potently through the medium 
of art. As Dana Brand (1987) notes, the transformation of art into 
the commercial, or rather that of the transcendental discourse into 
the discourse of pop culture, is finely interwoven into the changes 
in Humbert and Lolita’s relationship after H.H. “possesses” her, in 
every sense of the word—including that connoting a commodity. 
This diagnosis seems fair, and would explain the ever more 
determined melding of pop and romantic discourses that occupies 
the second half of the novel.
The intensifying collision between the romantic and poshlust 
codes appears also in how Humbert, in his capacity as Lolita’s 
“owner,” comes to resemble Charlotte more and more: “Charlotte, 
I began to understand you” (149). Even his complaints reverber-
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ate a note of hypocrisy characteristic to “a woman with principles”: 
“I am now faced with the distasteful task of recording a definite 
drop in Lolita’s morals” (183); “Lolita, when she chose could be 
a most exasperating brat” (148); “I have just retracted some silly 
promise . . .” (169). Charlotte educates her daughter by the instruc-
tion of A Guide to Your Child’s Development, while Humbert’s manual 
bears the “unintentionally biblical title Know Your Own Daughter” 
(174). Although he fails to notice, Humbert sends Lolita to the very 
Beardsley School of which Charlotte dreamed. Even Lolita’s and 
Humbert’s new home “bore a dejected resemblance to the Haze 
home” (176).
Humbert’s fatal attraction to nymphets, although transgressive, 
is certainly not alien to American cinema of the 1940s and ’50s, 
with its oddly sexualized child stars—Shirley Temple foremost 
among them. As Appel, who first drew attention to this parallel, 
notes, “The willful asexuality of screen adolescents is an interesting 
contrast to sexual charades indulged by the same stars when 
they resemble children . . . Except for the crude low-budget films, 
the charades of the child stars seem to complement, rather than 
burlesque adult behavior, as though the performers were adults 
alchemically reduced in size. . .” (1974, 94–95). Appel also cites the 
characteristic judgment of Graham Greene, who, as is well known, 
first championed Lolita: “Shirley Temple acts and dances with 
immense vigor and assurance . . . but some of her popularity seems 
to rest on a coquetry quite as mature as Miss Colbert’s and on an 
oddly precocious body as voluptuous in gray flannel trousers as 
Miss Dietrich’s” (100).
A similar duality marks other fairy-tale images, which play 
a vital role in conjuring a poetic aura around Humbert’s nympho-
lepsy. It was in the 1950s that Walt Disney’s cartoons achieved the 
status of the hyperreality of simulacra, pushing aside or dominat-
ing other fairy tales. The original Disneyland was constructed in 
1954, two years after the novel’s heroes die; otherwise, Lolita would 
have certainly insisted that they visit this fairy-tale province.
Finally, even the differences between Humbert and Quilty do 
not annul their deep inner likeness. It is no coincidence that the first 
mention of Quilty comprises a coded paraphrase of Humbert’s fate, 
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as read in the names of Quilty’s plays: “author of The Little Nymph, 
The Lady Who Liked Lighting . . . Dark Age, The Strange Mushroom, 
Fatherly Love and others” (31). Nabokov’s Russian translation of 
the text stresses the resemblance of the two men in their initials, 
G.G. and K.K. (in their English variants, these equate to H.H. and 
C.Q.). On the wall in Lolita’s bedroom, Quilty’s posing in a cigarette 
advertisement corresponds to another commercial idol, that which 
“Lo had drawn in a jocose arrow to the haggard lover’s face and had 
put in block letter: H.H. And indeed, despite a difference of a few 
years, the resemblance was striking” (69). Following Quilty’s tracks 
and parsing his “clues,” Humbert admits that “his genre, his type 
of humor—at its best at least—the tone of his brain, had affinities 
with my own. [. . .] His allusions were definitely highbrow. He was 
well-read. He knew French. [. . .] He was an amateur of sex lore” 
(249–50). Quilty speaks candidly of his kinship to Humbert: “We are 
men of the world, in everything—sex, free verse, marksmanship” 
(301). Quilty, like Humbert, is no stranger to transcendental aims. At 
the very least, he professionally imitates them; it is not in vain that 
he claims the epithet “the American Maeterlinck,” squaring him 
with perhaps the most mystical playwright in European theater.
There are many possible interpretations of the similarities 
between Humbert and Quilty. Most often, Quilty is read as the 
doppelgänger or Jungian “shadow” of Humbert, manifesting his 
low, animal side. (There is a strange irony in how Humbert, the 
romantic, is the one who repeatedly rapes Lolita, while Quilty the 
lecher proves to be impotent, and instead exploits her for “visual” 
pleasure, planning to use her in pornographic home videos.) 
However, we cannot deny that, in killing Quilty, Humbert not 
only reaps vengeance on a competitor and not only extinguishes 
his “shadow,” but passes judgment on himself. Through the act 
of murder, he performs a sort of suicide, bringing retribution on 
himself for what he has done to Lolita. It is telling how he surrenders 
to the police yet is unaware of the crime—knowingly breaking the 
laws of traffic, Humbert leaves the murder scene by driving on the 
wrong side of the road.
Quite logically, the intermingling of romantic and pop-culture 
imagery most frequently and most effectively corresponds to 
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the atmosphere of surreal horror that accompanies the realized 
transcendental project. A strong example is the mystical and, in 
essence, transcendental vision of an enormous film screen that 
Humbert passes on the eve of the premeditated murder: “While 
searching for night lodging, I passed a drive-in. In a selenian glow, 
truly mystical in its contrast with the moonless and massive night, on 
a gigantic screen slanting away among dark drowsy fields, a thin 
phantom raised a gun, both he and his arm reduced to tremulous 
dishwater by the oblique angle of that receding world—and the next 
moment a row of trees shut off the gesticulation” (293; emphasis 
mine).
The mutual transformations of the discourse of transcendental-
ism and the simulacra of mass culture in Humbert’s narrative form 
a principally new artistic philosophy in Lolita, distinct from both the 
earlier and later works of Nabokov. In essence, the high romantic/ 
modernist code proves undivided from the cheap codes of pop- 
culture, or the “cultural industry” (in Adorno and Horkheimer’s 
understanding of this term). Nabokov thus comes in Lolita to a post-
modernist perception of culture, showcased by a disruption of the 
autonomy of the high (elitist) and low (popular) cultures. The novel 
does not, however, posit a favorable synthesis of the two; rather, 
it depicts the tragic indistinguishability of transcendence and 
simulation.
Both of these forces work alike to devalue and destroy Lolita 
herself. Humbert, discerning and guilty, writes of her victimization, 
“She groped for words. I supplied them mentally (‘He [Quilty] broke 
my heart. You merely broke my life’)” (279). Humbert’s project of 
romantic transcendence replaces her single, brief life with an idea 
of eternity, reducing Lolita to a stand-in for Annabel, delineating 
the utopia of childhood as an individual paradise and offering an 
attempt to return to this utopian “island”—this is how H.H. breaks 
her life. Meanwhile, the flowing tide of mass culture substitutes all 
that is truly individual and alive in her with a celluloid simulacrum; 
this is why Quilty, whom Lolita loves, breaks only her heart. In both 
cases the principal victim is Lolita, crushed and burned away.
Interestingly, both projects fail in spite of their sacrificial toll 
on Lolita. Humbert, as we have seen, flunks his pursuit of the 
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“transcendental Other.” Lolita does not permit him into her secret 
world, guarded by a barricade of stereotypes, and Humbert realizes 
too late “that quite possibly, behind the awful juvenile clichés, 
there was in her a garden and twilight, and a palace gate—dim 
and adorable regions which happened to be lucidly and absolutely 
forbidden to me” (284). In the debris of his collapsed mission and 
its unrealized poetic significance—the return to childhood, to the 
“intangible island of entranced time”—only Quilty’s project of 
the enslavement and possession of Lolita’s body, by comparison 
uncomplicated and straightforward, remains. Yet he likewise 
cannot submit her to his will (though she loves only him), as she 
refuses to participate in his “films”; she evidently does possess 
some individuality, which reaches beyond the steadfast stereotypes 
of pop culture.
Nonetheless, she is ultimately effaced in the scramble for her 
soul waged by coveted transcendence and assimilating mass culture. 
Humbert’s worship of the poetry of childhood effectively dissolves 
Lolita’s childhood, ravaging her life without mercy. After all, the 
real Lolita concerns him little. It is only once he has lost Lolita that 
Humbert recalls the words she spoke that revealed her pain and 
commences his autotribunal. Ellen Pifer is right when she asserts, 
“It is Humbert’s riotous imagination that, paradoxically, leads to 
his betrayal of the highest values of imagination: the spontaneity, 
vitality, and originality emblemized by the child. In striving to 
obtain his ideal world or paradise, he selfishly deprives Lolita of 
her rightful childhood—and betrays the principles of romantic 
faith and freedom” (1995, 317). In other words, attainment of the 
individual freedom enjoyed by the modernist or romantic creator is 
accomplished at the cost of the total eradication of even the potential 
freedom of the Other—in this instance, of Lolita.
It is no coincidence that Humbert and Lolita’s story is framed 
by the image of a burned house. H.H. first arrives at the Haze abode 
because the home of Mr. McCoo, where he had previously arranged 
to live, “had just burned down” (35). At the very end of the novel, 
this imagery reemerges in the tale Lolita tells about her escape from 
Quilty’s ranch: “It had burned to the ground, nothing remained, just 
a charred heap of rubbish. It was so strange, so strange” (277). In the 
t h e  W a r  o f  D i s c o u r s e s :  L o l i t a  a n d  t h e  F a i l u r e  o f  a  t r a n s c e n d e n t a l  P r o j e c t 29
Russian variant, to emphasize the repetition of this motif, Humbert 
adds, “Well, McCoo had a similar name and his house also burned 
down” (Nabokov 2001, 315).6
Other motifs advancing death as a hopeless and inevitable 
outcome (and not the transcendental signified) populate the entire 
novel. Humbert arrives to Charlotte’s house in “a limousine, in 
a marvelously old-fashioned, square-topped affair” (35–36), and the 
first thing he observes on entering Quilty’s home in the finale is 
“a black convertible for the nonce” (294)—in Russian translation, 
“a black car resembling an undertaker’s limousine” (2001, 37).7 
Gazing at his beloved after their first night together, he feels “as 
if I were sitting with the small ghost of somebody I just killed” 
(140). At the home where the lovers reside in Beardsley, Humbert 
remarks, “One of the latticed squares in a small cobwebby casement 
window at the turn of the staircase was glazed with ruby, and that 
raw wound among the unstained rectangles [. . .] always strangely 
disturbed me” (192). Lolita comments, on receiving Humbert’s 
bouquet in the hospital at Elphinstone, “What gruesome funeral 
flowers” (243). Later, hunting for traces of Lolita, Humbert leafs 
through jumbled newspapers in the library, “turning the enormous 
and fragile pages of a coffin-black volume almost as big as Lolita” 
(262). And finally, we note how Lolita presses herself to the door to 
let Humbert into her modest domicile at their last encounter, a tragic 
expression lurking within a seemingly mundane gesture: “Against 
the splintery deadwood of the door, Dolly Schiller flattened herself 
as best she could (even rising on tiptoe a little) to let me pass, and 
was crucified for a moment, looking down, smiling down at the 
threshold, hollow-cheeked with round pommettes, her water-milk-
white arm outspread on the wood” (270).
Through these subtle yet insistent signals, entropy and death 
acquire an allegorical signification in Lolita. Thanks to the (fictional) 
foreword by Dr. John Ray, we know from the very start that all 
6 «. . . сгорело дотла, ничего не оставалось, только черная куча мусора. Это 
ей показалось так странно, так странно. . .»
7 «в погребальном лимузине».
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the major characters of the novel—Humbert, Lolita, Charlotte, 
and Quilty—have died. As strange as it may sound, even the hero-
author himself is conscious of this fact: the novel ends by noting 
his stipulation that “A Confession of a White Widowed Man” is to 
be published not only after his own death but after Lolita’s as well. 
Placing this restriction, he is unaware that Lolita will follow him in 
death by a mere few months. Thus, the text of Lolita illustrates with 
remarkable accuracy Derrida’s vision of the ruin, which “appears 
not after the work, but remains [. . .] as its origin. In the beginning 
there was a ruin [. . .] with no hope for the reconstruction” (Derrida 
1990, 68–69). For Derrida, the ruin is the very experience of an 
individual, his or her ontological self-portrait. Conversely, Walter 
Benjamin considers ruin the most expressive allegory for history: 
“History finds its embodiment in this form [of a ruin] not as the 
form of the process of an eternal life so much as that of irresistible 
decay. [. . .] In the process of decay, and in it alone, the events of 
history shrivel up and become absorbed in setting” (Benjamin 1978, 
179).
Nabokov himself seems to construct the ruin from within 
his hero-author’s text. By colliding the discourses of romantic 
transcendence and pop culture, he leads them to annihilate one 
other, leaving behind “ruins,” fragments of this or that discourse 
behind which there is only an abyss. Nominating nine episodes as 
“the nerves of the novel,” Nabokov selects either those in which 
the code of romantic culture imperceptibly transmorphs into its 
poshlust double (“that class list of Ramsdale school,” “Lolita in 
slow motion advancing towards Humbert’s gifts,” “Lolita playing 
tennis,” “Charlotte saying ‘waterproof,’” “the pictures decorating 
the stylized garret of Gaston Godin,” “the hospital at Elphinstone,” 
316) or those in which, behind the net of cultural codes, suddenly 
appears naked death—not as a transcendental dimension but as 
nothing: “The Kasbeam barber (who cost me a month of work)” 
(ibid.) and “pale, pregnant, beloved, irretrievable Dolly Schiller 
dying in Gray Star (the capital town of the book), or the tinkling 
sounds of the valley town coming up the mountain trail . . .” (ibid.).
It is most telling that Lolita’s status, subjected to the cultural 
aggression of Humbert, does not fit the boundaries of cultural 
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codes. This is demonstrated, for instance, in her expression “of 
helplessness so perfect that it seemed to grade into one of rather 
comfortable inanity just because this was the very limit of injustice 
and frustration” (283) and in “her sobs in the night—every, every 
night” (176), as soon as Humbert feigns sleep. In these expressions, 
unsullied by words, “reality” (“one of the few words which mean 
nothing without quotes,” as Nabokov remarks in the afterword; 
312) does not erupt from behind the screen of devalued discourses, 
nor is a shining “otherness” revealed. “The nerves of the novel” 
signify nothingness as the last horizon of being.
From this point of view, we can clearly see that culture, cultural 
models, and stereotypes, deconstructed in Lolita, are in principle 
necessary to guard against such a hopeless essence of existence. 
The exception of Humbert, trying to manufacture life as a work of 
literature, is different only in that he follows the models provided 
by Edgar Allan Poe and Mérimée, and not those by Marlene Dietrich 
and Humphrey Bogart. He denounces Quilty as the epitome of 
poshlust; but how guilty is Quilty? He is simply one architect, or one 
mold, of those flat cultural models (simulacra of transcendence) by 
which millions live. It seems there is no exit: life in the existential 
wilderness is unbearably horrifying, while life in the shell of cultural 
stereotype, high or low, is self-destructive and innately catastrophic.
Life, and especially Lolita’s childhood, is desiccated and 
withheld by two competing discourses: the romantic and the pop 
cultural. Humbert and Quilty find common ground in how they 
confiscate the individuality and freedom of Lolita, leaving naught 
but an empty husk, which each of the heroes (and the discourses 
they represent) struggles to fill with his own meaning. This battle 
ends with the death of Lolita “in childbed giving birth to a stillborn 
girl, on Christmas Day 1952” (4). The irrecoverability of childhood, 
even anew in the life of Lolita’s daughter, is poignantly underscored 
by the date of this twofold tragedy: an aborted Christmas places 
the final punctuation on Humbert’s and Quilty’s “projects.” (The 
conclusion is foretold, though goes unnoticed, on the second page 
of the novel.) This grim affirmation opens onto the historical (per 
Benjamin) aspect of Lolita, positioning the entire composition as 
a requiem for modernity, with all its logos manifested in the various 
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discourses that aim to order life into a correspondence with the 
ideal. As Lolita teaches, these endeavors yield only the extinction 
of innocent life—of Lolita’s precious, vanquished childhood. 
The whole history of modernity, in the end, becomes a history of 
cataclysm, self-destruction that propagates from toe tip to scalp, and 
concludes only in the undoing of its own origin—the liquidation of 
the Nativity and of the Birth.8 Probably, this is the point where the 
history of postmodernism begins.
8 This idea was introduced by the late Marina Kanevskaya, who planned to 
develop it in her book The Madonna of Gray Star: Fallacies of Modernity in 
“Lolita.” Marina’s tragic death interrupted her work on this project.
33
t h e  P o e t i C s  o f  t h e  i t r  D i s C o u r s e :  
i n  t h e  19 6 0 s  a n D  t o D a y *
Back in 2010, I wrote a column for the popular Russian web 
portal OpenSpace titled after a line from Mandelstam: “О, that 
abyss of technical intelligentsia.”1 I summed up in that piece my 
various grievances about the modern cultural mainstream as well 
as outlined its limitations, which derive from the discourse of the 
nauchno-tekhnicheskaia intelligentsia (scientific and technological 
intelligentsia). Originally formulated in the 1960s, this discourse 
has undergone some dramatic transformations in the subsequent 
decades. The column caused a certain stir on its publication, and 
it seemed that I had touched a nerve, so to speak, in the 2010 
state of things. This impression was followed within a year by 
the “snow revolution”: former technical intelligentsia, along with 
newly emerged white-collar workers (known in Russia as the 
“office plankton,” whom I view as the direct heirs of the technical 
intelligentsia’s culture) and those composing a complex community 
of the humanities, stood up in union with the Left, and even with 
the nationalists, to form a new social and political entity. It is no 
wonder that the term “creative class,” borrowed from Richard 
* Translated from Russian by Vladimir Makarov. “ITR”—inzhenerno-tekhni-
cheskii rabotnik, engineer/technical employee.
1 “О, эта бездна ИТР . . .” from Mandelstam’s draft of the poem “O, эта Лена, 
эта нора . . .” in the Voronezh notebooks.
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Florida’s book of the same title, so rapidly gained use. (I will reserve 
my appraisal of whether the phrase was relevant until later.) Like 
everyone else, I was fascinated by the social scope and the cultural 
energy of this movement: at first glance, it had disproved my 
pessimism regarding the prevailing cultural conditions.
I was not the only commenter to draw a quick parallel to the 
days of perestroika (see, for example, Belkovskii 2012a and 2012b). 
Excepting the availability of the Internet, the two movements had 
much in common: a clear consensus that the odious presiding 
regime is the common enemy, a very vague apprehension of what 
is to come in the wake of that regime, a stagnant hope that new 
and honest conditions will simply figure themselves into place 
following the regime’s collapse, a winged euphoria and a sense of 
involvement and concurrence with fellow thinkers who proved to 
be so very numerous . . . This probably all-too-subjective pattern 
of thought was immensely gratifying at first, but later gave way 
to a certain unease: Could it be true that the whole experience of 
Russia’s post-perestroika cultural history has been in vain? Is the 
intelligentsia actually returning to its state of the late—or even 
early—1980s, having learned nothing in more than twenty years, 
save access to the Internet? This discomfort—which, again, could 
be quite subjective—imparted a new meaning to my experience of 
grappling with the discourse of the technical intelligentsia of the 
1960s, which I see as the foundation and core of the specifically late-
Soviet and post-Soviet strands of liberalism.
“ITR” (inzhenerno-tekhnicheskii rabotnik, engineer/technical 
employee) was surely a misnomer as the cultural milieu unified by 
the scientific intelligentsia’s discourse incorporated a far broader 
company than these laborers alone. This ITR class, distinguished 
from the “bourgeois specialists” who were their predecessors, 
emerged in the 1930s. Sheila Fitzpatrick has suggested that it was 
designed to become the Soviet middle class, which was to form the 
basis of Stalinist socialism, and subsequently it was conceived of as 
the late-Soviet version of this middle class by the likes of Boris Dubin, 
Lev Gudkov, and Alexei Levinson. Western analysts as far back as 
the ’60s described the technical intelligentsia as the most educated 
echelon of the Soviet elite, coining the name “priviligentsia.” It was 
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this subsection of the intelligentsia who offered the most vigorous 
and massive support to the “Thaw” and became the core of the 
liberal Soviet intelligentsia in the ’60s. It was the ITRs who crowded 
in the lecture halls of the Polytechnic Museum, who were the chief 
audience of Galich and Vysotskii, whose jokes spread to the masses 
on the waves of KVN (a televised competition of wits) and whose 
compositions formed the sounds of the KSP (klub samodeiatelʹnoi 
pesni, amateur song club) movement.
The members of this class secured their freedom of thought as 
a precondition for scientific efficiency even before Stalin’s death. 
In the years of the Thaw, marked by an exponential growth in the 
numbers of the technical intelligentsia,2 the nurturing efforts of 
restricted-access research institutes finally kindled this free thinking 
to the point where it exceeded the bounds of the privileged stratum. 
Albert Parry, author of The New Class Divided: Science and Technology 
versus Communism (1966), was at the same time quite sure that 
“if in our permissive society American scientists, engineers, and 
other technical experts do not constitute one class or even a group, 
then under the much more restrictive conditions of the Soviet 
sociopolitical order the comparable Soviet intelligentsia has even 
less of a chance to get together as a unified force to challenge the 
Communist Party” (23). As we can clearly see now, Parry missed 
the mark; it was precisely the presence of the Communist Party 
and the Soviet power, their role as common enemy, that both 
rallied the technical intelligentsia and promoted its ideology to 
an undisputed new rank: the flagship of liberal modernization. In 
the words of Vladislav Zubok, “Scientists became the first group 
of highly educated people in the late 1950s and early 1960s whose 
influence on society and cultural life far surpassed their professional 
competence” (2009, 131).
As the same author argues, writers during the Thaw failed to 
wrest control of literary matters, while the technical intelligentsia ever 
more vigorously purged itself of ideological control and cultivated 
2 According to Vladislav Zubok, in the period from 1950 to 1965, the number of 
jobs in science and research grew in the Soviet Union from 162,000 to 665,000, 
increasing at the highest rate in world history (2009, 132).
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the intellectual freedom so conspicuously absent in the humanities 
(see Zubok 2009, 137). It is no coincidence that many of the famous 
dissidents of the 1970s began as hard scientists: Valentin Turchin and 
Boris Alʹtshuler as physicists; Sergei Kovalev, Vladimir Bukovskii, 
and Zhores Medvedev as biophysicists; Vladimir Alʹbrekht, 
Vladimir Kormer, and Aleksandr Esenin-Volʹpin as mathematicians. 
Vadim Delone, although a graduate of the philology department, 
came from a family of leading mathematicians and studied at 
a specialized mathematical secondary school. Liudmila Alekseeva 
was a history major at Moscow University, but her mother was 
another prominent mathematician, who authored several university 
textbooks, worked at the Institute for Mathematics, and taught at 
the prestigious Bauman Moscow State Technical University.
As Petr Vailʹ and Aleksandr Genis wrote in The Sixties: The World 
of the Soviet Man:
Scientists became more than just heroes. The public opinion 
turned them into the aristocrats of the spirit. [. . .] Scientists were 
to succeed politicians. Hard science would replace imprecise 
ideology. Technocracy, instead of partocracy, would lead the 
country towards utopia. [. . .] This is how the scientists’ view was 
expressed by [Petr] Kapitsa, member of the Soviet Academy of 
Sciences: “To be ruled democratically and lawfully, every state 
must have independent institutions, serving as arbiters for every 
issue. [. . .] It looks like this moral function in the Soviet Union 
falls on the lot of the Academy of Sciences.” (Vailʹ and Genis 2003, 
616–19)
Andrei Sakharov took a similar stance, opening his “Progress, 
Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom” with the following passage:
The views of the author were formed in the milieu of the scientific 
and scientific-technical intelligentsia, which manifests much 
anxiety over the principles and specific aspects of foreign and 
domestic policy and over the future of mankind. This anxiety is 
nourished, in particular, by a realization that the scientific method of 
directing policy, the economy, arts, education, and military affairs still 
has not become a reality. We regard as “scientific” a method based 
on deep analysis of facts, theories, and views, presupposing 
unprejudiced, unfearing open discussion and conclusions. The 
complexity and diversity of all the phenomena of modern life, 
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the great possibilities and dangers linked with the scientific-
technical revolution and with a number of social tendencies 
demand precisely such an approach, as has been acknowledged 
in a number of official statements. [. . .] International affairs must 
be completely permeated with scientific methodology. (Sakharov 1968; 
emphasis mine)
Despite a very cautious assertion of the compatibility of the 
suggested models with “a number of official statements,” the notions 
of freedom and progress born among the scientific community very 
soon ran contrary to official dogmas. Lev Landau, according to his 
KGB dossier, declared as far back as 1956, “Our system remains 
fascist and simply cannot change. It is ludicrous to hope that this 
system can lead us to something good” (quoted in Zubok 2009, 138). 
Landau added that “if our system cannot collapse peacefully, then 
a third world war with all its horrors is inevitable. Therefore, the 
issue of a peaceful dissolution of our system is the vital issue for 
the future of all humankind” (ibid.). He was much more pessimistic 
than, say, Sakharov, foreseeing an inevitable war as the extension of 
the Soviet political regime: “The current state of things cannot last 
for long. My opinion is, if our system is liquidated without a war, 
no matter whether by evolution or revolution, the war will be no 
more. No fascism, no war” (Bessarab 2003). Certainly, fascism here 
stands for the Soviet system rather than its political opponents.
I would like to argue that an understanding of modernization, 
which in the 1960s morphed into the ITR discourse, very soon 
became a rallying platform for the whole liberal intelligentsia—or, 
rather, for the intelligentsia that considered itself liberal. This is 
a crucial distinction since the concepts of freedom and personality 
within the scientific intelligentsia’s discourse, having originated 
in Soviet ideological constructs, bore little in common with what 
was known as liberalism outside the USSR. As a result, the boiling 
point for European and American liberalism—the 1968 student 
revolution—went virtually unnoticed by Soviet liberals (it was 
overshadowed by the Prague Spring’s destruction). Additionally, 
and for the same reason, the political agendas of today’s liberals 
in Russia are frequently closer to those of U.S. Republicans than to 
those of any liberal party proper.
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However, it would be an exercise in imprecision to limit our 
study to politics alone. Throughout the whole Soviet period, 
politics remained indivisible from cultural phenomena. Moreover, 
it was in the field of culture that central political processes actually 
transpired.
The first authoritative confirmation of the ITR discourse as 
a cultural phenomenon was the now nearly forgotten incident known 
as the debate of “physicists and lyricists.”3 Konstantin Bogdanov 
(2011), in his detailed analysis of this once very lively forum, aptly 
points out the “heated grandiloquence and empty rhetoric” that 
characterized these arguments. Such a description was warranted, 
most likely, by the rhetorical tendency to substitute actual problems 
with false ones. Feuds over what was more useful for mankind, “the 
culture of feelings” or scientific progress, were utterly meaningless; 
these subjects—mere placeholders for an ulterior contest. Behind 
the façade of the debate, the intelligentsia of the Thaw was deeply 
disappointed with the squandered potential of art and literature, 
seeing contemporary authors’ works as trussed up and permeated 
by ideological mythologies and Socialist Realism’s lies.4 In such 
a context, science and scientific pursuits were perceived not only as 
liberated from Soviet ideology but as openly opposing it.5 As Vailʹ 
3 A letter to Komsomolʹskaia Pravda by Igorʹ Andreevich Poletaev, a specialist in 
cybernetics, in the words of Vladislav Zubok, “was a revolutionary claim for 
the supremacy of science as a cultural form replacing the previously dominant 
poetry and highbrow novels” (2009, 133). This interpretation is unlikely to be 
correct, as the debate had its hidden “signifier” in the dominance of socialist 
realism rather than in actual “highbrow literature.” Poletaev made it clear 
that his reaction to an article by Ilya Ehrenburg condemning a certain Iurii the 
ITR for his lack of interest in literature and art was quite calm: “The trouble 
starts when an idiot, an uneducated bohemian, a poetaster calling himself 
a poet for the lack of better examples, approaches a hard-working engineer 
and starts annoying him and calling him ‘uncultured’, since the engineer has 
nothing to do with poetry” (ibid., 19).
4 The debate began before the publication of Solzhenitsyn’s One Day in the Life of 
Ivan Denisovich; like Pasternak’s Doctor Zhivago, the works of Nikolai Arzhak 
and Abram Terts, along with other samizdat texts, remained unknown to the 
mass reader and could not be discussed in Soviet media.
5 “Studies of music, fine arts, theater and literature Dau considered 
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and Genis remarked later, “After it was discovered that words tell 
lies, equations were more trustworthy” (2003, 612). The impossibility 
of addressing the real underlying issue ultimately conducted all the 
demagogic effusions of “physicists vs. lyricists.”
This debate was often analytically paired with the famous article 
by C. P. Snow about two cultures—the sciences and the humanities—
that have lost any point of contact whatsoever (see Snow [1956] 
1998). The actual Soviet situation, however, was vastly different 
from this model. As Zubok explains it, “Even the literary vanguard 
during the Thaw seemed to recognize the supremacy of scientists. 
For all their personal candor and linguistic experimentation, the 
young poets of the Thaw could not and did not offer a universal 
and global alternative to the discredited official ideology” (2009, 
140). Agents of science could and did offer such an alternative. 
Lacking any authoritative opposition from the visible public culture 
of the humanities, with its excessive dependence on ideology, the 
technical intelligentsia began to build its own cultural milieu. 
Physicists did not limit themselves to joke writing (anthologized 
in the popular book Fiziki shutiat [Physicists’ Jokes, 1966]), but also 
produced undeniably fine poetry such as that of atomic scientist 
Gertsen Kopylov6 or neurobiologist Dmitrii Sukharev. Scientists 
could spread their wings in professional prose as well: among the 
most triumphant examples are Vladimir Makanin, a graduate of 
the Faculty of Mechanics and Mathematics (mekhmat) at Moscow 
State University, whose novel Priamaia liniia (A Straight Line) made 
him famous in 1965, and Elena Venttselʹ, a professor of mathematics 
known since 1962 by her pen name, I. Grekova (from igrek, a Russian 
pronunciation of the algebraic symbol y).
‘pseudoscience’ and usually referred to them as ‘the deception of the working 
people.’ It was impossible to make him change his mind” (Bessarab 2003).
6 Under the pen name of Semen Telegin, Kopylov published the article “Kak 
bytʹ” (“How to Be,” 1969?), which was known to have evoked Solzhenitsyn’s 
indignation, in samizdat. Among other things, the article described how 
“physics’ powerful methodology” gives rise to “a new philosophy of life,” 
and “dozens of discipline-specific and local subcultures are putting forth in 
the drawing rooms of design bureaus, in research institutes’ lobbies, in the 
halls of the Academy of Sciences.”
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The social science fiction by the Strugatsky brothers (Boris, an 
astronomer, and Arkady, an interpreter); Deviatʹ dnei odnogo goda 
(Nine Days of One Year, 1952) by Mikhail Romm; Kollegi (Colleagues, 
1959) and Zolotaia nasha Zhelezka (Our Golden Iron, 1973) by Vasilii 
Aksenov, a medical doctor by education; Idu na grozu (Into the Storm, 
1962) and Eta strannaia zhiznʹ (This Strange Life, 1974) by Daniil 
Granin, a graduate of the Leningrad Polytechnic; Bratskaia GES (The 
Bratsk Power Station, 1965) by Evgenii Evtushenko, of the Institute 
for Literature; Oza (1964) by Andrei Voznesenskii, an architect by 
degree; Vertikalʹ (The Vertical, 1967) by Stanislav Govorukhin, who 
graduated from the school of geology and subsequently the VGIK 
(State Institute of Cinematography)—these are but a few of the 
conspicuous cultural out-churnings in which the ITR discourse 
honed and polished its rhetoric and attitudes toward life. But 
the particular diploma that this or that person had was largely 
unimportant in the 1960s and ’70s since the cultural values born 
unto the technical intelligentsia were spread further (even furthest) 
by people outside the ITR class. It is highly indicative that Shurik, 
the hero of Leonid Gaidai’s tremendously popular movie trilogy, 
joins a polytechnic university in Operatsiia “Y” (Operation “Y,” 1965) 
and in Ivan Vasilʹevich meniaet professiiu (Ivan Vasilievich: Back to 
the Future, 1973) invents a time machine. Although in Kavkazskaia 
plennitsa (Kidnapping, Caucasian Style, 1966), he suddenly appears 
as a philologist studying folklore in the Caucasus, Shurik is 
indeed an archetypal ITR. It is also worth remembering that Iurii 
Lotman’s appeal to literary studies to become a real nauka—a word 
used in Russian for both science and scholarship—meant not only 
untethering itself from ideological pressure but also embracing 
scientific methods. It was on this very foundation that mathematical 
linguistics and Russian versions of structuralism and semiotics 
originated.
In its development, the scientific intelligentsia’s discourse has 
absorbed a number of related entities (among them the “youth 
prose” and the “bard” tradition of songwriting) and distanced 
itself from others, which at first seemed cognate but later proved 
incompatible with the liberal concepts framed by this discourse. The 
ITR discourse’s boundaries thus began to seem eroded and blurred. 
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At the same time, however, the discourse itself has preserved an 
internal structure, albeit one drastically reformed in the post-Soviet 
period. Ultimately, as my hypothesis goes, it is the ITR discourse 
that has in fact shaped the cultural mainstream of late-Soviet and 
post-Soviet liberalism.
The ITR discourse was, of course, far from the only intellectual 
and cultural formation of the 1960s and ’70s. On one side of this 
spectrum of developing thought, almost concurrent to the discourse 
of the ITR, arose the nationalist discourse, in all of its “white” and 
“red,” “Orthodox” and “pagan” varieties. On the other, stirring 
to life deep in the underground, the proto- and postmodernist 
discourse was conceived at the same moment—with many brands 
of its own, from Moscow conceptualism to Leningrad religious 
modernism.
In this context, the Sakharov-Solzhenitsyn rift remains quite 
urgent, as well as both indicative of and very important in shaping 
the two wings of Soviet anti-Sovietism (liberal vs. nationalist, or 
rather, Enlightenment vs. romanticism). Solzhenitsyn remains 
irrefutably a product of the scientific and technical milieu, first 
tied to the Department of Physics and Mathematics at Rostov 
University, then to the Marfino sharashka (a secret research institute 
staffed by political prisoners). However, his sociocultural agenda 
is radically divergent from the ITR discourse, though they belong 
to a common intellectual paradigm. I would venture to explain this 
affinity as follows: both Sakharov’s and Solzhenitsyn’s concepts of 
modernizing Russia are built on essentialist concepts. In the case of 
Sakharov, this means the notion of progress; for Solzhenitsyn, that 
of nation. This essentialism—the idea that intellectual constructs 
have an objective and invariable nature—stems not solely from 
a scientific and technical mind-set. To a certain degree, it is a mirrored 
version of Soviet ideological essentialism and imports from this 
parent discourse two of its pillars: “the progress of mankind” and 
“the Soviet people.”
Solzhenitsyn scrutinizes the influence of “nation” as subsuming 
personality and opposing both “the Soviet people” and the 
cosmopolitan intelligentsia’s notion of individuality: “Nations are 
very much living entities, to whom all moral senses are available, 
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including, however painful it might be, remorse” (1973). Sakharov 
centers conversely on “progress,” also understood to be an absolute 
value, and one construed primarily as an extension of personal 
freedom: “I am likewise convinced that freedom of conscience, 
together with the other civic rights, provides the basis for scientific 
progress and constitutes a guarantee that scientific advances will 
not be used to despoil mankind, providing the basis for economic 
and social progress, which in turn is a political guarantee for the 
possibility of an effective defense of social rights. At the same 
time I should like to defend the thesis of the original and decisive 
significance of civic and political rights in molding the destiny of 
mankind. This view differs essentially from the widely accepted 
Marxist view, as well as the technocratic opinions, according 
to which it is precisely material factors and social and economic 
conditions that are of decisive importance” (1968). In this instance, 
Sakharov is speaking of a person liberated from national, religious, 
ideological, and many other suprapersonal dependences.
It is this abstract vagueness of “person” as a category within the 
ITR discourse that gave rise to so many subsequent transformations 
and reorientations, seeking “roots” in religion, blood and soil, or 
imperial supremacy (i.e., inclining toward Solzhenitsyn’s position). 
However, this uncertainty also begot irony—to the present 
culture, the ITR subject’s most attractive feature. Irony comprises 
a distancing of oneself from most (though not all) metanarratives—
primarily from the Soviet quasi religion—and articulated increasing 
disappointment in the supposed Communist utopia. Such areas 
as science, progress, and personal freedom generally remained 
immune to irony. Hence, texts and movies discovered a fresh, 
popular device: the shestidesiatnik (“one of the generation of the 
’60s”), an ironist who seemingly doesn’t give a penny for anything 
yet heroically sacrifices himself—frequently for the sake of science. 
(As an aside, it should be noted that the ironic hero of the ITR culture 
is always or almost always a man. The major bodies of the scientific 
intelligentsia’s discourse, such as the KSP and tourist or alpinist 
subcultures, have formulated a cult around educated versions of 
machismo, with a “real man” stifling a woman into the second-rate 
role of an obedient lover or “war bride.” In this sense, the distance 
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between Romm’s Deviatʹ dnei odnogo goda and Govorukhin’s Vertikalʹ 
is remarkably slight.)
Thus, essentialism and the binarism that derives from it have 
become the most important facets of the ITR discourse. Emanating 
into the cultural domain, these traits “ontologize” culture, 
consequently representing it as a set of “eternal” values rather 
than a dynamic and paradoxical process. This perspective consigns 
culture to rubber-stamping premade ideas instead of problematizing 
values, seeks unwavering loyalty to lessons long learned rather than 
producing creative discomfort, and promotes reverent protection of 
established hierarchies rather than subversion. It denies, in a word, 
the “un-coziness” of culture (as described by Leonid Batkin and 
in a different way by Giorgio Vattimo): “Knowledge itself among 
the intelligentsia was and still is imagined as a sum of ready-made 
truths, objectively existing somewhere, to be found and utilized. [. . .] 
Any issue of importance that could cast doubt on and relativize 
the existing views and ideas, was ousted. [. . .] In other words, the 
mechanisms of the intelligentsia’s culture give their sanction to the 
value of subjectivity only as a collective good, an ideological symbol, 
a collective resource, inherited from the completed tradition, the 
‘classics’” (Gudkov and Dubin 2009, 133, 136).
It was on this foundation that the neotraditionalist turn (as 
diagnosed by Gudkov [2004]) transpired in the first decade of 
the twenty-first century. It cannot, of course, be entirely written 
down to the role of the ITR discourse, but being a core of the 
cultural liberal mainstream, it proved to have little or no resistance 
against new political trends essentializing nation and empire. 
The essentialization of culture above all is accountable for the ITR 
discourse’s tendency to binarize, simplify, and resist complexity. 
It is why the community of Gaidai’s Shuriks, avid readers of 
Hemingway and the Strugatskys, admirers of Evtushenko and 
Voznesenskii, of bard songs and KVN, has ebbed quietly past and 
yielded its shores to the fans of Veller and Minaev, Lukʹianenko and 
Prilepin, Grishkovets and Emelin, Nasha Russia and Comedy Club, 
and so on. It is why each and every cultural player in today’s liberal 
mainstream functions as no more than a substitutive tremor to 
a late-Soviet counterpart.
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The resistance to complexity erected by the scientific intelligen-
tsia’s discourse, an attempt at revitalizing the Enlightenment by 
its nature, either completely overlooks or willfully ignores the 
critique of the Enlightenment that has been simmering in Europe 
and America since 1968. This critique—spawned in the wake of the 
Second World War by Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer and 
fostered by Foucault, Derrida, Lyotard, and later Agamben and Jean-
Luc Nancy—led in time to the creation of a new cultural paradigm, 
which can be called, with a good deal of reserve, post-structuralist. 
Rather, it should be termed post-ideological or post-utopian, as 
it methodically and consistently undermines belief in progress as 
a category and in the unambiguity of scientific knowledge, as well 
as traces the link between violence and metaphysics, between 
power and the seemingly natural “order of things.” Most important, 
it demonstrates how the zeal of enlightenment forms a basis for 
terror. The late-Soviet cultural milieu cannot claim total ignorance 
of these ideas (consider Iurii Levada’s sociological circle or Merab 
Mamardashvili’s philosophical influences), yet on the whole, the 
late-Soviet and post-Soviet scientific intelligentsia’s discourse has 
lain on the other side of the divide.
The Enlightenment fever—based in a belief in progress and 
supported by the strength of reason, science, and technologies 
(including those with political ends)—struck the promoters of 
the ITR discourse with a twofold opposition: to the state and the 
“people,” and to the absurdity of the regime, on the one hand, and 
to the insurmountable idiocy of the “uneducated masses,” on the 
other. Sakharov (1968), in his manifesto, exposed the peril resultant 
to free thinking: “Freedom of thought is under a triple threat in 
modern society—from the deliberate opium of mass culture, from 
cowardly, egotistic, and philistine ideologies, and from the ossified 
dogmatism of a bureaucratic oligarchy and its favorite weapon, 
ideological censorship.” “Mass culture” and “philistine ideology” 
appear as interchangeable here, as both terms are really de facto 
synonyms for the Soviet ideologeme of “the people” (narod).7
7 Solzhenitsyn and his nationalist followers employ an analogous strategy: 
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The ITR discourse’s preservation of the Soviet notion of 
“philistinism” (meshchanstvo, obyvatelʹshchina) is curious. Whereas 
the Soviet discourse repurposed meshchanstvo from a generic 
term for the third estate into a political label inciting hatred of 
conventional norms of living and everyday comfort, the ITR 
discourse makes the meshchanin, or philistine, an antonym to the 
free Man (capitalization mandatory), or rather, a euphemism for the 
sacral Soviet category of “the people.” This contrast is most notably 
exhibited by the Strugatsky brothers (more on them below), with 
the most exemplary case being Ulitka na sklone (Snail on the Slope, 
1966), in which Peretz skirmishes with the bureaucratic machine 
while Candide is devoured by the Woods as an allegorical feast 
of narod.
The theme of this collision finds a reduced (or rather, a traves-
tied) treatment by Sergei Lukʹianenko in his Vselennaia “Dozorov” 
(World of Watches) series of novels (popularized by Timur Bek-
mambetov’s Night Watch / Day Watch film diptych). Through the 
undying clash between the Dark and the Light, the author portrays 
a supernaturally tinged melee that pits constructive, impersonal 
powers of the state against destructive forces of individualist free-
dom. One description of the Light is most indicative:
A burning heart, clean hands and a cool head. [. . .] Small wonder 
that in the days of the revolution and the civil war the Light 
almost in full strength joined the Cheka. And those who hadn’t, 
mostly perished. From the hands of the Dark, yes, but more often 
from the hands of those whom they were trying to protect. From 
human hands. From human stupidity. From human stupidity, 
meanness, cowardice, hypocrisy or envy. (Lukʹianenko 2006, 273)
A similar friction in Dmitry Bykov’s ZhD (2006; published in 
English as Living Souls, 2010) takes the shape of a civil war between 
the Varangians (proponents of a strong state) and the ZhD people 
he, too, renames the categories that do not fit into his ideologemes. Thus, 
he terms a not-quite-national and irreligious intelligentsia obrazovanshchina 
(“people with superfluous education”), and people who lost their national or 
ethnic roots become the “masses” (as opposed to narod and natsiia, “nation”).
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(liberals), with the two sides depicted as equally injurious. Acting 
both as perpetual victim and as stumbling block to the warring 
parties are the Vasʹki, the true “people” of the region, who struggle 
to protect their secret culture and identity.
It was just such a twofold conflict as these authors imagine that 
induced the particular liberalism of the ITRs, at once antidemocratic 
and antitotalitarian. Such oxymoronic pairings as idealism and 
pragmatism, total irony and hierarchic consciousness, anti-
Marxism and reliance on implicit Marxist dichotomies, populism 
and a particular brand of sectarianism (intellectual clubs, KSP, KVN, 
tourist clubs)—all of these are attributable to what may be defined 
as the double negativity of the ITR discourse.
Double negativity deposits the intelligentsia protagonist in 
a position of exceptionalism. The intelligentsia may be compared 
to magicians and wizards, as in the Strugatsky brothers’ Ponedelʹnik 
nachinaetsia v subbotu (Monday Begins on Saturday, 1965), or encircled 
with a halo of heroic self-sacrifice, as in Romm’s Deviatʹ dnei 
odnogo goda. When this conceptualization extends to the dissident 
movement, seen as a struggle for social progress, the exceptionalism 
is augmented by the illumination of a profoundly tragic alienation. 
As the scientific intelligentsia’s discursive tributaries roll ever 
more robustly into the mainstream, this exceptionalism drenches 
the whole liberal intelligentsia, essentializing itself along the 
way. Vladimir Kormer, among others, has examined the ensuing 
complex:
No one has ever been alienated from their country and their 
state to such an extent as the Russian intelligentsia. No one has 
ever felt so alienated—not from others, or society, or God—but 
from their land, their people, their statehood. It was this peculiar 
feeling that the heart and mind of an educated Russian felt in 
the late nineteenth–early twentieth century. It was realizing this 
collective alienation that made him part of the intelligentsia. [. . .] 
In spite of all the transformations that happened to Russia and its 
educated layer over this amazing 60 years, this layer has remained 
unchanged in its main feature, still being the intelligentsia in the 
only true sense of the word. (1970)
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Kormer also explains how the exceptionalist or alienated 
consciousness nurtures what he defines as the intelligentsia’s 
“double consciousness”:
The intelligentsia does not accept the Soviet power, they repel it, 
sometimes hate it. On the other hand, they both are in a symbiotic 
relationship: the intelligentsia feeds and nurtures it, at the same 
time waiting for the collapse of the Soviet power and hoping that 
it collapses sooner or later. On the other hand, the intelligentsia 
collaborates with it. The intelligentsia suffers because they have 
to live under Soviet control and, at the same time, aspires for its 
own well-being. The intelligentsia would prefer to think of Soviet 
power as of something external, as of a tribulation that came on 
them from somewhere, but fails to think this way consistently, 
hard as they try to stick to such a viewpoint. (1970)
Kormer’s statements from an article published in 1970 under the 
pen name O. Altaev can be further expounded by two quotations, 
one detailing the early phases of the complex in question and the 
other considering its post-Soviet repercussions. The first comes 
from the book by Petr Vailʹ and Aleksandr Genis The Sixties, written 
in the 1980s: “It is worth recalling that the Soviet physicists did not 
have Hiroshima-type moral sufferings. The image of a Frankenstein 
was not present in the Russian imagination” (2003, 614).8 And the 
second comes from Dina Khapaeva’s Goticheskoe obshchestvo (The 
Gothic Society, 2007):
Mass idealization of the West that permeated Russian society in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s was a way of living through the 
changes that led the Russian mind to deny any connection with 
the Soviet past. [. . .] The more detailed, thanks to westernizers’ 
efforts, the picture of the ugly [Soviet] past became, the stronger 
the impulse to identify this past with the hostile regime rather 
8 Nevertheless, the omniscient recording devices preserved the following 
statement by Lev Landau, which runs counter to Vailʹ and Genis’s sureness: 
“One must use every available power to steer clear of the nuclear affair. At the 
same time, any attempt to refuse or exempt oneself from such affairs should 
be done most carefully. The aim of a clever man, who wants to live a happy 
life, as far as this is possible, is to exempt oneself from the tasks put forth by 
the state that is built on repression” (Bessarab 2003).
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than themselves. The “condemnation of Stalinism” made the 
Soviet past turn alien, an alien history which had nothing to do 
with those who had made up their mind to “rebuild Russia” 
anew. [. . .] To clear up the path toward the West for Russia, the 
Soviet past had to disappear in the abyss of oblivion. Otherwise, 
its continued presence would destroy the belief in progress. 
(89–91)
The absence of any feeling of responsibility for the devastating 
military might of the Soviet regime is typical among many (though 
certainly not all) representatives of the technical intelligentsia of the 
1960s. This is a notable instance of the class’s double consciousness, 
possibly in its purest form. Khapaeva has shown how the double 
consciousness propped up by the liberal scientific intelligentsia’s 
discourse begets the hefty issue of the Soviet past failing to be 
“worked out.” This issue looms over every acre of post-Soviet 
culture. (It is remarkable how close, almost verbatim, Khapaeva 
comes to Kormer’s words.) The Soviet catastrophe’s not being 
“worked out,” as has been many times corroborated by research 
and analysis, leads both to nostalgia for the Soviet past and to the 
replication of many cultural and social practices of late socialism 
(more on this in upcoming chapters).
Curiously, the absolutization of progress has been abandoned 
by the ITR discourse in the post-Soviet period. The proof of this 
lies not only in the retrospective fantasies of mathematician-turned-
historian Anatolii Fomenko but also in the well-elaborated, four-
stage cyclical schematic of Russian history (reforms—crackdown—
thaw—stagnation or dementia) that Dmitry Bykov has advanced for 
more than ten years (see Bykov 2003a). Although these conceptions 
of history leave no place for progress, they do preserve the 
exceptionalism complex that appoints the intellectual as an agent of 
liberal modernization.
The post-Soviet transmutations of the scientific intelligentsia’s 
discourse can be demonstrated perhaps most clearly by the Strugatsky 
brothers and by Viktor Pelevin, whose works have served as the 
preeminent mouthpieces for critical periods of the ITR discourse—
in the 1960s and ’70s, and in the ’90s and 2000s, respectively. The 
subsequent article in this collection analyzes the Strugatskys’ trope 
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of the progressor as the central element of the ITR discourse. As for 
Pelevin, the younger author’s personal pedigree is, likewise, that of 
the ITR. Pelevin graduated from the Moscow Power Engineering 
Institute, after which he was employed by the magazine Khimiia 
i zhiznʹ (Chemistry and Life), while his first independent compositions 
were exercises in social sci-fi. However, Pelevin’s characters feature 
one important distinction from their ITR parentage: positivist faith 
in reason and science is replaced with a belief in the irrational, also 
understood as a certain technology, at times demanding chemical 
catalysts—that is, drugs. This technology transforms the mind, and 
with it the world. The substitution is quite in line with the overall 
evolution of the ITR discourse proper; in the 1980s and 1990s, the 
technical intelligentsia was fascinated with religion, mysticism, and 
the occult, fields that came to succeed the fully dispersed “grand 
narratives” of ideologies.
Pelevin’s texts, from the very start, might seem to invest no 
illusions in their characters toward improving the world. At best, 
these characters are found deep in self-improvement; at worst, trying 
to acclimate to a world that reinvents itself blazingly fast, jostling 
them in unwelcome, unknown directions. But this impression is 
mistaken: these individuals really do influence the world around 
them. Their strategy (Pelevin’s favorite, it seems, visible most overtly 
in the conclusion of Chapaev i Pustota / Buddha’s Little Finger [1996]) 
is to erase “reality” and ascend into the beautiful and boundless 
world created by their own imagination. One can construe this self-
deliverance as an essentially solipsistic response to the defeat of 
a particular ITR variation of utopia: basically, we have tried to 
change society’s consciousness, but nobody cares about our ideas, 
so let us not expend our effort on the ungrateful; we shall instead 
create a perfect world for ourselves and our loved ones with the 
same mind-altering technique.
Generation “P” (1999) employs a different, yet more significant, 
scenario, also derived from the disillusionment of former 
progressors: technologies, albeit with an irrational background, 
are aimed at manipulating mass conscience in order to secure 
the nearly absolute power of a new-generation ITR (here with an 
Institute for Literature degree). This rule is founded on deception 
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and self-deception, on dreams and illusions and, most importantly, 
on the blinding, pervasive, and hypnotic desire for the dough. 
Nevertheless, as the novel’s finale reveals, the authority situated on 
such a foundation is just as illusory and demands that Tatarsky, 
now verging on divinity, be both literally and metaphorically 
depersonalized. His face, endlessly copied and plastered across 
every advertisement, becomes a symbol of power and forsakes its 
significance as a personal identifier.
Pelevin carries the Strugatskys’ motifs further, albeit with 
a tangible irony: whereas one Strugatsky character becomes a liuden 
and vanishes transcendentally into the vast expanses of open space, 
almost every protagonist of Pelevin’s, from Omon Ra to his latest 
works, must become a god, with each new metamorphosis more 
monstrous than the last. I read this disparity between the authors 
as signaling a transformation in the technical intelligentsia’s 
exceptionalism/alienation complex.
Tatarsky is the first in Pelevin’s line of polittekhnologi (spin 
doctors), who, like their prototypes from Georgii Shchedrovitskii 
(see Kukulin 2007) to Gleb Pavlovskii, so vibrantly embody cynical 
modernization: as described by Peter Sloterdijk, “that modernized 
unhappy consciousness, on which enlightenment has labored both 
successfully and in vain” (1987, 33). Indeed, Sloterdijk expresses 
exactly the outcome of the ITR modernizers’ enterprise:
Today the cynic appears as a mass figure: an average social 
character in the upper echelons of the elevated superstructure. 
[. . .] The key social positions in boards, parliaments, commissions, 
executive committees, publishing companies, practices, faculties, 
and lawyers’ and editors’ offices have long since become a part 
of this diffuse cynicism. A certain chic bitterness provides an 
undertone to its activity. [. . .] They know what they are doing, but 
they do it because, in the short run, the force of circumstances and 
the instinct for self-preservation are speaking the same language, 
and they are telling them that it has to be so. Others would do it 
anyway, perhaps worse. Thus, the new, integrated cynicism even 
has the understandable feeling about itself of being a victim and 
of making sacrifices. (32–33)
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Sloterdijk’s statement fits Pelevin’s cast of characters perfectly, 
with one minor caveat: their cynicism is far from diffuse. On the 
contrary, it is a very proud and defiant cynicism. However, its 
sources lie in the same double consciousness that permeated the 
intelligentsia of the 1960s and ’70s (including the exceptionalism 
complex and the self-sacrificial volunteerism), as described by 
Kormer.
As is well known, the participants of the protest movement of 
the winter of 2011–12 chose to identify themselves with the phrase 
“creative class.” Out of this descriptor stems the question I have 
been saving: Can the modern liberal intelligentsia, molded, inter 
alia, by the ITR discourse, broadly be deemed the “creative class”? 
For the famed sociologist Richard Florida, from whose books 
the term is borrowed, the creative class entails a strange unity of 
software engineers, architects, designers, university professors, 
people of art—in a word, all those marketing the products of their 
creative activity and capable of developing “meaningful new 
forms.” Having studied the areas where their concentration is the 
highest, Florida discovered that although this social group is highly 
mobile, professionals of this sort prefer to live in a few particular 
U.S. cities and towns over, say, any old stead where jobs are 
available. Comparing his own map of the creative class’s residential 
hot spots with a colleague’s study examining the concentration of 
gay communities, Florida found the maps to be nearly identical. He 
arrived at the conclusion that those individuals assembled under 
the “creative class” designation are linked together not only by 
their seat in the economic system and the type of commodity they 
produce but also by the aspects of lifestyle.
In the process of becoming a social force, creativity, as Florida’s 
work demonstrates, demands a specific code of values, in opposition 
to those of both orthodox and pragmatic standpoints. Protestant 
ethics is replaced here by a cult of individuality reaching into 
the eccentric, a fascination with everything “foreign and exotic,” 
a rejection of traditional religions, and an imperative of racial, 
gender, and sexual diversity. The issue of whether a company is 
ready to provide insurance to homosexual partners is substantial 
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to the creative class regardless of one’s own sexual orientation. 
At the same time, Florida insists, “Members of the Creative Class 
resist characterization as alternative or bohemian. These labels 
suggest being outside or even against the prevailing culture, and 
they insist they are part of the culture, working and living inside 
it. In this regard, the Creative Class has made certain symbols of 
nonconformity acceptable—even conformist. It is in this sense that 
they represent not an alternative group but a new [. . .] mainstream 
of society” (2000, 82).
To mechanically cross apply all of these traits to Russia’s protest-
minded intelligentsia would surely be an empty gesture. However, 
it is quite remarkable that the debates in the Russian Internet 
community (i.e., the new intelligentsia, a candidate to the position 
of Russia’s creative class) have in recent years been raging around 
exactly the same values that Florida cites among those definitive of 
the creative class in the United States.
Reactions to Pussy Riot’s performance in the Cathedral of 
Christ the Savior in February 2012 for the first time have linked 
together at least three crucial and yet-unresolved issues in the 
modern intelligentsia’s mind-set: the attitude toward the church and 
traditional religiosity in general, the attitude toward contemporary 
art and its eccentric and postmodernist “obscenity,” and the 
attitude toward feminism. A newly adopted law of 2013 prohibiting 
“homosexual propaganda” also triggered an intense debate and 
uncovered another chord of dissonance within the protest-thirsty 
intelligentsia—the attitude toward gay culture and homosexuality. 
The new round of discord began after the annexation of Crimea in 
2014 and the war in eastern Ukraine, marking the neo-imperialist 
and isolationist turn of neotraditionalism. The chasm around 
values of the empire and nationalism indicates a new step away 
from the ITR discourse. Will this process continue, or will it prove 
to be reversible? Is essentialism supported in the ITR discourse 
fading away under the new historical and cultural conditions, or is 
it getting stronger in confrontation with new political repressions? 
These questions deserve close monitoring since they surely 
define whether the future of Russian culture will be different 
from its past.
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I was a Progressor for three years only, I was 
bringing good, only good and nothing but good, 
but, God, how they hated me, those people! And 
they had a right to do so. Because gods have come 
without asking permission.
—Arkady Strugatsky and Boris Strugatsky1
We are progressors, enlighteners, a landing party. 
We do not need to be liked by the electorate. We do 
not care if they like us or not.
—Valeriia Novodvorskaia2
W it h i n  “ I m p e r i a l  S i t u at io n”
Alexander Etkind’s monograph Internal Colonization: Russia’s 
Imperial Experience (2011) has accomplished a good measure more 
than to contribute a novel perspective to the ongoing conversation 
1 «Я был Прогрессором всего три года, я нес добро, только добро, ничего, 
кроме добра, и, господи, как же они ненавидели меня, эти люди! И 
они были в своем праве. Потому что боги пришли, не спрашивая 
разрешения» (2000–2003, 8:631). All translations from Russian in this chapter 
are mine.
2 «Мы прогрессоры, просветители, десант. У нас нет обязанности нравиться 
избирателям. Нам абсолютно безразлично, нравимся ли мы или нет» 
(Sobchak 2012).
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about the Russian Empire as a cultural entity. It has also presented 
a new paradigm for the discussion of Soviet, late-Soviet, and post-
Soviet cultural experiences. Etkind’s concept, wherein the methods 
of colonial domination were exercised upon both colonial and 
noncolonial subjects, dissolves the dichotomy of “external” and 
“internal” colonization by the revelation of a constructed, rather 
than an essentialized, notion of the “colonial Other.” Following 
the author’s logic, one may find that the effects of the “colonial 
boomerang” (an idea introduced by Hannah Arendt in her book On 
Violence) spread two-directionally. In its “classical” interpretation, 
the colonial boomerang concept suggests the adoption of colonial 
methods of repression within metropoles. By the same token, the 
Soviet colonization of Eastern Europe evinces the “externalization” 
of Communist methods of internal colonization developed in 
the USSR in the 1920s–30s, through the “cultural revolution,” 
collectivization, industrialization, and the Great Terror.
However, this historical approach is complicated by openly 
anticolonial Soviet rhetoric and practices in former Russian colonies 
that result in the paradoxical “affirmative action empire” (see 
Martin 2001). Ilya Gerasimov, Sergei Glebov, and Marina Mogilner 
explicate the complex nature of Soviet empireness as one that has 
already integrated its anticolonial and postcolonial aspects:
The Soviet regime established on much of the territory of the 
former Russian Empire [. . .] after 1917 made anticolonialism one of 
its priorities in both domestic and foreign policies. [. . .] The Soviet 
version of anticolonial rhetoric and politics contained a genuinely 
postcolonial quality. It unmasked the hidden hegemonic agenda 
of even the most benevolent bourgeois mission civilisatrice, and 
underlined the clash between the authentic and spontaneously 
revolutionary class consciousness of the oppressed, and the false 
consciousness of the colonial ideology of capitalist modernization 
imposed by the oppressors. Most importantly, the Soviet regime 
dared to counter the very hegemonic discourse of the “West” with 
an alternative version of modernity as its cornerstone category. 
[. . .] The claim to be a “Second World” was the claim for an 
alternative version of history, the claim for historical subjectivity 
and independence in articulating the discourse of modernity. 
(2013, 109, 117)
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While answering Mogilner’s query about the applicability of 
his concept to Soviet society, Etkind tellingly avoids generalizing 
statements, emphasizing the continuity between certain aspects of 
the Soviet project with the imperial period’s internal colonization:
Internal colonization is not an ideal sort (having corresponding 
“versions”), but a vector that connects geographic, political, and 
cultural impulses. A vector always has a direction, it starts from 
one point and aims at the other. Certainly among a huge diversity 
of Soviet practices there were many that were directed towards 
the center. I think, soon one will not be able to write a history 
of the Gulag, or, for example, the history of Soviet urbanization 
without involving the concept of internal colonization. (Mogilner 
and Etkind 2011, 124–25)
Other scholars (myself included) have attempted to apply 
Etkind’s scheme to Soviet and post-Soviet periods on a much 
broader scale. Contributors to the volume Tam, vnutri (There 
within; Etkind, Uffelmann, and Kukulin 2012) have extended 
Etkind’s logic to Soviet and post-Soviet forms of modernity. In the 
introduction to the volume, its editors, while observing the fusion 
of repressive methods of internal colonization in the USSR of the 
1920s–50s, exemplified by the Gulag (“an extreme form of internal 
colonization” [29]), describe the post-Soviet period as postcolonial, 
yet complicated by neo-imperialist tendencies. Kukulin, through 
the analysis of a massive body of literary texts (with a special 
attention paid to Fazilʹ Iskander, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, and 
Semen Lipkin), has demonstrated how Russian literature between 
the 1970s and 2010s explored the hybridity of a Soviet subject (see 
Kukulin 2012). According to this scholar’s conclusions, the late 
Soviet subject exemplifies an amalgam of features characteristic 
of the “colonizer” and the “colonized,” while the post-Soviet 
subject exhibits the crumbling of this hybridity, triggered by the 
emancipation from dependence on and continuous dialogue with 
the state power. Kukulin argues that both phases resonate with the 
postcolonial paradigm; indeed, the melding in the Soviet subject of 
the qualities of imperial master and colonial subaltern recall Homi 
Bhabha’s idea of postcolonial mimicry: “the desire for a reformed 
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unrecognizable Other, as a subject of a difference that is almost the same 
but not quite” (Bhabha 1994, 86; author’s emphasis).
Since 2014 neo-imperialist rhetoric has surged in Russia’s 
state media and political (as well as cultural) discourse alongside 
the annexation of Crimea and the dispatch of support to 
separatist enclaves in the eastern part of Ukraine, reinforced 
by the enthusiasm of an overwhelming majority of the Russian 
population. Such widespread zeal indicates a more dimensional 
presence of neo-imperialist tendencies in post-Soviet culture than 
a mere lingering shadow of the postcolonial late-Soviet mainstream. 
In this environment, the concept of the cognitive turn acquires new 
relevance. This concept has been developed by a circle of scholars 
affiliated with the historical magazine Ab Imperio. In a series of 
publications, these scholars have argued that revisionist studies 
of modern empires induced the crises in traditional dichotomies 
between premodern and modern, and between overseas and 
continental empires, and planted doubts about “the assumed 
fixity of boundaries between metropoles and colonial periphery” 
(Gerasimov et al. 2009, 8). Yet such labels as “racialized discourse, 
Orientalism, modern politics, ideologies, and techniques of the 
‘gardening empire’” have demonstrated much greater stability 
in the characterization of modern empires than those supposedly 
“objective” dichotomies (8–9). In accordance with some Western 
researchers of modern empires (see Beissinger 1995; Brubaker 1998; 
Suny 2001; Burbank, von Hagen, and Remnev 2007), the Ab Imperio 
historians urge us to focus “on empire as a mental construct or 
a system of thinking that accommodates the different types of 
human and spatial diversity” (Gerasimov et al. 2009, 15), an 
approach that entails understanding empire as a “context-setting 
framework of languages of self-description of imperial experience.” 
According to these scholars, the concept of the “imperial situation,” 
defined by “the complex of [imperial] languages of self-description 
and self-rationalization” (17, 20), appears to be more flexible than 
the concrete terms of empire. Furthermore, the ideal sort of empire 
presupposes “the situation of uncertainty, incommensurability, and 
indistinction [. . .] as the quintessential characteristic of ‘imperial 
formation’” (21; authors’ emphasis).
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From this perspective, I would like to revisit the functions and 
implications of the progressor. This figure is an agent of a highly 
developed civilization covertly planted into the repressive bog of 
a backward society, who tries not to interfere with the natural course 
of the “alien” history, but instead to help or alleviate the suffering 
of select denizens of the host world—mainly its intellectuals and 
those to whom the progressor grows attached. Surprisingly, this 
character type has maintained its currency beyond its formative 
appearances in the works of Arkady (1925–1991) and Boris (1933–
2012) Strugatsky, and into the era of post-Soviet literature, as will be 
exemplified by analysis of widely popular contemporary authors 
such as Dmitry Bykov, Viktor Pelevin, Boris Akunin, and Sergei 
Lukʹianenko. I argue here that the trope of the progressor signifies 
the cultural dramaturgy of internal colonization, and in this capacity 
it has become a form of imaginary self-identification for late-Soviet 
and post-Soviet liberals who opposed the Communist regime in the 
1980s and have confronted authoritative, as well as nationalist and 
neo-imperialist, tendencies in post-Soviet politics.
The progressor’s role can hardly be defined as postcolonial, 
since the character primarily offers an identification not with a “col-
onized” but with a “colonizer,” a bearer of enforced progress to 
the passive and backward community of “natives”; such a stance 
typically predicates Orientalization of aborigines as a part of the 
“package.” At the same time, as I will attempt to show, progressors 
tend to expose internal contradictions in the implied sociopolitical 
identification, frequently despite the respective authors’ intentions. 
Most significantly, the progressor signifies the interconnectedness 
and mutual influence of seemingly incompatible positions, one 
based on the imagined or real cultural (and sometimes political) 
superiority and another on the imagined or real external or internal 
subalternity. Thus, this cultural trope in many ways epitomizes the 
nature of late Soviet postcolonial mimicry, representing “the sign of 
a double articulation; a complex strategy of reform, regulation and 
discipline, which ‘appropriates’ the Other as it visualizes power” 
(Bhabha 1994, 86).
 As will be demonstrated, the progressor’s selfhood and strategy 
undergo significant problematization both in the late-Soviet works 
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of the Strugatsky brothers and in post-Soviet literature. These 
reevaluations, however, do not contradict the “strategic relativism” 
of the “imperial situation”; rather, they signify its mature, self-
reflexive stage: “An imperial situation cannot be described within one 
noncontroversial narrative or typified on the basis of rational and 
equally noncontroversial classificatory principle” (Gerasimov et al. 
2009, 24; emphasis in the original). Nevertheless, the self-reflexive 
state of the imperial discourse may be also described as postimperial, 
as it tangibly connects the Soviet empire’s final decades with its post-
1991 remnants, including the contemporary revival of imperialist 
rhetoric. Arguably, the Soviet “imperial situation” fully takes shape 
only when it becomes post-Soviet (i.e., “postimperial”) and its 
subjects enter “the situation of uncertainty, incommensurability, 
and indistinction.” This very atmosphere descended on the liberal 
Soviet culture around 1968 and continues to hold its humid fog into 
the present moment.
T he  I nt e r n a l  C o l o n i z e r
The progressor, and his incognito operations on a remote planet in 
a repressive, medieval, or totalitarian society, serves as the 
centerpiece for many of the Strugatsky brothers’ science fiction 
novels of the 1960s–80s: most notably, Popytka k begstvu (Escape 
Attempt, 1962), Trudno bytʹ bogom (Hard to Be a God, 1964), Obitaemyi 
ostrov (Inhabited Island, 1967), Ulitka na sklone (Snail on the Slope, 
1966–8), Zhuk v muraveinike (Beetle in the Anthill, 1980), and Volny 
gasiat veter (The Time Wanderers, 1985), as well as the 1964 short 
story “Bednye zlye liudi” (“Poor, Angry People,” initially titled 
“Trudno bytʹ bogom”). The theme is also addressed, albeit not front 
and center, in other of the coauthors’ works including Ponedelʹnik 
nachinaetsia v subbotu (Monday Begins on Saturday, 1965), Khishchnye 
veshchi veka (Predatory Things of the Century, 1965), Vtoroe nashestvie 
marsian (The Second Invasion of Martians, 1968), Otelʹ “U pogibshego 
alʹpinista” (The Dead Alpinist Hotel, 1970), Malysh (The Space Mowgli, 
1971), Piknik na obochine (Roadside Picnic, 1972), Gadkie lebedi (The 
Ugly Swans; written in 1967, published abroad in 1972, in the USSR 
in 1987), and Parenʹ iz preispodnei (The Kid from Hell, 1974).
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It would not be an exaggeration to claim that the Strugatsky 
brothers enjoyed a veritable cult following during the decline 
of the Thaw (1964–68) and the period of stagnation (1968–85), 
especially among the ITR class.3 Besides one of the brothers, Boris, 
personally belonging to the ranks of the technical intelligentsia as 
a professional astronomer, the duo’s vision of the communist future 
was but minimally informed by the official ideology from the very 
start of their joint career. Rather, their premonitions reflected the 
cultivation of creative freedom, in association with the world of the 
scientific intelligentsia. In brother Arkady’s words:
We were writing about the country of “junior researchers.” 
About people who, as we thought back then, have already been 
embodying features of their descendants in the communist 
future. About people for whom the main value of life has been 
associated with the “adventures of the spirit.” (Strugatsky and 
Strugatsky, 2000–2003, 11:335)4
Furthermore, the brothers’ novels have in many ways shaped 
the symbolic core of liberal ideology in late-Soviet and post-Soviet 
Russia. Their science fiction offered an indirect narrativization of 
contemporary Soviet social contradictions and conflicts, through 
seemingly distant and fantastic collisions between different 
civilizations of the future, predicated on an ideological process. 
According to Clifford Geertz, “Thinking, conceptualization, 
formulation, comprehension, understanding, or what-have-you, 
consists not of ghostly happenings in the head but of a matching of 
the states and processes of symbolic models against the states and 
processes of the wider world” (1973, 214).
3 For a discussion of the specific understanding of modernization and of 
the cultural ethos of the Soviet scientific intelligentsia in the 1960s–80s, see 
a debate (with articles by Vladislav Zubok, Maxim Waldstein, Zinaida 
Vasilʹeva, Benjamin Nathans, Artemii Magun, Pal Tamas, Jan Kubik, Alaina 
Lemon, and Mark Lipovetsky) in Ab Imperio (2013, 1:133–219).
4 «Мы писали о стране ‘младших научных сотрудников’. О людях, 
которые, как мы тогда считали, уже сегодня несут в себе черты потомков 
из коммунистического завтра. О людях, для которых главные ценности 
бытия—именно в ‘приключениях духа’».
L i t e r a t u r e60
The very genre of the Strugatsky brothers’ oeuvre—allegorical 
sci-fi with political subtexts—best of all corresponded to the function 
of symbolic models described by Galanter and Gerstenhaber 
and cited by Geertz as definitive for the production of ideology: 
“Imaginal thinking is neither more or less than constructing 
an image of the environment, running the model faster than the 
environment and predicting that the environment will behave 
as the model does” (Geertz 1973, 214). Among these models, 
the progressor trope holds a central seat, offering the Soviet/
post-Soviet liberal intelligent an appealing platform for identity 
construction on the basis of interiorized internal colonization—in 
Dirk Uffelmann’s terminology, “self-colonization” (2012, 62–67)—
which is molded into the oppositional intelligentsia’s ideologeme 
in the 2010s.
As Alexander Etkind has argued in Internal Colonization (2011), 
the logic of internal colonization elucidates the nature of Russian 
modernity. The figure of the progressor, a modern intellectual 
wading through a totalitarian backwater, has provided a powerful 
focal point of self-identification for the Soviet scientific intelligentsia, 
which was spawned by the Soviet imperial project and naturally 
assumed аn imperial position in the national context as well. The 
Foucauldian transformation of knowledge into power—symbolic 
and cultural in this case—serves as the most logical explanation for 
this phenomenon. According to Etkind, it is not racial, ethnic, or 
political differences but a cultural disparity that predicates internal 
colonization: “Where there is no cultural distance—there is no 
colonial situation” (2003, 111).5
5 Cf. in Said’s Orientalism: “We are left at the end with a sense of the pathetic 
distance still separating ‘us’ from an Orient destined to bear its foreignness as 
a mark of its permanent estrangement from the West” (1979, 244). “For every 
idea about ‘our’ art . . . another link in the chain binding ‘us’ together was 
formed while another outsider was banished. Even if this is always the result 
of such rhetoric, wherever and whenever it occurs, we must remember that 
for nineteenth-century Europe an imposing edifice of learning and culture 
was built, so to speak, in the face of actual outsiders (the colonies, the poor, 
the delinquent), whose role in the culture was to give definition to what they 
were constitutionally unsuited for” (228, author’s emphasis).
t h e  P r o g r e s s o r  b e t w e e n  t h e  I m p e r i a l  a n d  t h e  C o l o n i a l 61
In the Strugatskys’ oeuvre, the culture gap between the 
progressors and the subjects of their mission constitutes the nexus 
of the authors’ genre and its artistic conventions. This cultural 
distance is even externalized, both in the interstellar spatial distance 
between the communist Earth and the progressed planets, and as 
the historical distance between the futuristic World of the Noon, 
to which the progressors belong, and the medieval (Trudno bytʹ 
bogom) or totalitarian (Obitaemyi ostrov, Parenʹ iz preispodnei) worlds 
they visit.
The Strugatskys’ early output (from 1959 to 1963) featured 
a wholly unproblematized glorification of intervention on distant 
planets by progressive communist intellectuals. Quite tellingly, in 
Dalekaia raduga (The Distant Rainbow, 1963) the term “colonization” is 
used without any negative connotations: “This is a planet colonized 
by science and needed for physical experiments. All of humanity 
awaits the result of these experiments” (Strugatsky and Strugatsky 
2000–2003, 3:219).6 In their later novels, the colonization theme is 
predominantly associated with educational practices, through 
which children may be culturally distanced from their parents, as 
one can see in Gadkie lebedi. This scholastic emphasis also emerges 
in the plots of Malysh and Parenʹ iz preispodnei.
However, the Strugatskys also stress “cultural relativity” in 
the later works by bringing into play nonhumanoid civilizations 
that developmentally eclipse the society of the progressors. The 
earthlings’ contact with these superior alien races is varyingly 
explored from observation (Malysh) to misunderstanding (Otelʹ 
“U pogibshego alʹpinista”), from sacralization (Piknik na obochine) 
to persecution (Zhuk v muraveinike) and immigration (Volny gasiat 
veter). This “double bind” of the progressors’ engagement with both 
more backward and more advanced civilizations narrativizes one of 
the key facets of the late-Soviet and post-Soviet “imperial situation.” 
The duality of the progressors’ self-awareness as both agents 
and victims of colonization grounds the Strugatskys’ discourse. 
6 «Это планета, колонизированная наукой и предназначенная для 
проведения физических экспериментов. Результата экспериментов ждет 
все человечество».
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In Ilya Kukulin’s words, “the depiction of the Soviet person as 
a hybrid phenomenon, who combines in a conflicted way features of 
a ‘subaltern’ and ‘master’” (2012, 850) has become foundational for 
the late-Soviet postcolonial discourse, which, for this reason, can 
equally be interpreted as postcolonial—depending on which side of 
this hybrid dominates. Furthermore, the Strugatskys were probably 
the first to detect the mutual transformability of postimperial 
and postcolonial complexes of the late Soviet subject. As I will 
attempt to illustrate further, this quality lays the foundation for 
post-Soviet subjectivity, in which identification with the position 
of power (postimperial) does not preclude self-representation as 
a colonial subaltern (postcolonial): the dominance of each of these 
models depends on circumstances, immediate needs, context, 
and so on.
Symptomatically, the novella Popytka k begstvu, which the 
authors considered the dawn of the “real Strugatskys,” also marked 
the progressors’ inauguration: “This is our first work in which 
we have discovered for ourselves the theme of the Progressors, 
although this term was not yet conceived. There was only a que-
stion: should a highly advanced civilization interfere with a back-
ward one—even with the most noble intentions?” (2000–2003, 
3:679).7 In the novella’s plot, adventuring earthlings from a distant 
future start acting as, in essence, freelance progressors after coming 
across an extraterrestrial Gulag. Ultimately it is revealed that Saul 
Repnin, who initiated their expedition and eventually decides to 
stay on this nightmarish planet, is a time-displaced survivor of 
a Nazi concentration camp seeking to settle historical scores. (The 
reader of the 1960s was accustomed to Aesopian substitution of the 
Gulag with the Nazi camp.) Thus, a profound connection between 
potential (and unsuccessful) progressors and the subjects of their 
progressive efforts is established in this novel through allusion to 
7 «Это первое наше произведение, где мы открыли для себя тему 
Прогрессоров, хотя самого этого термина еще не было и в помине, а был 
только вопрос, следует ли высокоразвитой цивилизации вмешиваться 
в дела цивилизации отсталой—даже с самыми благородными 
намерениями».
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real historical trauma inflicted by state-imposed colonial violence. 
In this context, we might rethink the meaning of the Zone in Piknik 
na obochine: while in the novel it signifies the effects of contact with 
a superior civilization, the more literal meaning of the word zona 
yields a clear association with the Gulag, suggesting another potent 
symbolic evocation of the trauma of internal colonization by the 
totalitarian state.
Alongside imagining far-off realms subjected to progressors’ 
intercessions, the Strugatsky brothers have methodically saturated 
these chronotopes with motifs and realia promoting an interpre-
tation of these planets as sociopolitical metaphors for the Soviet 
world. Don Reba in Trudno bytʹ bogom is readable as a slightly 
distorted anagram of Beria. The same novel’s depiction of persecuted 
intellectuals, torture chambers, and the fascist coup; the division of 
intelligentsia into hounded “degenerates” (dissidents) and well-
paid (yet suffering) conformists; the mysterious transmitted waves 
that cause patriotic exaltation in some and unbearable headaches 
in others (a transparent metaphor for the propaganda machine); 
the concentration camps that figure in Popytka k begstvu and 
Obitaemyi ostrov—all these and alike motifs in the brothers’ works 
compact the light-years between planets into an ironic allegorical 
device, emphasizing the internal vector of the quasi-sci-fi repre- 
sentation.
Under these conditions, the progressor’s alienation from his 
immediate historical environment precipitates a powerful symbolic 
mirror for enlightened Soviet intellectuals who find themselves 
confronted by a culturally distant social milieu. Meanwhile, the 
accompanying sci-fi conventions essentialize cultural differences 
by presenting the unenlightened masses as—literally—aliens. The 
second, and much more significant for the Strugatskys’ readers, layer 
of metaphorical interpretation enveloping these “distant worlds” 
is an ironic problematization of the Orientalizing essentialism, 
thus displaying the “self-referential and performative character 
of internal colonization” (see Etkind, Uffelmann, and Kukulin 
2012, 16–17; cf. Uffelmann 2012, 72). Nonetheless, we should 
note that this problematization, however ironic, also effectively 
accents the progressor’s authority, expressly unearthing its roots 
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in his intellectual and cultural superiority, and thus amplifies the 
postimperial overtones of this trope.
Due to the duality of their position (power/powerlessness, 
master/subject), and contrary to the model described by Etkind, 
the Strugatskian progressor conducts a double Orientalization, 
targeting both the masses and the state power. Through the eyes 
of the progressor, the “local authorities” are no more than better-
dressed “savages,” while the repressed subalterns inspire no 
empathy (either in the progressor or the reader) in light of their 
enthusiastic complicity with their repressive overlords. The 
authorities and the masses are typically represented by the writers 
as symbiotically conjoined and culturally codependent, if not 
entirely indistinguishable from one another. Aleksei German, in 
his cinematic take on Trudno bytʹ bogom (2013), underscores this 
inseparability through the uniformly putrescent visual texture of 
the film, which makes the royal palace indiscernible from a pigsty. 
In Ignatiy Vishnevetsky’s words, “If Hard to Be a God isn’t the 
filthiest, most fetid-looking movie ever made, it’s certainly in the 
top three. Everyone seems to be continually kicking each other, 
spitting on each other, or beating each other—and if they’re not, it’s 
because they’re busy picking things out of the mud, poking bare and 
dirty asses with spears, or smelling what they just wiped off their 
boots. It is grotesque and deranged and Hieronymus Bosch-like, 
and damn if it isn’t a bona fide vision” (2015; emphasis in original). 
Other critics, Russian and Western alike, unanimously share this 
impression.
The visual logic of German’s film blossoms directly from the 
source text’s narrative, in which “the cold-blooded brutality of those 
who slaughter” matches only “the cold-blooded meekness of those 
who are slaughtered” (Strugatsky and Strugatsky 2014, 173–74).8 
The hero, a progressor, alias Don Rumata Estorian, summarizes 
the situation in the Arkanar kingdom as a quasi-medieval fascist 
coup d’état: “Wherever grayness triumphs, black robes come to 
8 «Xладнокровное зверство тех, кто режет» — «хладнокровная покорность 
тех, кого режут» (Strugatsky and Strugatsky 2000–2003, 3:380).
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power” (171).9 Rumata’s diagnosis, expressed by this chromatic 
formula, eludes a consummate translation: “grayness” stands here 
for mediocrity and the ignorant masses, while “blackness” could 
signify the black gowns of the religious order employed by Don 
Reba, the Soviet “black hundreds” (i.e., the Russian party), or the 
uniforms of the SS.
The oneness of the oppressive state and the masses is uncovered 
in even harsher light in Ulitka na sklone, where the action takes 
place on the planet Pandora and the Stugatskys’ typical hero, the 
paradigmatic Soviet intelligent, is divided into two protagonists.10 
The first, Peretz, desperately appeals to the Kafkaesque Directorate 
of the Woods for permission to access the mysterious and tantalizing 
world of the Woods. The second, Candide, is stranded in these very 
woods by a helicopter crash and hopelessly seeks escape. The novel’s 
depiction of the natives of the Woods bears all the markers of Saidian 
Orientalization: they are thoroughly passive, and their existence 
comprises the same daily rituals in cyclical repetition: the same lies 
ever spun, the same conversations ever reiterated, and the same 
desires forever unfulfilled. In short, they are portrayed as beings 
in chronic lack of agency. Like Arabs in the Orientalist discourse, 
they “have an aura of apartness, definiteness, and collective self-
consistency such as to wipe out any traces of individual Arabs with 
narratable life stories” (Said 1979, 229). The representation of the 
aboriginal mind-set in Ulitka perfectly resonates with the words, as 
cited by Said, of T. E. Lawrence: “They think for the moment, and 
endeavor to slip through life without turning corners or climbing 
hills. In part it is a mental and moral fatigue, a race trained out, 
and to avoid difficulties they have to jettison so much that we think 
9 «Там, где торжествует серость, к власти всегда приходят черные» 
(ibid., 378).
10 The inseparability of this novel from the progressors’ discourse can be 
supported by its first edition, published in the late 1980s and titled Bespokoistvo 
(Anxiety), in which the protagonist Gorbovskii, who in the Strugatskys’ 
other texts is depicted as a superprogressor, contemplates the destiny 
of the Woods.
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honorable and grave: and yet without in any way sharing their 
point of view” (228–29).
At the same time, in the Peretz portions of the novel, the 
bureaucratic gears of the Directorate, despite its centralized and 
hierarchical nature, produce the same effect of senseless repetitions 
and meaningless routines, imprisoning the protagonist and driving 
him to stagnant despair at the futility of his efforts to reach the 
beckoning Woods. The only detectable difference between the 
indigenous society’s customs and the bureaucratic regime of the 
Directorate is that the natives passively obey the incomprehensible 
logic of the Woods, while the colonizers, with a cruel persistency, 
demolish the unknowable realm with their machinery, exercising 
a purely imperial power.
The melding of the colonizing and liberating perspectives 
is not new for postcolonial discourses, especially in their Soviet 
reduction. Accordingly, confrontations of the intellectual with 
both the Orientalized masses and the oppressive power, as well as 
the mutual mirroring of these two “others,” have been typical for 
the Soviet legacy of internal colonization since the 1920s (see the 
previous chapter). However, the Strugatsky brothers’ treatment of 
this symbolic configuration appears to differ from, say, Olesha’s 
Zavistʹ (Envy, 1927). The intellectual was stigmatized in the ’20s and 
beyond as impotent (see Rutten 2012), while his opponents proved 
strikingly energetic and proactive. To the contrary, the Strugatskys 
imagined a world in which both the “people” and the “power” are 
marked by the lack of agency, while the progressors’ agency fuels 
each narrative arc. This willpower stems from the progressors’ 
commitment to the two basic principles of the Enlightenment: 
rationality (manifested by science) and humanism (manifested in 
their aversion to violence). Rumata’s recourse to violence in Trudno 
bytʹ bogom is represented as morally ambivalent, although it is 
obvious that his decision to kill—notably, not with the unparalleled 
technology he possesses, but instead with a common sword—
results from his humanism:
My brothers, thought Rumata. I’m yours, I’m the flesh of your 
flesh! He suddenly felt with tremendous force that he was no 
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god, shielding the fireflies of reason with his hand, but instead a 
brother, helping a brother, a son saving a father. I’ll kill Don Reba, 
he thought. What for? He’s killing my brothers. (Strugatsky and 
Strugatsky 2014, 148)11
Budach said quietly, “Then, Lord, wipe us off the face of the 
planet and create us anew in a more perfect form. . . Or even 
better, leave us be and let us go our own way.”
“My heart is full of pity,” Rumata said slowly, “I cannot do 
that.” (ibid., 209–10)12
In Trudno bytʹ bogom the Strugatskys use subtle colors to mark 
the mutability of the progressor’s position, with motifs of violence 
that indicate the transformation of the progressor’s symbolic power 
from that of the Enlightenment agent into a political force pregnant 
with (imperial) domination. In Zhuk v muraveinike this change 
becomes central: the head of the progressors’ agency, Rudolf 
Sikorski, organizes a witch hunt against the progressor Lev Abalkin, 
whom he suspects to be an incognizant vessel for a destructive 
program implanted in his body (or his mind, maybe) by the superior 
civilization of the Wanderers. Sikorski’s climactic murder of Abalkin 
remains unjustifiable in the eyes of the novel’s narrator, Maxim 
Kammerer (also a progressor, and the protagonist of Obitaemyi 
ostrov). Even if Abalkin is indeed the “robot” Sikorsi believes him 
to be, preprogrammed by the Wanderers to commit some horrible 
atrocity despite his will, his assassination at Sikorski’s hands clearly 
illumines a political paranoia that incriminates (perhaps rashly) any 
and all “Others” capable of questioning or subverting the imperial 
rule on the basis of progressism. Zhuk v muraveinike, thus, can be 
11 «Братья мои, — подумал Румата. — Я ваш, мы плоть от плоти вашей!» 
С огромной силой он вдруг почувствовал, что никакой он не бог, 
ограждающий в ладонях светлячков разума, а брат, помогающий брату, 
сын, спасающий отца. «Я убью дона Рэбу. — За что? — Oн убивает моих 
братьев» (Strugatsky and Strugatsky 2000–2003, 3:360).
12 «Будах тихо проговорил:
—Тогда, господи, сотри нас с лица земли и создай заново более 
совершенными. . . или еще лучше, оставь нас и дай нам идти своей 
дорогой» (ibid., 407).
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read as the Strugatskys’ version of Arendt’s colonial boomerang, 
“the process in which imperial powers bring back their practices of 
coercion from their colonies back home” (Etkind 2011, 7)—in other 
words, of the postimperial discourse.
Sikorski himself, however, validates his decision to kill by 
citing the imperative to defend Earth from colonization by the 
Wanderers—that is, to protect Earth from an imagined or real 
state of powerless colonial subalternity. Despite disapproving of 
his actions, Kammerer shares his boss’s conviction: “Yes, there are 
intelligent beings in the world who are much, much worse than 
you, whatever you may be. And it’s only then that you develop the 
ability to divide the world into friend and foe, make instantaneous 
decisions in acute situations, and learn the courage of acting first 
and thinking later. In my opinion, that is the essence of a Progressor: 
the ability to decisively divide the world into friend and foe” 
(Strugatsky and Strugatsky 1980, 7).13
P r og r e s s  v s .  Powe r
Ulitka na sklone similarly uncovers the progressor’s fear of potential 
subjugation. Among the many “races” inhabiting the Woods, 
authority and agency seem to belong solely to a community 
of women who possess magic powers over the Woods and its 
creatures. They are true goddesses of the Woods. Without the touch 
of a finger, by their intangible will alone, they are able to inspire life 
in the dead and dispel it from the living. Monstrous mertviaki, feared 
by all humans, including Candide, appear to be their servants, 
controllable automatons not unlike zombies.
These mystical witches seem to gain sympathy from neither the 
hero nor the authors. They steal Candide’s wife, Nava, and treat 
13 «Существуют на свете носители разума, которые гораздо, значительно 
хуже тебя, каким бы ты ни был. И вот только тогда ты обретаешь 
способность делить на чужих и своих, принимать мгновенные решения 
в острых ситуациях и научаешься смелости сначала действовать, 
а потом разбираться. По-моему, в этом сама суть прогрессора: умение 
решительно разделить на своих и чужих» (Strugatsky and Strugatsky 
2000–2003, 8:12).
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him with unveiled contempt, disregarding his knowledge and his 
good intentions. In the close-knit matriarchy of witches, males are 
either sterilized or discarded as useless and detrimental beings. 
Although the women are prepared to make an exception for our 
hero and enfold him into their world, Candide opts to run away; 
he apprehends that this “adoption” entails his diminution into 
a subordinate deprived of autonomy. In lieu of this fate, he returns 
to the Woods’ passive subalterns, over whom he can preserve his 
status as progressor.
The Strugatskys themselves interpreted this episode as the 
intellectual culmination of Ulitka na sklone. As Boris wrote,
Historical truth here is on the side of the highly unpleasant, alien 
and unsympathetic to him [Candide], complacent and arrogant 
Amazons. The protagonist’s compassion fully belongs to the 
dumbish, ignorant, and helpless men and wives, who, nonetheless, 
have saved him, given him a wife and house, admitted him as 
one of their own. [. . .] What is a civilized person to do when he 
realizes where the progress that appalls him goes? How should 
he relate to this progress if he despises it?! (Strugatsky and 
Strugatsky 2000–2003, 4:613–14; author’s emphasis)14
The emotional incandescence of this commentary hides a few 
significant contradictions. Through their depiction of the paranormal 
women of the Woods, the Strugatskys, on the one hand, revitalize 
and invoke ancient myths of the Great Goddess or Great Mother 
(one of the women is pregnant; another turns out to be Nava’s long-
lost mother), spirits who occupy the liminal border between life 
and death. Their linkage with the mertviaki and drowned women 
14 «Историческая правда здесь на стороне крайне неприятных, чужих 
и чуждых ему [Кандиду], самодовольных и самоуверенных амазонок. 
А сочувствие героя целиком и полностью на стороне этих туповатых, 
невежественных, беспомощных и нелепых мужичков и баб, которые 
его, все-таки, как-никак, а спасли, выходили, жену ему дали, хату 
ему дали, признали его своим. [. . .] Что должен делать, как должен 
вести себя цивилизованный человек, понимающий, куда направлен 
отвратительный ему прогресс? Как он должен относиться к прогрессу, 
если этот прогресс ему поперек горла?!»
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hints at pagan mythological figures like the rusalki and Baba Yaga. 
On the other hand, the writers openly mock Western feminism, or 
at least the typically distorted image by which it was known to the 
late Soviet intelligentsia (see Goscilo 1996, 5–31). The association 
of these powerful women with Western feminism validates their 
characterization as the embodiment of progress that is appalling to 
Candide (and the authors).
But why exactly is this progress so appalling? The Strugatskys 
methodically underscore the negative traits of the Woodland 
hostesses—they are condescending, they humiliate Candide on 
the basis of his gender, they are unwilling to recognize the man’s 
personal merits. All these behaviors are meant to emphasize their 
role (and defuse Candide’s) as the colonial lords of the Woods. 
However, on closer inspection, it becomes clear that the goddesses’ 
power—the occult and the colonial—is not extrinsic to the territory. 
Unlike humankind’s Directorate of the Woods, their influence is 
inseparable from the Woods’ internal life, wherein it manifests its 
highest form, which remains unattainable to the progressor, who 
has fallen, literally, from the sky. The Strugatskys cannot imagine 
a power that is not divorced from the masses by a cultural gulf. 
(Perhaps this is a reflex of internal colonization?) Nonetheless, the 
witches’ might is not imperial, and in fact is much more effectual 
and rational than the strength of Earth’s science and civilization, 
imported by the Directorate. Women’s power resists Orientalization, 
yet it is still depicted in a critical, quasi-imperialist, color.
Only partially can this paradox be explained by the fact that 
Candide’s supremacy dissolves before the women of the Woods, 
meaning that he ceases, at this point, to be the progressor. He 
could concede their truth and surrender his authority in exchange 
for admission to their community as the most “progressive” 
and enlightened, but this fails to pass for reasons only of gender. 
Gender relations, as is well known, ordinarily replicate colonial 
configurations of mastership and subalternity; Candide cannot 
accept the dominion of women because it contradicts his—not 
only patriarchal but also (post)imperial—conception of power. 
According to Said, whose observation fully harmonizes with 
the Strugatskys’ progessor material, “Latent Orientalism also 
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encouraged a peculiarly (not to say invidiously) male conception of 
the world. [. . .] This is especially evident in the writing of travelers 
and novelists; women are usually the creature of a male power-
fantasy. They express unlimited sensuality, they are more or less 
stupid, and above all they are willing” (Said 1979, 207). The magic-
wielding woodswomen of Ulitka na sklone patently defy this model: 
they are definitively more progressive than women, as scrutinized 
through the Orientalist lens, they “should be.” Yet this progress 
is loathsome to the male protagonist, as it strips him of his own 
power. His self-identification, to which this power is vital, appears 
to supersede the notion of progress.
This sentiment resonates with certain other subplots in the 
Strugatskys’ library of progressor stories. One might recall the 
turbulent relationship of the progressor Lev Abalkin with his 
mistress Maia Glumova, whom he subjects to physical (in childhood) 
and psychological (in adulthood) abuse as an expression of his love 
for her. We also might notice how the Strugatskys’ progressors, in 
cross textual opposition to Ulitka na sklone’s witches of the Woods, 
constitute a veritable boys’ club. The same can be said of the utopian 
commune of scientist-wizards in Ponedelʹnik nachinaetsia v subbotu; 
in neither instance is the gender bias of the progressors or the 
reasons behind this exclusivity ever plainly articulated.
Orientalism—that toward Soviet authorities and the masses 
but also, as we can see, the “gender Orientalism” toward women—
appears to be inscribed into the progressor trope. The imperial 
situation in late-Soviet society materializes, alongside other 
discourses, through internal Orientalism, justified by a cultural 
distance, and emerges as a pillar of the intelligentsia’s (symbolic) 
power. The phantasy of the progressor, while manifesting 
Orientalist complexes, simultaneously serves up a thoroughly 
romantic image for the intelligentsia’s identification. Yet this model 
necessarily involves a logic of binary oppositions as the predicate 
for the progressor’s power. Despite his professed humanism, the 
progressor strives for the Other, and the process of othering (as 
Zhuk v muraveinike demonstrates) is inextricable from his mission.
The distinct division of the world into “us” and “them” 
begins to crumble, however, in the Strugatskys’ later works. If, in 
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the novels of the 1960s, the roster of “they” was unambiguous—
medieval Berias and the brutal masses in Trudno bytʹ bogom, or the 
“Fathers” with their bustling propaganda machines in Obitaemyi 
ostrov—the clarity of this category harshly waned in the novels 
of the 1980s. In Zhuk, the wanted “Other” Abalkin is encircled by 
an aura of compassion, while Sikorski, the appointed defender of 
“us” and “our” independence, repulses the narrator. Thus, binaries 
foundational for the progressor discourse appear to destabilize—
and this erosion resonates with the shift in the progressor’s focus, 
from the strategic acceleration of a subordinate society’s intellectual 
stock to the preservation of the progressor’s own identity. In other 
words, the progressor becomes increasingly concerned not with 
becoming like them but with the project of advancing them and 
improving their lives. This new interest first reaches center stage in 
Ulitka: illuminatingly, Boris Dubin interpreted both protagonists of 
this novel—Candide confronting the Woods and Peretz confronting 
the Directorate—as Soviet versions of existentialist “strangers” (see 
Dubin 2010, 162–63).
The hazard of becoming like the masses is rooted chiefly in 
the progressor’s resistance to the former’s collective fatalism and 
passivity, but the progressor’s alliance with the rulers likewise 
prefigures conformity to the imperial body. (Furthermore, either of 
these avenues implies the acceptance of violence.) The two scenarios, 
in fact, correlate precisely to the dual roles scripted by the imperial 
discourse: by resisting the gravitation of both the “masses” and the 
“authorities,” the progressor charts the path between the positions 
of imperial power and colonial subjectivity. He wishes to avoid the 
clutches of both and yet to remain the colonizer, colonizer-liberator, 
colonizer-enlightener.
As demonstrated in the Strugatskys’ late novels—Grad 
obrechennyi (The Doomed City; written in 1975, published in 1988–89), 
Volny gasiat veter, and Otiagoshchennye zlom (Overburdened with Evil, 
1988)—the identity of the enlightened colonizer, paradoxically, 
cannot find any other means for its realization than self-isolation, 
which, in turn, evicts all concern for the progressor’s mission. Heroic 
service to intergalactic Enlightenment is usurped by the instinct of 
self-preservation and its resistance to the allure of conformism.
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Promises of the most refined exemplification of this change of 
attitude lurk in the prospect for a novel that remained unwritten 
due to Arkady’s death in 1991. The book, tentatively titled Belyi ferzʹ 
(The White Bishop) or Operatsiia “Virus” (Operation “Virus”), was to 
have followed Maxim Kammerer’s exploits in the Island Empire 
on the planet Saraksh. Revising its depiction in Obitaemyi ostrov as 
a cannibalistic and militaristic Nazi-like state, in the new novel the 
world of the Empire would have consisted of three circles. The first, 
“hell,” is the region reserved for the masses: “Dregs of society [. . .] 
drunkards, outcasts, trash [. . .] they didn’t fear punishment and 
lived by laws of brute force, baseness and hatred. [. . .] By this circle 
the Empire bristled up against the rest of the universe, defended 
itself and attacked the others” (Strugatsky and Strugatsky 2000–
2003, 8:725).15 The second circle, “purgatory,” houses the “ordinary 
people”—presumably, the philistines and conformists—while the 
center, “paradise,” comprises a replica of the ideal world of the 
Noon Universe, whose values progressors have tried to export to 
remote worlds: “And in the center reigned the World of Justice. 
‘Noon. 22nd Century.’ Warm, friendly, a safe world of spirit, 
creativity and freedom, inhabited exclusively by talented, nice, 
and friendly people keeping holy faith in the commandments of 
the highest morality” (725).16 Naturally, this society—this Empire, 
to be more emphatic—requires segregation and discrimination as 
a precondition for its prosperity: “Everyone born in the Empire 
inevitably would find ‘his own’ circle, the society would gently (and 
if necessary, crudely) push him to where he belongs according to 
his talents, temper and moral potential. This distribution happened 
either automatically or with the help of a corresponding social 
15 «Подонки общества [. . .] вся пьянь, рвань, дрянь [. . .] тут не знали 
наказаний, тут жили по законам силы, подлости и ненависти. [. . .] 
Этим кругом Империя ощетинивалась против всей прочей ойкумены, 
держала оборону и наносила удары».
16 «А в центре царил Мир Справедливости. “Полдень. XII век.” Теплый, 
приветливый, безопасный мир духа, творчества и свободы, населенный 
исключительно людьми талантливыми, славными, дружелюбными, 
свято следующим всем заповедям самой высокой нравственности».
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mechanism (something like a vice department of the police). This 
was a world in which the principle ‘To each his own’ triumphed in 
its broadest interpretation” (725).17
Тhe Strugatskys surely remembered that the inscription “Jedem 
das Seine”—a translation of the Latin expression Suum cuique (“To 
each his own” or “Everyone gets what he deserves”)—adorned 
the entrance to Buchenwald, the infamous Nazi concentration 
camp (as well as, after the war, the NKVD Special Camp no. 2), 
a reference that leaves no doubt as to the true nature of this utopia. 
It is no wonder that Boris Strugatsky described the unwritten novel 
as “some summary of the whole worldview. Its epitaph. Or— 
a sentence?” (726).18
There is also no doubt that the worldview in question corresponds 
to the standpoint of the Soviet modernizing intellectual, epitomized 
by the progressor figure and his accompanying discourse. Most 
likely, the novel-to-be would have lowered an indictment on the 
progressor’s utopia. The similarity of the book’s proposed design to 
blueprints of colonial settlements exposes the core of the progressor 
project. As it turns out, even through self-isolation, the progressor 
cannot maintain the seat of an enlightened internal colonizer without 
mutating into an imperial power of aggression and domination.
Po s t - S ov i e t  R e eva l u at io n s  o f  t he  P r og r e s s or
The perseverance of the progressor device in the post-Soviet period 
testifies not only to the continuity between the “imperial situation” of 
the 1960s–80s and the “post-imperial situation” of the 1990s–2010s; 
it also sheds a certain light on the various meanings of the post- 
17 «Каждый, рожденный в Империи, неизбежно оказывался в “своем” 
круге, общество деликатно (а если надо—и грубо) вытесняло его туда, 
где ему было место—в соответствии с талантами его, темпераментом и 
нравственной потенцией. Это вытеснение происходило автоматически, 
и с помощью соответствующего социального механизма (чего-то, вроде 
полиции нравов). Это был мир, где торжествовал принцип “Каждому—
свое” в самом широком его толковании».
18 «Некий итог целого мировоззрения. Эпитафия ему. Или приговор? . .»
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prefix, revealing a diverse plethora of vectors, each differently 
connoting the rhetoric of modernization based on cultural distance 
and entailing internal Orientalization. Despite certain variations 
between representations of progressors in the works of such 
disparate artists as Aleksei German, Boris Akunin, Dmitry Bykov, 
Viktor Pelevin, and Sergei Lukʹianenko, one structural feature unites 
all of these recent progressor and progressor-like creations: as I will 
attempt to demonstrate further, post-Soviet progressors invariably 
operate as “switches” between imperial and colonial rhetorical 
modes, between the external and internal, between the enlightening 
shepherd and the repressed lamb. The progressor as a character type 
exemplifies the coexistence and mutual influence of postimperial 
and postcolonial models and forms of self-identification within 
post-Soviet culture.
One may isolate three prevailing treatments that the progressor 
receives in post-Soviet culture: (a) the progressor is heroized as 
a tragic figure embodying a nostalgia for lost historical 
opportunities and, more specifically, for the lost connection with 
the spirit of Enlightenment and humanism; (b) the progressor 
is relativized and emerges as a metaphor for the intelligentsia’s 
psychological mechanism of coping with historical catastrophe; or 
(c) the progressor is satirized as a byproduct or agent of the Western 
cultural or political colonization of Russia.
The finale of Aleksei German’s screen adaptation of Trudno bytʹ 
bogom opts to venerate the progressor, presenting this reverence in 
perhaps the most direct and impressive manner yet achieved. The 
film’s ending differs radically from that of the Strugatskys’ novel: 
while, in the text, Rumata leaves the affairs of Arkanar behind and 
returns to Earth, where a few red drops of strawberry remind of 
the blood he has spilled, German concludes his three-hour-long 
fresco with a stark, snow-coated landscape (visually reverting the 
mud and grime of the preceding scenes) and Rumata traveling in 
a sledge through the blinding white, breathing a soulful tune on 
some clarinet-like reed. The camera zooms in on his face, on which 
a smile of strange amazement, bordering insanity, has been fixed. 
Such a conclusion hardly signifies the hero’s liberation—or, if so, 
it grants his liberation only through death, through departure 
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from life, with all its dirt and dismay. Alternatively, this finale 
may be read as the procession of Rumata’s exile, or escape, from 
Arkanar, where he can no longer stay. Yet even in this case, the 
scene effects a visual requiem to the progressor and his attempts to 
uphold humanist values despite their inexorable defeat. According 
to German’s visual logic, however, the progressor’s cause had 
been lost before it began. Rumata’s dedication to behaving as an 
enlightened human being in an inhumane age is a mark of the truly 
tragic hero, who acts as the one of greater power, while aware of his 
incapacity to either dominate or improve this world, drowning in its 
own shit.
In Boris Akunin’s historical novella Ognennyi perst (The Fiery 
Finger, 2014), written as one of the fictional “illustrations” to the 
first volume of his megaproject Istoriia rossiiskogo gosudarstva (Тhe 
History of the Russian State, 2013–), a progressor appears in a less 
tragic light, yet with a more pronounced connection to imperial 
power than in the works of German and the Strugatskys. The author 
here directly establishes the connection between the protagonist of 
his novella and the Strugatskys’ Rumata. Two central characters, 
both amintes—secret agents of Byzantium, sent to the land of the 
Slavs—have the following dialogue:
“Did you notice how the prince’s guards you killed were looking 
at us? What was the look on their faces?”
“Fear. For Slavs—we are aliens, who possess unfathomable 
knowledge, and therefore are frightening.”
“To them we are not human, but superhuman beings. Here 
we are gods, who have descended as humans.”
“With just one difference: that we’re also mortals,” noted 
Damianos. (Akunin 2014, 246)19
19 — Ты обратил внимание, как на нас с тобой смотрели дружинники, 
которых ты убил? Какие у них были лица?
— Боязливые. Мы для славян — люди чужие, обладающие непонятным 
знанием, а потому страшные.
— Мы для них не люди, а сверхъестественные существа. Здесь мы—боги, 
спустившиеся к смертным.
— С той лишь разницей, что мы тоже смертные, — заметил Дамианос.
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Damianos is indeed believed to be of divine genesis: a Slavic girl 
called Radoslava, who falls in love with him, is certain that he is 
a forest deity. Consummating the parallel with Rumata, Akunin 
brands his Damianos with a birthmark on the forehead, reminiscent 
of Rumata’s “third eye” (although for the latter man, this is a hidden 
camera that documents his mission).
Damianos is assuredly a progressor: he undertakes to 
exterminate the marauding Viking bands and dreams of the 
blossoming of a yet-small and innocuous Kievan princedom into 
a formidable Byzantine outpost, a colonial megalopolis beside the 
regional Slavic tribes. He is dispatched to urge local princes and 
warlords toward decisions that are beneficial to Byzantium. On his 
execution of this charge, Akunin argues, hinges the fate of ancient 
Russia: a European path or an Asian one. (The first installments of 
Akunin’s Istoriia are illuminatingly titled Chastʹ Evropy [A Part of 
Europe] and Chastʹ Azii [A Part of Asia].) Thus, the writer presents his 
“historical progressor” (albeit with a slight touch of irony) as one 
who could directly and monumentally affect the historical trajectory 
of the entire country. His power to change the course of history 
is, no doubt, derivative of the imperial might that he represents. 
Akunin depicts Constantinople as an exemplar of national success, 
and its intellectual leader and father (literally) of all amintes as an 
advocate of benevolent imperial hegemony, delivering the light 
of civilization unto “wild” and “backward” clans. But, unlike his 
father, Damianos cannot detach himself sentimentally from the 
“natives”: when both he and his beloved Radoslava drink poisoned 
wine, Damianos gives his antidote to the Slavic girl and admits 
death. His self-sacrifice, however valorous in the present, undoes all 
beautiful, far-reaching prospects for Russia.
In German’s film and Akunin’s novella alike, the progressor’s 
putative godlike status epitomizes the essentialization of cultural 
distance in the imperial ruler-subaltern relationship. However, both 
Rumata and Damianos fail to be true gods. To be a god means to 
adopt a wholly external position toward base “savages”; instead, 
both heroes choose to remain human. Their stance signals the 
minimization of Orientalist attitudes and affirms that the life of the 
colonial subaltern is no less (or more) valuable than the progressor’s. 
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Inevitably, the humanistic choice spells doom to the progressor and 
to his mission.
Considering the reliably liberal leanings of both German and 
Akunin, one may argue that the elevation of the progressor as 
a martyr of Enlightenment ideals and values (in German’s film), 
or as the embodiment of lost historical alternatives (in Akunin’s 
novella), serves as a foundational layer of the contemporary liberal 
Russian imagination. Quite tellingly, Valeriia Novodvorskaia 
(1950–2014), a famous dissident and the founder of the Democratic 
Union Party, when asked in one of her final interviews how she 
sees her role in Russian society, referred to herself and her followers 
as “progressors” (see epigraph).20 Novodvorskaia backed up this 
self-definition with a perfectly Orientalizing description of the 
Russian “electorate” as nedeesposobnyi—passive and lacking rational 
direction:
A people that is not capable of electing a normal president, 
normal organs like parliament or Senate. A people that begs 
for alms from the authorities, that agrees with everything. And 
the majority, about 60%—this is “Putin’s mattress.” On such 
a mattress he can spend not just two but three terms. [. . .] This 
people has no agency. (Sobchak 2012)21
Novodvorskaia’s characterization probably most blatantly reveals 
the interconnectedness of seemingly opposite concepts within the 
progressor trope: the sense of his tragic doom and Orientalizing 
attitudes toward the masses. It is the essentialization of cultural 
distance that, while precipitating Orientalization of the “natives,” 
at the same time predicates the inevitable failure of the progressor’s 
utopia.
20 Notably, Novodvorskaia wrote a critical article on the Strugatsky brothers. 
See Novodvorskaia 2012.
21 «Народ, который не в состоянии избрать нормального президента, 
нормальные органы типа парламента или Сената. Народ, который 
выпрашивает у власти подачки. Народ, который на все согласен. 
А большинство, около 60%—это ‘Путинский матрас.’ На этом матрасе 
можно пролежать не только два, но и три срока. [. . .] А этот народ не 
дееспособен».
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Dmitry Bykov—who, along with Akunin, has become an 
intellectual leader of the anti-Putin movement and its protests in 
2011–14—aims with his adaptation of the progressor to deconstruct 
the essentialist notion of cultural distance and thus to abolish tragic 
fatalism. His novel Evakuator (The Evacuator, 2005) at first glance 
replicates a conventional progressor plot: computer engineer Igorʹ, 
initially in jest but then with gradually greater sincerity, convinces 
his lover Katia that he is an emissary of an idyllic civilization 
located in a remote star system, and that he has been sent to Earth 
as an observer and evacuator of select humans. Subsequently, 
he persuades Katia and five random strangers to fly away in his 
spaceship from Moscow, which in the meantime slips into chaos 
under a torrent of terrorist attacks.
Throughout this story, Bykov methodically overturns all the 
key components and plot points of the progressor narrative. First, 
the progressor and his beloved are followed in their departure by 
a second spaceship, ferrying a herd of Katia’s relatives and their 
friends, from all of whom she dreamed to escape. Second, the 
progressor’s home planet turns out to be as devastated as Russia. 
Third, the unfamiliar inheritors of this formerly perfect planet 
eventually outcast Igorʹ and Katia as inessential to their mundane 
needs and incompatible with their xenophobic worldview, forcing 
the lovers to fly away once again. And, finally, the entire tale of 
interplanetary exodus is revealed to be but a fruit of Igorʹ and 
Katia’s joint fantasizing, while they spend the night together in 
apprehension of a massive, preannounced terrorist attack on 
Moscow.
Though the inevitable isolation and downfall of the progressor 
remains intact, Bykov rids his narrative both of the sense of cultural 
superiority (Katia and Igorʹ are distinct from the others by their 
shared love, not by any prominent mental or cultural merits) and of 
the ensuing Orientalism. Instead of the essentialization of cultural 
distance, Bykov presents the progressor fantasy as a form of coping 
with a less and less manageable social reality. The daydream that 
has been embraced by the technical intelligentsia (both Igorʹ and 
Katia belong to this social stratum) acts as a counterweight to 
social despair and helplessness. Thus, the motif of the progressor’s 
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tragic doom, while preserved in Evakuator, stems in Bykov’s 
interpretation from the fact that this trope manifests anything but 
the symbolic power and cultural superiority of the intelligentsia. 
Rather, it compensates for the intelligentsia members’ post-Soviet 
transformation into a new generation of subalterns, manifested by 
their utter isolation from any means of power and any channels of 
influence on post-Soviet society. Notably, (post)colonial and (post)
imperial overtones are minimized in Bykov’s novel: they become 
increasingly irrelevant as the progressor gives up his mission of 
enlightenment and modernization, choosing instead to save himself 
and his loved ones from the impending calamity that he cannot 
prevent or control.
If all authors discussed above depict the progressor as the 
embodiment of internal Russian phenomena, two other Russian 
writers of extreme popularity—Sergei Lukʹianenko and Viktor 
Pelevin—utilize the trope of the progressor for a science-fictional 
representation of the West and its relations to Russia. Lukʹianenko, 
famous for his World of Watches cycle of novels—Nochnoi dozor 
(Night Watch, 1998), Dnevnoi dozor (Day Watch, 2000), Sumerechnyi 
dozor (Twilight Watch, 2004), and so on—and for Timur Bekmam-
betov’s screen adaptations of the series’ first two entries, is a flaming 
Russian nationalist.22 Pelevin is equally critical of Russian conser-
vatives and liberals, but in his Internet postings he consistently 
defends liberal views on the current events.23
Surprisingly, however, the two writers’ satirical takes on the 
progressor device share some basic features. In his novel Zvezdy—
kholodnye igrushki (Stars Are Cold Toys, [1997] 2004), Lukʹianenko 
openly mocks the Strugatsky brothers’ utopian World of the Noon 
(the motherland of all progressors) with his society of the Geometers. 
By means of an institution of Mentors, responsible for overseeing 
the development of each and every individual, the Geometers 
22 See his blog pages on LiveJournal under the avatars “doctor-livsy” (http://
doctor-livsy.livejournal.com/) and “dr_piliulkin” (http://dr-piliulkin.
livejournal.com/).
23 See his Facebook page at https://www.facebook.com/plvnv.
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maintain a civilization of hypocrisy, disguising strict regulation and 
psychological manipulation as brotherhood and loving care. These 
twisted principles define the Geometers’ relations with extramural 
cultures as well: their progressors are in fact “regressors,” whose 
goal is to degrade a foreign civilization into inferiority and to allow 
the Geometers’ society to conquer its “savages” by a program of 
“friendship”—that is, colonialization. Numerous signs (emphasized 
order, uncanny cleanliness, perpetual smiling, and so on) indicate 
that Lukʹianenko’s pen has scribbled “Geometers” where he means 
it to write “contemporary Western society,” while his protagonist, 
Petr Khrumov, represents the rebellion of the colonial subaltern 
against Western cultural and political domination.
Lukʹianenko’s novel as a whole represents a blueprint for 
the breadth of postimperial nationalism—exactly the scheme, in 
fact, that would be widely adopted by the Russian state media in 
orchestrating the annexation of Crimea and the conflict in eastern 
Ukraine. The imperialist methods of Orientalization are pitted 
against the “West” as an imaginary colonial oppressor. Consequently, 
the “West” is homogenized and demonized, and in this capacity 
cast as a symbol of hostile forces against which “all Russia” must 
unify. Old-fashioned strategies of the Soviet representation of the 
“capitalist West” merge here with a newfound conceptualization of 
Russia as a victim of hidden colonial oppression.
Zvezdy can be interpreted as a truly postcolonial work since its 
narrative patently rejects the progressor’s standpoint as repressive 
and evil. However, a closer look at its protagonist (a mouthpiece 
for the author) reveals that the “imperial situation” described 
above remains intact in the novel. Petr is neither a progressor nor 
a regressor; he is a secret agent, a mole among the Geometers, 
plotting to uncover their secrets and expose their true intentions. 
Curiously, while penetrating the Geometers’ society, the hero fuses 
in his body and mind three personae: himself, Petr Khrumov, an 
Earthling; Nik Rimer, a regressor for the Geometers; and a Kualkua, 
an amorphous creature who lives in symbiosis with another being. 
With the conjoined Kualkua’s assistance, Petr is able to mimic the 
real Rimer not only physically but also genetically. At the same time, 
his somatic partner equips him with supernatural resilience and 
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physical strength. In other words, while remolding progressors and 
their community into a metaphor of creeping Western colonization 
of post-Soviet Russian culture, Lukʹianenko depicts his (Russian) 
protagonist as the synthesis of a colonial subaltern and an imperial 
regressor, melded by the powers of a perfect transformer-imitator-
trickster. This “structure of the subject” suggests that, for the 
author and his hero, postcolonial posing as a repressed subaltern 
is really a tactical means to gain power: underneath the sheepskin 
of the subaltern crouches an aggressor, outfitted with extraordinary 
mimicry. Simply put, the face of the colonial subject, within the logic 
of Zvezdy—kholodnye igrushki, is but a mask, a cunning diversion in 
the imperial skirmish for domination.24
However much international acclaim Lukʹianenko has amassed, 
his contemporary Viktor Pelevin enjoys no less, and perhaps more. 
Many of the volumes in Pelevin’s prolific bibliography have become 
cornerstones of Russian postmodernism. In one of his recent novels, 
S.N.U.F.F. (2012; English translation of 2016 by Andrew Bromfield), 
the author deconstructs not only the figure of the progressor but 
also the essentialized image of the West as the alleged cultural 
and ideological colonizer of Russia. To this end, Pelevin presents 
a futuristic Earth stratified societally and geographically into two 
levels: on the planet’s surface reside the Orcs, denizens of the nation 
of Urkaina (derivative of urki, professional criminals in Russian 
prison argot), altogether ordinary people whose agency is limited 
by a deficit of technological progress and the heavy thumb of an 
autocratic, oligarchic political regime, reminiscent of Russia (and 
Ukraine) in the 2000s. Artificial spheres above the surface house 
the technologically superior society of the Big Biz (Big Business). 
These spheres are inhabited by “People,” whose lives are dictated 
by an intricate system of social codes, promoting sexual tolerance, 
feminism, and consumerism, along with other Western liberal 
values invariably depicted as repressive, hypocritical, and comic. 
24 The use of the rhetoric of “repressed minorities” by the Russian government 
and media to justify the annexation of Crimea and military intervention in 
eastern Ukraine might serve as a political parallel to Lukʹianenko’s sci-fi 
composition.
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The worship of Manity, a fusion of a computer monitor and money, 
paired with the People’s paralyzing dependence on information 
technologies (in these superterranean quarters, even the landscapes 
are computer simulations), roundly completes Pelevin’s satire of 
the architecture of Western culture.
S.N.U.F.F.’s protagonist is Damilola Karpov, military pilot and 
cameraman for CINEWS, a corporation that broadcasts a blend 
of news and fiction, pertaining predominantly to the world of the 
Orcs. Damilola is a parodic version of the progressor: with his 
flying camera/war machine he rescues two young lovers, Khloia 
and Grym, from the repressive Urkanian regime and evacuates 
them to the culturally advanced and (supposedly) politically 
emancipated Big Biz. The novel’s parody can be seen first in the 
fact that overweight Damilola operates his camera-copter from the 
private space of his apartment, and second in the counterfeit nature 
of the “rescue,” staged as a casus belli for the next “war” between 
the People and the Orcs.
Pelevin’s tale in certain ways exhibits a more complex form of 
Lukʹianenko’s logic. Yet if Lukʹianenko epitomizes postimperial 
nationalism, Pelevin imagines a new cycle of imperial exploitation, 
based on the sedative power of spectacles and simulacra rather than 
the abuse of economic and human resources. In the course of the 
novel, the reader realizes that the entire Orc civilization is actually 
a synthetic product of the Big Biz. The primary justification for the 
existence of Urkaina lies in regular warfare, wherein the People use 
machines and elaborate cinematic monsters as their proxy, while 
the Orcs arm themselves with medieval weaponry and dress in 
colorful, Hollywood-esque outfits. In fact, each new war (waged 
in the specially designed Circus) is but another gargantuan film 
production, recorded by scores of flying cameras, though the Orcs 
shed real blood and die by the thousands. For the “hyperreality 
of simulacra” epitomized by the Big Biz, the Orc wars serve as an 
indispensable source of truth, or in the Big Biz lingo, snuffs: real 
death and real sex. War provides the background for the production 
of porno films, used for Manity worship. In short, Urkaina supplies 
the Big Biz with material for further endless constructions of 
hyperreality.
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One of the novel’s plotlines follows the two extracted Orcs, 
Khloia and Grym, in their acclimation to the Big Biz culture. Khloia 
easily assimilates and gradually steels her pretty face into a “face 
of war,” while Grym, despite obtaining the enviable position of 
“content sommelier,” responsible for imitating the “rough Orcs’ 
truth,” recoils from the constant, ubiquitous simulations and 
eventually returns to Urkaina. The story of another subaltern, 
Damilola’s sex doll Kaia, plays out as a parallel and supplement to 
the Orcs’ narrative. Highly intellectually advanced, Kaia proves to 
Damilola that in the hyperreality of contemporary civilization there 
is no difference between her, a sentient rubber doll, and him, a war 
pilot and her owner. Their philosophical conversations, along with 
the Big Biz’s depicted “snuff dependence” on its colony of Urkaina, 
suggest that the dichotomy between the master and subaltern, and 
between the empire and its colonial possessions, sharply erodes in 
a society dominated by images rather than substances, by smoke 
and mirrors rather than scents and flesh—by simulations rather 
than reality.
The narrative arc bears fruitful evidence to sustain this argu-
ment. Kaia, thanks to her vast intellect and emotional complexity, 
acquires agency (Damilola calls it “bitchiness”) and falls in love 
with Grym. Ultimately, she manages to escape from Damilola’s 
possession and join Grym in the remote reaches of Urkaina. 
Damilola is ruined both morally and financially (before leaving, 
Kaia empties all of his accounts, and he still faces an outstanding 
debt for her purchase). Furthermore, Kaia and Grym’s elopement 
happens at the very moment when the Big Biz’s grip over the 
Urkainian autocracy is shaken and the People’s sphere is poised 
to collapse on Earth’s surface. As a result, a new war between the 
People and the Orcs is dawning—although in this clash the People 
will have to fight according to the Orcs’ rules, spelling the imminent 
defeat of the “masters.”
Both Lukʹianenko and Pelevin transform the progressor into 
a hypocritical conduit of exploitation and repression, projected onto 
the relations between Russia and the West. Russia, allegorized by 
the Conclave alliance of planets (including Earth) in Lukʹianenko’s 
novel and by Urkaina in Pelevin’s, becomes the extratextual referent 
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for a collective subaltern squashed by the paralyzing imperial 
power of the progressors (that is, regressors). Unlike other texts 
discussed above, Zvezdy—kholodnye igrushki and S.N.U.F.F. are 
truly postcolonial: they entail both the dissection of imperial power 
and its mask of liberal rhetoric, and the exploration of scenarios 
(illusive hypotheticals, granted) of subalternate emancipation from 
the specious imperial repression. Nonetheless, in both cases the 
foundational contrast between the imperial pincers and colonial 
pinched collapses. Lukʹianenko inadvertently exposes a key covert 
operation of the postcolonial rhetoric through the power-hunger and 
potential postimperialism of his protagonist. Pelevin deliberately 
demonstrates that the empire of the Big Biz, caramelizing in its 
sophisticated hive of simulation, relinquishes its capability for 
engaging with reality to its colonized subalterns—or rather, it 
manufactures subalterns as an inexhaustible fuel source of reality. 
This dependence loop, in Pelevin’s opinion, reduces even imperial 
domination to just another simulation, which can be undermined 
when the input—the subalterns, real and substantive—refuses to 
participate in the social games designed by the empire in its own 
interest. (Kaia’s receipt of agency from her owner exemplifies the 
logic of such a rebellion.)
Nevertheless, the representation of the progressor in post-Soviet 
culture, in a devolutionary molt from heroic and self-sacrificial 
martyr to overweight visual manipulator and evil regressor, proves 
that this trope in Russian culture of the last fifty years has epito-
mically expressed power dynamics associated with the ideology of 
modernization. Changing social and cultural attitudes to various mo-
dels of modernization produce correspondingly different editions 
of the progressor. However, despite these variations, the progressor 
device invariably continues to conceptualize modernization as 
a colonial procedure, which unavoidably problematizes the process, 
its goals, its methods, and—most importantly—its price.
The progressor continually emerges as both a model of cultural 
and symbolic power, justified by a cultural distance from the masses, 
and a compensatory fantasy of the late-Soviet and post-Soviet 
intelligentsia, lacking access to actual political clout. This duality 
explains why the progressor functions as the “switch” between the 
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roles of the master and subaltern, between the postimperial and 
postcolonial.
Finally, the progressor offers a tenable and symbolically rich 
example of the formation, deformation, and transformation of 
Soviet subjectivity, or more specifically, of the peculiar brand 
of this subjectivity that has been sculpted in the atmosphere of 
the Thaw, distinguished by enthusiastic dreams of a fusion of 
Soviet Communism with modernization founded on the ideals 
of the Enlightenment and humanism. The progressor provides 
a metaphoric documentation of this idea’s historical mutations 
since the failure of the Thaw era’s hopes. In other words, the 
progressor and its evolution have stood, and continue to stand, as 
a self-reflexive representation of Soviet liberals—as the mirror into 
which they stare, eyes straining to detect what has gone so wrong, 
and why.
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C y C l e s  a n D  C o n t i n u i t i e s  
i n  C o n t e m P o r a r y  r u s s i a n  l i t e r a t u r e
As Boris Gasparov suggested in his article on Pushkin, “History 
without Teleology,” reading the cultural process through the 
dichotomies of prose vs. poetry, archaists vs. innovators, culture 
vs. explosion, and so on can be productive despite the common 
anxiety surrounding binary oppositions, if one would “release 
these categories from the concept of the progressive historical 
development, within which they are typically invoked” (2003). 
Furthermore, according to Gasparov, parallel developments of 
contrary trends can be identified in any given period. The fact 
that one of these currents traverses the spotlight, manifesting the 
tenor of the time, while the other is marginalized and suspended 
in obscurity, permits the use of these dichotomies as a sensitive 
analytical tool.
Following this prompt, I will discuss in this article cycles and 
continuities that connect post-Soviet culture with the cultural 
phenomena of the Soviet period. I have no ambition of constructing 
an overarching and universalizing model; I fully realize that 
contemporary culture—Russian or any other—cannot be reduced to 
a generalized construct. Rather, I hope that the following might be 
taken as an intellectual provocation, demonstrating simultaneously 
the need for historical typologies in the study of the contemporary 
cultural process and the multiplicity of models that can be applied 
to it. I am not worried, therefore, over the contradictions that surely 
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await between articulations of the post-Soviet cultural process 
posited below. Taken separately, each approach would inevitably 
turn reductive; multiple overlapping angles, however, have a better 
chance of capturing a three-dimensional image of the present 
cultural dynamics.
“ S i m p l i c i t y”  /  “ C om p l ex i t y”
In the early 2000s, talk about the tiredness of overly “complex” 
forms (i.e., postmodernist, avant-gardist, and modernist 
experiments) became epidemic in Russian literary criticism. Out of 
this discourse emerged the notion of “the end of postmodernism,” 
followed by a deluge of manifestos declaring the “new realism” in 
prose, drama, and even poetry (see, for example, Basinskii 2000, 
Beliakov 2009, Bolʹshakova 2009, Ermolin 2006). The shift from 
“complex” (sophisticated, self-reflective, fragmentary) forms to 
“simpler” (transparent, coherent, and democratic) forms is not 
a new phenomenon in the twentieth-century culture.
Heinrich Wölfflin (1996) was probably the first to propose 
a dichotomy of styles dominated by either an “open” or a “closed” 
form. Dmitry Chizhevsky (1952) had argued that literary styles 
oscillate between two extremes: the pursuit of unity and the pursuit 
of complexity. While the former quest produces completed forms, 
the latter generates free-form and even “formless” phenomena. 
A similar dichotomy is reflected in the typology of “primary” and 
“secondary” styles developed by Dmitrii Likhachev (1973) and 
applied to the nineteenth- and twentieth-century literature by Igorʹ 
Smirnov (2000). In the 1990s, Georgii Knabe maintained that the 
development of art is defined by fluctuations within the dichotomy 
of “culture vs. life” (1993). In his last book, on the theory of genre, 
Naum Leiderman (2010) divided “grand” styles as gravitating 
toward the diametric poles of cosmological and chaological 
strategies in aesthetic world-modeling.
All these dichotomies implicitly presuppose life or reality 
as something independent of cultural production. Unlike these 
prominent scholars, I share the belief that “life” cannot be anything 
but a product of “culture.” In other words, the “life” situated at 
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the heart of a new “simplified” cultural process is always the 
remnant of another preceding “complex” period. During each 
“complex” period, new constructs of the real are introduced and 
tested; during the ensuing “simple” periods, these new concepts 
seem congruent with “life,” which testifies to their adoption into the 
culture. Therefore, a fluctuation between “complex” and “simple” 
forms may be described as a shift between the creation of new, yet 
incessantly changing, concepts of the real, and the appropriation 
of already-existing models that are mistaken for actual reality by 
authors and audiences alike. Thus, it would be more accurate to 
speak about an ongoing competition of two modalities: one reader-
oriented (“simple”) and the other author-oriented (“complex”), 
in the same sense that an utterance can be speaker- or listener-
oriented.
Also, unlike the scholars cited above, I doubt that such 
dichotomies—should they be discernible in the cultural process—
necessarily produce new styles or aesthetic systems. These 
modalities can develop within (or above) any aesthetic language—
modernist, postmodernist, or even avant-gardist—without altering 
its inner structure. For instance, the case of the “simplification” of 
the avant-garde can be illustrated through the use of avant-garde 
tropes in posters of the late 1920s and early ’30s, or even in Sergei 
Eisenstein’s films of the ’30s and ’40s (see, for example, Bonnell 
1999; Neuberger 2003, 25–135).
The discussion that proceeded in the 2000s about “the end of 
postmodernism” appears to be quite symptomatic. In my book 
Paralogii (Paralogies, 2008), I have argued that attempts to concep-
tualize contemporary Russian literature in terms of the twilight of 
postmodernism, post-postmodernism, “new realism,” and so on, 
are misleading. Such trends as New Drama, contemporary poetry, 
and even the recycling of Socialist Realist tropes in the pop culture 
of the 2000s still employ postmodernist tactics:1 the “reality effect” 
resurges here as a mutable product of language games, and even 
when binary oppositions seem to be restored, the authors leave 
1 See “Post-Soc” in this volume.
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a handy loophole for their ironic interpretation. The latter device 
was successfully tested for the first time in Aleksei Balabanov’s Brat 
2, a film that can well be interpreted as a straight-faced expression 
of xenophobic ideology, yet leaves ajar the door to perceiving it as 
a postmodernist mockery of post-Soviet nationalism. This opportu-
nity was gladly met by many liberal-minded critics, who scrabbled 
at the inviting sliver, flung open the door, and heliolatrously lauded 
this film despite its explicit nationalistic message.
On the topic of postmodernism, it is worth recalling that 
bridging the gap between highbrow modernist and commonplace 
popular culture was decreed one of the central goals of Western 
(and especially American) postmodernism in the late 1960s–70s 
(Fiedler 1972). For Russian postmodernism, developing in the 
underground synchronously with its Western counterparts, this 
task was quite irrelevant. However, in the wake of Viktor Pelevin’s 
Generation “P” (1999) and Vladimir Sorokin’s Goluboe salo (Blue Fat, 
1999), Russian postmodernism launched a campaign for a broader 
readership, which, in turn, precipitated easy-to-follow plotlines 
in place of self-reflective meditation, references to politics of the 
day and popular culture rather than broad and sophisticated 
cultural allusions, (quasi-)relatable and recognizable characters 
rather than metamorphosing narrative masks and multilayered 
voices, monological narratives rather than polyphonic discourses, 
coherence rather than fragmentation, and an interest in social 
and political subjects rather than philosophical inquiry. Another, 
quite significant, indicator of such a seismic shift in the 2000s can 
be detected in the transition from the deconstruction of various 
cultural myths to a new industry of mythmaking; even if these 
myths are individual, they are still presented by their authors as 
universal and, typically, enforce binary oppositions. This tendency 
is exemplified by such works as Sorokin’s Ice Trilogy (Led; Putʹ Bro 
[Bro, 2004]; 23,000 [2005]); by Dmitry Bykov’s novels, especially 
ZhD; by the evolution of Evgenii Grishkovets’s plays; by Nikita 
Mikhalkov’s films of the 2000s; and by Andrei Khrzhanovsky’s 
much-acclaimed cinematic rendition of the romantic lore 
surrounding Nobel laureate Joseph Brodsky, Poltory komnaty 
(A Room and a Half, 2009).
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The turn in the new millennium toward reader- or viewer-
oriented discourses may be seen as one crest among many waves 
that first rippled through the entire twentieth century. The Silver 
Age of Russian modernism, spanning the 1890s–1910s, beheld the 
radical innovation and complication of poetic discourses. These 
tandem winds of creative and critical reevaluation extended to 
the field of prose in the 1920s and converged with a trend toward 
a breezy oversimplification of artistic language. In the ’30s, the latter 
habit took the upper hand, due not only to the pressure of Socialist 
Realism: Boris Pasternak’s laboring for “unheard-of simplicity” 
and Anna Akhmatova’s affinity for “epic” forms, detectable even 
in Rekviem (Requiem, 1940), do not necessarily satisfy the Socialist 
Realist doctrine, but do resonate with the reader-oriented vector of 
the period. The 1950s, conversely, witnessed the transmogrification 
of Socialist Realism into highly codified art, ornate and sometimes 
nearly baroque in its fantasticality.
Yet a few years later, “the generation of the sixties” was 
invigorated by a drive toward “sincerity” (to use Vladimir 
Pomerantsev’s catchphrase, from the title of his famous article 
“Ob iskrennosti v literature” [“On Sincerity in Literature,” 1953]). 
The decade saw emerging a specific kind of social (not socialist!) 
realism, the so-called “lieutenant” and “youth” prose, as well as 
a new brand of ideological realism best represented by Solzhenitsyn’s 
novels V kruge pervom (The First Circle, 1968) and Rakovyi korpus 
(The Cancer Ward, 1968), and Vasily Grossman’s Zhiznʹ i sudʹba (Life 
and Fate, 1959), which was ironically labeled by Sergei Dovlatov 
“Socialist Realism with a human face.” Along with attention to 
the details of everyday life, the author’s “sincerity,” understood as 
a direct, if naive, reaction to the catastrophic twists of history, was 
also responsible for the success of the poets Evgenii Evtushenko, 
Bulat Okudzhava, and Andrei Voznesenskii, as well as that of 
Aleksandr Volodin’s plays. By contrast, “the long seventies” (1968–
86) exhibited the surge of “complex” literature and film, not only 
through the development of underground phenomena belonging 
to modernist, avant-gardist, and even postmodernist aesthetics 
but also due to the deeply intricate system of hints, ellipses, and 
allusions maintained by published Soviet authors (for instance, 
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Iurii Trifonov) and filmmakers (Andrei Tarkovsky, Kira Muratova, 
Aleksei German).
Perestroika and the ’90s were reminiscent, somewhat, of the ’20s: 
during this late- and post-Soviet period, the simplistic social realism 
distilled from the Thaw developed alongside postmodernism as 
it rose from the underground and began to influence the cultural 
mainstream. These years witnessed more than the parallel 
dynamic of “simplistic” and “complex” tendencies; they were also 
characterized by a revival of the so-called returned literature. Texts 
that had been banned during the Soviet period for political reasons 
created an unprecedented circumstance when the high modernism 
of the 1920s–30s, with all its complexity, suddenly acquired a new 
cultural and political urgency.
Finally, since the late 1990s and throughout the 2000s, we can 
observe another shift toward “simplicity” as manifested by the 
spread of the languages of mass culture and myth construction. The 
rise of Internet-based forms of literature is especially demonstrative 
of the reader-oriented modality: in blogs, fan fiction, and other forms 
of net-lit, the reader is the writer; the borderline between audience 
and author is deliberately blurred. That said, it is important to 
remark that the opposite tendency did not vanish in the 2000s: 
sophisticated and multilayered high modernist novels,2 or new 
films by Kira Muratova, Aleksei German, and Aleksandr Sokurov, 
all mark the presence of a “complex” countercurrent underneath 
the “new simplicity” of the 2000s. It would be a stretch to consider 
this literature as lacking an audience: Mikhail Shishkin’s recitation 
of excerpts from his Pisʹmovnik (Letter-Book) was certainly among 
the most attended events of the Moscow Book Festival in June 2010.
The “complex” undertow can be located in other epochs of 
“simplicity” as well, and vice versa. Silver Age poetry enjoyed 
2 For example, Mikhail Shishkin’s Vziatie Izmaila (The Taking of Izmail, 2000), 
Venerin volos (Maidenhair, 2005), and Pis’movnik (Letter-Book, 2010); the 
meditative prose of Aleksandr Golʹdshtein’s Pomni o Famaguste (Remember 
Famagusta, 2004) and Spokoinye polia (Quiet Fields, 2006); and Andrei Levkin’s 
Golem, russkaia versiia (Golem, Russian Version, 2000), Mozgva (2005), and Marpl 
(2010).
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less popularity in the 1900s–1910s than neorealist prose. Andrei 
Platonov’s most complex works, such as Kotlovan (The Foundation 
Pit, 1930) and Schastlivaia Moskva (Happy Moscow, 1933–36), were 
composed during the “simplistic” ’30s. And the aforementioned 
“returned” modernist masterpieces of Zamiatin and Nabokov were 
misread during the perestroika period as predominantly political 
and antitotalitarian statements; that is, their meaning was reduced 
to a narrow spectrum of simple political ideas.
T he  Me a n i n g  o f  “Po s t”
What conclusions can we draw from all these observations? 
Evidently, transitional periods such as the 1920s and 1990s are 
marked by a relative, albeit conflictful, balance between reader- and 
author-oriented tendencies. Phases dominated by author-oriented, 
“complex” poetics, such as the Silver Age or the long seventies, tend 
to precede catastrophic or revolutionary historical shifts. But what 
is the common denominator between the Stalinist thirties, the Thaw, 
and the 2000s? Is it consumerism? A relief in “traditional values” 
after typhoons of revolutionary and totalitarian experiment? Not 
quite; perhaps it would be more productive to seek common tracks 
not in the features that are inherent in any given decade but in the 
self-descriptions of each period, which immediately surprise with 
their similarity. All periods of “simplicity” were regarded from 
within as following times of trouble, days of havoc and chaos—
radical, tectonic shifts and the attendant muddle: in short, traumatic 
episodes concerning society at large, be it the Revolution and Civil 
War, the Stalinist terror, or the anarchic nineties. Thus, one might 
be expected to claim that times culturally marked by the reign of 
a reader-oriented tendency imagine themselves as posttraumatic.
From this premise, I would like to propose another hypothesis: 
What if “simplistic” and “complex” tendencies in cultural history 
correlate to two opposing scenarios of digesting traumatic 
experiences—of acting out and of working through? Of course, any 
artistic work in some sense “works through” traumas, personal and 
societal alike. But the resonance between diverse compositions of 
the same historical hour suggests that certain remedial methods 
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acquire greater urgency and attract more limelight during “complex” 
moments, while others dominate “simplistic” ones.
The reader-oriented modality arises, perhaps, as an attempt to 
address and reflect recent traumatic experiences in a most direct way. 
Socialist Realism is not an exception in this context—it only entails 
a compulsory positive outlook on the traumas of the Revolution and 
the Civil War, and most importantly, of Stalinist modernization. As 
to post-Soviet culture of the 2000s, here the concept of trauma is 
multifold, but consists mainly of two contradictory and overlapping 
components: the trauma of Soviet history seen in its wholeness, from 
the Revolution to “developed socialism,” and the trauma caused 
by the collapse of Soviet civilization in the 1990s (see Oushakine 
2010a).
Through Dominick LaCapra’s interpretation of Freud, one may 
define such cultural emergency-response measures as the acting out 
of trauma (frequently mistaken for realism): “Acting-out is related 
to repetition, and even the repetition compulsion—the tendency to 
repeat something compulsively [. . .] [a tendency] to repeat traumatic 
scenes in a way that is somehow destructive and self-destructive. [. . .] 
Acting-out is a process, but a repetitive one. It’s a process whereby 
the past, or the experience of the other, is repeated as if it were fully 
enacted, fully literalized” (1998, 2, 5). This definition corresponds to 
many phenomena of recent Russian culture, such as the fascination 
with (quasi) documentary, a new wave of hypernaturalism as 
manifest in New Drama (see Beumers and Lipovetsky 2009), and 
photographic representation (from a minimal distance) of everyday 
traumatic experiences in present-day nonfiction (including blogs). 
The repetition impulse can also be detected in the frantic recycling of 
Socialist Realist tropes endemic to 2000s pop culture, the infatuated 
revival of Soviet songs (Starye pesni o glavnom), regular remakes of 
popular Soviet films, and the literal and metaphorical recoloring of 
Soviet “cult” series such as Semnadtsatʹ mgnovenii vesny, as well as 
in Sergei Ursuliak’s miniseries Isaev (2009), a prequel to the Shtirlitz 
spy saga that captivated viewers in 1973.
However, the acting out of trauma has certain intrinsic 
limitations. These are most evident in the evolution of New 
Drama: the hypernaturalist poetics of this movement, articulated 
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by various performances of brutality, aspire to act out the trauma 
of the nineties generation, of those who were too late to quaff 
the humid euphoria of perestroika but got the full downpour of 
disappointments, frustrations, and most importantly, violence that 
accompanied the collapse of the Soviet economy and system in the 
’90s. Theirs is the generation traumatized by the everyday violence, 
who immersed themselves in violence as a basic and common 
language. The isomorphism between trauma and the language of 
its performance makes for a powerful emotional impact, heaved in 
the abrasive New Drama productions—although the bruise did not 
last for more than a few years.
In the plays of New Drama, communication through 
carnage—and further, the elevation of violence into a language of 
transcendental pursuit—not only saps all alternative channels of 
self-identification and self-realization but also leads its speakers 
to the ultimate self-destruction, or at least reduces them to hueless 
husks. The semiotic mechanism of New Drama is represented self-
reflexively in Kirill Serebrennikov’s film Izobrazhaia zhertvu (Playing 
the Victim, 2006), based on the Presniakov brothers’ play of the same 
title. Performance (of savagery, of victimization) constructs the 
protagonist’s and other characters’ existence solely out of violent 
interaction. Valia (the protagonist) can find no escape from this 
“reality” except through the annihilative maw of death: the murder 
of his entire family, by poison that he administers, functions both as 
a rebuke for their contentment to live in a false world and as his own 
logical conclusion to the violent nature of the real. This is where the 
acting out of trauma reaches its limit, fatally demonstrating that the 
reproduction of languages of violence as the main source of trauma 
does not engender any other forms of communication. The traumatic 
is first presented as an identity-forming device, then aestheticized 
(and sometimes ritualized), and finally—inexorably—automatized 
and commercialized. Yet all these operations remain chained to 
the compulsion to repeat (i.e., they themselves belong to the realm 
of the traumatic), and more importantly, they fail to produce, in 
LaCapra’s words, the “necessary critical distance” that allows one 
“to engage in life in the present, to assume responsibility—[which] 
does not mean that you utterly transcend the past” (1998, 5).
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The crisis of New Drama has led to the emigration of many of its 
playwrights and theater directors to the cinema, and to the translation 
of New Dramatic aesthetics into cinematic language. This exodus 
is responsible for some of the key Russian films of recent years.3 
Such films blatantly depart from the orientation toward audience 
expectations, as testified, for example, by the public scandals 
associated with Korotkoe zamykanie (Crush, 2009) or Sergei Loznitsa’s 
Schastʹe moe (My Joy, 2010). In their own ways, these works hint of 
a renaissance of auteur cinema, with its meditative tempo, sustained 
long shots, and diminished plot intensity; in other words, they seek 
a new complexity. These films render the destructive outcomes of 
communication through violence in a suggestive rather than an 
explicit way, allowing gaps in the film’s texture and forcing viewers 
to seek their own, emotional rather than rational, justifications of 
the filmic logic.
Thus, it is not plainly stated why Valia in Izobrazhaia zhertvu 
decides to kill his family; why Pasha in Popogrebskii’s Kak ia provel 
etim letom does not immediately tell his boss about the tragedy that 
has befallen the latter’s wife and son; why Proskurina’s road movie 
is entitled Truce; and why Loznitsa’s travelogue, hopeless and blood 
saturated (with a similar plot to that of Proskurina’s film), bears the 
title My Joy.
I would like to argue that these and similar inner lapses 
stimulate a critical distance that constitutes the working through of 
the same traumatic experience that was acted out in New Drama. 
According to LaCapra, “In the working-through, the person tries to 
gain critical distance on a problem, to be able to distinguish between 
past, present, and future” (1998, 2). This distinction, I stress, is 
3 For example, Ivan Vyrypaev’s Eiforiia (Euphoria, 2006) and Kislorod (Oxygen, 
2009), Vasilii Sigarev’s Volchok (Wolfy, 2009), Aleksei Popogrebskii’s Kak 
ia provel etim letom (How I Ended This Summer, 2010), Boris Khlebnikov’s 
Svobodnoe plavanie (Free Floating, 2006) and Sumasshedshaia pomoshchʹ (Help 
Gone Mad, 2009), Valeriia Gai Germanika’s Vse umrut, a ia ostanusʹ (Everybody 
Dies but Me, 2008), Aleksei Mizgirev’s Kremenʹ (The Hard-Hearted, 2007), Bakur 
Bakuradze’s Shultes (2008), Aleksei Fedorchenko’s Ovsianki (Silent Souls, 
2010), Svetlana Proskurina’s Peremirie (Truce, 2010), and Sergei Loznitsa’s 
Schastʹe moe (My Joy, 2010).
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based on the demonstrated instability of binary oppositions. The 
working through of trauma, unlike its hastier cousin, tries by all 
means to avoid the mechanism of scapegoating, which is in turn 
based on pure binaries between past and present, self and other, 
and so on.
T he  M a i n s t r e a m  a n d  Мa g i c a l  H i s t or i c i s m
Such mainstream writers of the 2000s as Boris Akunin, Viktor 
Pelevin, Dmitry Bykov, Aleksandr Terekhov, Mikhail Elizarov, 
Liudmila Ulitskaya, and Olga Slavnikova do not pursue an “ad-
equate” imprint of the traumatic experience. Using various forms 
of modernist and (sometimes) postmodernist defamiliarization, 
such as grotesque, phantasmagoria, mythmaking, and so on, they 
instead attempt to whittle a critical distance into the reenactment 
of traumatic experience, personal and collective alike. Furthermore, 
these writers are above all concerned with the mutual connection be-
tween Soviet and post-Soviet traumas—a relationship that the “new 
realists” failed to recognize. We can see this most palpably drawn 
in works like Olga Slavnikova’s novels Вessmertnyi (The Immortal, 
2001), 2017 (2006), and Legkaia golova (Light-Headed, 2010); Bykov’s 
ZhD; and Akunin’s stylized vision of prerevolutionary Russia, 
permeated by portents of coming historical catastrophes and re-
plete with tongue-in-cheek references to post-Soviet disappoint- 
ments.
Alexander Etkind has recently introduced an analytical model 
for gauging this literature’s relation to traumatic experience through 
his concept of magical historicism. In his book Warped Mourning: 
Stories of the Undead in the Land of the Unburied (2013), Etkind isolates 
the defining principle of this retrospective fancy as the dialectic of 
reenactment and defamiliarization. The scholar focuses on motifs 
of the uncanny typical for this mode of literature, including ghosts, 
vampires, and werewolves, as signs of the returned repressed—
first and foremost, in Etkind’s view, the repressed memory of the 
victims of Stalinist repressions. Invoking the Freudian concept of 
melancholia and Benjamin’s ideas on the work of mourning, Etkind 
argues that in this literature
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the past is perceived not just as “another country” but as an exotic 
and unexplored one, still pregnant with unborn alternatives 
and imminent miracles. [. . .] Possessed by the ghostly past and 
unable to withdraw from its repetitive contemplation, post-Soviet 
writers find themselves trapped in a state of melancholia. [. . .] 
The inability to differentiate oneself from the lost object prevents 
the individual from living in the present, from love and work. 
On the political level, the reverse is probably equally important: 
when there is no choice in the present, the historical past unfolds 
into an overwhelming narrative that obscures the present rather 
than explaining it. (2013, 234)
Despite his bitter appraisal, Etkind concludes that “magical 
historicism does have critical potential,” since its propelling minds 
“are recognizably different from those authors who use realistic 
techniques to spread their pro-Soviet nostalgia, like Aleksandr 
Prokhanov or Maksim Kantor” (235)—or, one might add, the “new 
realists” of the younger generation.
While accepting Etkind’s proposal broadly, I would suggest 
a few amendments. We should not forget that “the inability to 
differentiate oneself from the lost object” acquires a peculiar form 
in many mainstream texts. Writers like Bykov, Terekhov, Elizarov, 
and Slavnikova find unanticipated concurrence in depicting present 
or future Russian history as a reprise of Soviet patterns. Thus, they 
thematicize the repetition itch. However, in magical historicism it is 
not the authors (as in “new realism”) but their penned personages 
who undergo the reenactment of trauma, while the scripter 
observes their perturbation with varying degrees of alienation and 
sometimes contempt.
These writers more typically nominate the traumatic echo as 
the “objective” feature of Russian history, as a foundational myth 
of sorts. In Bykov’s ZhD, this configuration is materialized through 
the author’s schematic of history driven by the cyclical clash of two 
forces: Khazars—liberals, Jews, or Westernizers; and Varangians—
nationalists, statists, and militarists, repeatedly colonizing and 
recolonizing Russia. In Slavnikova’s 2017, it is not the pressure of 
present-day political or social problems—mostly obviated in her 
novel—but a mere memorial reenactment of the October revolution, 
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performed during the centennial celebrations, that triggers a new 
quasi-revolutionary eruption.
Most characteristic in this respect is Aleksandr Terekhov’s 
historical crime novel Kamennyi most (The Stone Bridge, 2009), in 
which the replication of the traumatic past is internalized by the 
narrator, a former KGB officer and collector of toy soldiers. On the 
order of some mystical authority, he leads the inquest into the 1943 
murder of Nina Umanskaia, daughter of the Soviet ambassador 
to the United States, allegedly killed by the son of the aviation 
industry minister Vladimir Shakhurin. The investigation, the 
search for meaning in this heinous and legendary crime (the so-
called delo volchat, “wolfies’ affair”) is constructed as an exhaustive, 
more than eight-hundred-page-long Gordian knot of self-repeating 
interviews and inquiries with witnesses living and dead, all leading 
practically nowhere (it is one of Mikoian’s sons who probably killed 
Nina—so what?) and testifying only to the hollow core of Stalinist 
trauma.
Theodor Adorno wrote of the resistance that worn memory 
poses to a working through of the past: “It tenaciously persists in 
glorifying the National Socialist era, which fulfilled the collective 
fantasies of power harbored by those people who, individually, 
had no power and who indeed could feel any self-worth at all only 
by virtue of such collective power” (2005). The diagnosis applies 
well to Terekhov’s novel, wherein the narrator finds existential and 
even metaphysical meaning in his ceaseless, senseless investigation 
precisely because it affords him the ability, or rather the opportunity, 
to immerse into communal reveries of power. Power in Kamennyi 
most is represented equilaterally by, on the one hand, the “men 
of Truth” (liudi Pravdy, the sobriquet used by the narrator for the 
NKVD and KGB henchmen without the lightest touch of irony), 
whom the narrator impersonates in his metaphysical quest, and, 
on the other hand, by the Soviet elite—“the Emperor” (as Stalin is 
exclusively referred to) and his ministers (pravda zheleznykh liudei, 
“men of iron”).
Mikhail Elizarov loudest of all proclaims his nostalgia for the 
Soviet epoch—less in his novels, though, than in his interviews. 
Among his written works, especially demonstrative is the Booker 
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Prize–winning Bibliotekarʹ (The Librarian, 2008), in which he depicts 
the restoration of Soviet mythology as a transcendental signified, 
alleging a meaningful answer while enveloping the characters 
in the world of enduring violence and trauma. Resultantly, the 
narrative transforms into a tragicomic ritual of self-destruction for 
those who seek this promised Truth. Nonetheless, the absorption of 
power—the symbolic sort, at least—becomes the ultimate objective 
in Elizarov’s reanimations of Soviet discourses.
These writers’ efforts to retake Soviet history contralogically 
testify to the opposite—to the persistent injury of the recent historical 
experience (the collapse of the USSR and the painful post-Soviet 
contortions of the former Soviet society) as a source of unremedied 
historical disorientation. One may conclude that in these works the 
“critical distance” rent by defamiliarizing turns is sutured by the 
acting out of trauma: grotesquerie and mythologization appear not 
to be strong enough aesthetic quakes to achieve the effective critical 
distance that would process the reenactment of trauma into the 
working through of trauma.
The greater the distance between author and personage, the 
more obvious is the association between most traumatic phenome-
na in magical historicism and the inability to sieve the past from the 
present, dependence on the Soviet historical and rhetorical pattern 
seeming to dictate the logic of today’s events and behavior. This 
dependence condemns characters, endlessly, inescapably, to revisit 
and re-incur Soviet catastrophe and to reenact post-Soviet calami-
ties. All the authors of magical historicism conceive of history as 
an irrational, nightmarish déjà vu, from which one cannot extricate 
oneself by any effort. Terekhov and Elizarov accept this verdict with 
almost religious ecstasy; Slavnikova and Ulitskaya psychologize it, 
and therein, intentionally or not, reconcile with habitual recursion 
as the norm; while Dmitry Bykov seeks rational algorithms behind 
the irrational historical turns.
Pelevin represents the most paradoxical expression of this 
dependence. Beginning with Omon Ra (1993), he has essentially 
rewritten, with varying specifications, the same story: how a man 
becomes a god, and what doing so means. In Pelevin’s earlier 
texts—plus the plotline of A Huli in Sviashchennaia kniga oborotnia 
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(The Sacred Book of the Werewolf, 2003)—this was a tale of achieving 
ultimate freedom. However, in his output since Generation “P” 
(including the plotline of FSB general Sasha Seryi in Sviashchennaia 
kniga) and with the utmost persistence and even despair in his 
later works—Ampir V (Empire V, 2006), Operatsiia “Burning Bush” 
(Operation “Burning Bush,” 2010), S.N.U.F.F.—he demonstrates how 
the “ascension” of his hero into a godlike being changes nothing, 
frequently even worsening affairs both for the rookie deity and 
for the world around them. The deification of the protagonist thus 
deflates and dissolves into the churning tapioca of déjà vu, historical 
and ahistorical alike—but always very Russian, despite numerous 
signs of globalization.
Although Etkind counts Sorokin and Vladimir Sharov among 
“magical historicists,” this title can be bestowed neither on Sorokin’s 
later works nor on Sharov’s novels of any period. Sorokin has 
slipped into the mainstream only once, with his Ice Trilogy, in which 
he invented a metamyth factoring in occultist scholarship of the 
Silver Age, totalitarian ideologies (Soviet and Nazi alike), and New 
Age motifs. This myth poeticized the traumatic “eternal return,” 
prohibiting any alternatives to it; no wonder the mortal opponents 
of the Brotherhood of Ice, in the final movement of the trilogy, 
actually accepted the truth and the message of their foes, thus 
becoming their heirs. Denʹ oprichnika (Day of the Oprichnik, 2006), 
Sakharnyi Kremlʹ (Sugar Kremlin, 2008), Metelʹ (Blizzard, 2010), and 
Monoklon (Monoclone, 2011) manifest a different logic: in these texts, 
Sorokin declares the impossibility of overcoming the traumatic past 
as Russia’s central and sharpest affliction, permitting old wounds 
to scorbutically split open and ache and precipitating new ones 
through the self-destructive replication of yesterday’s pains. True 
to his conceptualist schooling, Sorokin in these books focuses on the 
language—that is, the embodied cultural tradition—that, according 
to him, is the fountainhead of the compulsive reenactments of 
trauma in disparate historical settings. These works explore cultural 
dialects as tongues of trauma; in fact, considering the healthy critical 
distance they keep from their subjects, languages are essentially 
promoted to the office of main characters. The deconstruction of 
cultural linguistic patterns as sources and mechanisms of recurring 
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historical traumas is Sorokin’s method of working through trauma 
and his alternative to the mainstream.
As to Sharov, his mode of operation recalls magical historicism 
on the surface, while being quite alien to it in deeper layers. 
Each of his novels could be cursorily read as a reenactment of 
the catastrophe of the revolution and terror, which his characters 
invariably interpret as yet another failed attempt of the Second 
Coming, a missed renewal of the world. However, what seems to 
be natural and sensible in the process of reading is utterly lost if 
one attempts to retell his plots. Sharov inserts imperceptible pitfalls 
of defamiliarization into his diorama of disaster. He methodically 
enshrouds the reader in catastrophe as an experience of ultimate 
otherness, resistant to any “external” rationalization. Resultantly, 
all of his novels inverse the logic of magical historicism: they 
demonstrate how attempts to reenact (sacred) history perpetually 
incite further devastation and trauma. All endeavors of his 
characters to spark the Second Coming typically end in the Gulag 
or, if one is fortunate, a psychiatric asylum.
Nowadays, however, it is hard not to notice similarities be-
tween magical historicism and the cultural simulacra produced by 
post-Crimea and post-Maidan Russian media. According to Etkind, 
magical historicism embodies the Freudian logic of the uncanny; 
it facilitates the “return of the repressed”—repressed memory and 
historical experience, along with literal victims of political repres-
sions. Thus, fantastic elements, on the one hand, emphasize the 
alogical and surreal character of Soviet history, and on the other, 
offer purely aesthetic, fictional links that allow the possibility of re-
storing the historical continuity between the Soviet and post-Soviet 
eras, and, most importantly, of connecting them with a simulacra 
of teleology (if negative). Although in many cases such a teleology 
has been openly ironic (as in Pelevin and Sharov), and in others col-
lapses under its own weight (as in Tolstaya and Terekhov), novels 
of magical historicism responded to a broad-scale need for histori-
cal teleology in Russian society. Furthermore, they normalized the 
idea that if such a need exists, then anything, any methods and ma-
terials, including the openly fantastic, can serve as prosthetics for 
teleology; here the process is more significant than its results.
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This idea has been materialized with impressive coherence 
by Russian TV since 2014. The quasi-factual mystery play / 
“geopolitical” soap opera produced by all major TV channels 
includes all features of magical historicism, with one significant 
difference: the genre that Etkind considers to be designed for the 
liberal interpretation of history (the return of repressed Stalinism) has 
been successfully adopted for imperialist and antiliberal narratives. 
The entire propaganda discourse of 2014–15 was based on the 
constant connection—to the point of indiscernibility—of the Soviet 
past and the post-Soviet present: the Soviet images and rhetorics of 
victimhood—victims of Nazism, victims of the Holocaust, and even 
victims of Stalinism—merge with the contemporary demonization 
of revolutionary Ukraine (“Fascists”), the vile and morally degraded 
West (“Gayrope” and American imperialism), and, most recently, 
the anticivilizational hordes of immigrants (“barbarians”). Yet the 
main purpose of this production is the demonstration of the “eternal” 
teleology that connects today’s Russia with the Stalinist Soviet 
Union and the prerevolutionary tsarist empire. This is the story of 
Russia as always victimized by global evil and always representing 
the last frontier of global good, a Russia that has been humiliated 
numerous times but has always returned to greatness and glory, 
despite its enemies’ attempts to destroy it forever. Certainly, this 
binarist grand narrative has nothing to do with postmodernism; yet 
it requires various conspiracy theories and grotesque horror stories 
with strong erotic connotations (a crucified boy in Slavyansk, 
a raped girl in Berlin) that function in ways similar to fantastic 
motifs in magical historicism. Such a transformation completes the 
story of this literary genre and transforms it into a set of ideological 
clichés.
A  D ou bt  i n  O ne’s  O w n  Ut t e r a nc e
Sorokin’s and Sharov’s writings of the last two decades, along 
with the prose of Aleksandr Golʹdshtein, Dmitry Prigov, Mikhail 
Shishkin, Nikolai Baitov, Andrei Levkin, Nikolai Kononov, and 
some others, have indeed led the way to the strategies of working 
through trauma recruited by the “complex” literature of the next 
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generation of writers. However, the turn toward “complexity,” 
as we see it now, began not with prose but with poetry. It was 
poetry that started to attract and condense diverse phenomena 
in a common direction. Why poetry? Probably because its artistic 
discoveries admitted critical distance, the necessary factor for the 
working through of trauma, into the core of literary discourse.
In short, in the “complex” poetry of the 2000s, a new subject was 
born. In a programmatic 2001 essay by the title “Postconceptualism,” 
Dmitrii Kuzʹmin located the shift of subject position in the following: 
“I know that an individual utterance is exhausted and therefore my 
own utterance is not individual anymore. But I want to know how to 
re-individualize it.” As the poetic practice of the 2000s demonstrated, 
each of the new generation’s poets sought and secured his or her 
own solution to this puzzle. Roughly speaking, one may say that 
the subject of poetic discourse was shaped in the new poetry as the 
pliable combinations of somebody else’s borrowed, depersonalized, 
or authorized voices and positions. The subjective and personal thus 
appeared to be inseparably conjoined to the Other, and even the 
most intimate utterance constantly was problematized: Is it I who is 
speaking? Who is speaking through me? Where am I?
Kuzʹmin has astutely defined this poetic trend as 
postconceptualism—certainly, it has emerged on the foundation 
of poetic discourse, and its understanding was elaborated by 
Prigov and Rubinshtein. For instance, Prigov repeatedly stressed 
“the problematization of the personal utterance, its impossibility” 
(Balabanova 2001, 28) as the central principle of his poetics and 
ideology. He was also known to define postmodernism by the 
same formula, but the meaning of this principle is much broader. 
Speaking about poets of the conceptualist circle, he employed it as 
the ethical criteria: “We had a principally different premise. It was 
very relativist and, while criticizing the others’ discourses and the 
Big Soviet discourse, we inadvertently arrived at what characterizes 
postmodernism—the doubt in one’s own utterance. [. . .] In other 
words, the critique of any discourse naturally leads to the doubt in 
one’s own utterance” (87). By this qualifier, Prigov distinguished 
other conceptualist literati of his generation and the generation 
of the 1960s. Elsewhere he discusses Vsevolod Nekrasov, a fellow 
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conceptualist, his discrepancies with whom he explains as follows: 
“The problem is that he doesn’t understand and doesn’t presuppose 
that his language is his language. He is convinced that he speaks the 
universal and correct language” (28; author’s emphasis).
This “doubt in one’s own utterance,” and the knowledge that 
your language is not universal and true—this ethical principle 
supported by Prigov’s lifelong project was gratefully embraced by 
“complex” poets of the new generation, laid as the soil from which 
critical distance would grow. The fact that the new, postconceptualist 
poetry is also focused on trauma, while the present remains situated 
in the climate of continuous trauma, does not require special proofs. 
Rather, it would be sufficient to cite an acknowledged connoisseur 
of contemporary poetry, Ilya Kukulin, who wrote, “Today poetry 
more intensively than prose works out the methods of analysis 
of historical traumas of contemporary mind and demonstrates 
the paths of curing these traumas” (2010b). To this I would add 
mention of such remarkable texts as, for instance (the list is certainly 
just mine), “Oni opiatʹ za svoi Afganistan” (“Again They’re Off for 
Their Afghanistan”) and “Chernye kostiumy” (“Black Suits”) by 
Elena Fanailova, the Leningrad blockade cycle by Polina Barskova, 
“Sovetskie zastolʹnye pesni” (“Soviet Feasting Songs”) by Stanislav 
Lʹvovskii, “Proza Ivana Sidorova” (“The Prose of Ivan Sidorov”) by 
Mariia Stepanova, and Semeinyi arkhiv (The Family Archive) by Boris 
Khersonskii.
The transmission of this principle into the realm of prose turned 
out to be quite complicated, necessitating a number of “extensions.” 
By his own route, mainly through adoption of European 
modernism’s experience, Mikhail Shishkin achieved a similar 
result in his prose. Shishkin’s novels Vziatie Izmaila (The Taking of 
Izmail, 1999), Venerin volos (Maidenhair, 2005), and in part Pisʹmovnik 
(Letter-Book, 2010) interweave numerous voices and quotations into 
a powerful lyrical stream of consciousness. The subject in each 
book is born before our eyes, absorbing someone else’s stories of 
individual and historical traumas and unifying them by a common 
rhythm, almost forcing on them echoing motifs, correspondences, 
and rhymes, translating them across languages, and finally 
convincing the narrator and reader that life always consists of 
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these traumas, and that their cure is found in rhythm, otherwise 
called love, and that there is no other substance of being apart from 
this one. To a certain extent, although with important variations, 
a similar logic can be traced in such significant texts of the recent 
period as Gnedich (2011) by Maria Rybakova, Kamennye kleny (Stone 
Maples, 2008) and other novels by Lena Eltang, and Flaner (Flaneur, 
2011) by Nikolai Kononov. The same outlook underlies the prose of 
the late Aleksandr Golʹdshtein, whose influence on contemporary 
Russian writing is yet underestimated.
An opposing vector of “complexity” is launched by prose that 
might be deemed, for lack of a better term, “anthropological.” I refer 
to those works that attempt to penetrate the other consciousness and 
the psychological state always situated amid historical cataclysm. 
Authors of these works methodically undermine authoritative or, 
conversely, popular counterauthoritative assessments and beliefs, 
excavating (or imagining) with the meticulousness of a patient 
paleontologist all the incredible, unprecedented complexity of the 
traumatic experience. This profound expedition into otherness is 
founded on a sort of taboo that proscribes any attempts to judge or, 
for that matter, reward or penalize characters. The aesthetic attitude 
here is based on Varlam Shalamov’s example, with his imperative 
vision of the writer “as Pluto ascending from hell, as opposed to 
Orpheus descending into hell” (1998, 4:365). Shalamov’s principles 
fuse with the analytical poetics of the “interim prose” of Lidiia 
Ginzburg, who taught contemporary writers to seek connections 
between language and physiology. (Another important influence 
on this poetics is W. G. Sebald, although only a few of his novels 
have been translated into Russian.)
It is no wonder that the stories of the Leningrad siege attract 
today’s poets (Polina Barskova, Sergei Zavʹialov) and prosaists 
alike. Immersion into this dark tempest of Russian cultural memory 
produced one of the best “anthropological” novels of the last decade: 
Igorʹ Vishnevetsky’s Leningrad (2010), in which the monstrous 
world of the siege appears as the complex intersection of different 
layers and languages of culture—stemming from Silver Age, Nazi, 
and Soviet sources alike—overlapping, interweaving with horrible 
resonance, and spelling the apocalypse in horrible minutiae. In 
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a different way, through the resurrection of skaz, an anthropological 
prose is crafted by Margarita Khemlin, author of the novels Klotsvog 
(2009), Krainii (The Last One, 2010), and Doznavatelʹ (The Investigator, 
2012); and Valerii Votrin in his Logoped (The Speech Therapist, 2012).
Certainly, lyrical and anthropological renditions of “complex” 
prose are only the most obvious or tangible avenues taken by 
the working-through mind-set. I hope that others will appear (or 
perhaps, have already appeared, though I failed to notice them). 
It is important to emphasize that “complexity” derives from 
conditions securing a critical distance around historical traumas—
conditions created by the inequality of the subject to oneself (and of 
the author to the protagonist or narrator); by the deconstruction of 
binary oppositions; by the rejection of expected (i.e., stereotypical) 
approaches; by limitations self-imposed on those who accept the 
doubt in their own utterance as the highest aesthetic and ethical 
principle. Furthermore, the experience of reader-oriented and 
mainstream literature suggests that the most vital task facing 
“complex” literature is to detach one’s own language from 
vernaculars of violent communication, including rhetorical and 
symbolic justifications of violence.
Although the richness of “complex” literature is self-evident, and 
even evokes a certain Renaissance flavor, the prevailing reception of 
this literary trend in current Russian criticism is more reminiscent 
of that met by decadent literature at the turn of the twentieth 
century. Writers developing such strategies are frequently branded 
as “anemic” or even “autistic.” This field-wide (mis)perception 
symptomatically mirrors the popularity of the “new realists” and 
other “reader-oriented” authors. The Russian literary establishment 
and general readership alike seem to accept violence—beyond the 
level of representation, on the plane of rhetoric and symbolism—as 
proof of the literature’s vitality. This is why compositions that do 
not conjure the illusion of a violence-based redistribution of power, 
or that, however humbly, propose peaceful systems of power, 
are doomed to dismissal as “decadent”—lifeless, effete, hermetic, 
designed for a narrow stratum of the “creative class” only. The 
political consequences of this judgment, sadly, are too obvious to 
elaborate.
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However, today we encounter a scenario where the question of 
the Other—cultural, ethnic, religious, sexual, social, or ideological—
has obtained in contemporary Russia a paramount political weight. 
These issues stem from historical traumas, not yet worked through, 
and from the dearth of critical distance before these traumas, 
Soviet and post-Soviet alike. In the present situation, approaches 
expounded by “complex” literature have a white-hot opportunity 
to pass from book pages into streets and squares. Those who have 
chosen to propel and evolve “complex” pathways of cultural healing 
will make an unforgivable error if they miss the chance to enrich 
their “complexity” in the flames of social discontent and protest.
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One of the most famous and most repeated self-commentaries 
by Vladimir Sorokin sounds as follows: “When they ask me how 
can you torture people like this, I respond: These are not persons, 
these are just letters on paper” (Semenova 2002).1 In another 
interview, the author tenders something like an apophatic defense 
of the alleged “immoralism” of his compositions: “On paper one 
may allow himself to do anything. It will tolerate everything. 
[. . .] The Word that God had wasn’t on paper” (Shapoval 1998, 
20).2 As implied here, his characters and their deeds are merely 
words and should not be judged on moral or on any extraliterary 
grounds.
This dictum only partially reflects the actual meaning of 
Sorokin’s texts. It is a half-truth at best, which the writer indirectly 
admits when he says, “Text is a powerful weapon. It can hypnotize, 
and sometimes paralyze” (Rasskazova 1992, 121).3 Note the 
physiological effects of the text that he highlights—and, most likely, 
1 «Когда мне говорят — как можно так издеваться над людьми, 
я отвечаю: ‘Это не люди, это просто буквы на бумаге’».
2 «На бумаге можно позволить все, что угодно. Она стерпит. . . То самое 
Слово, что было у Бога, было вовсе не на бумаге».
3 «Tекст — очень мощное оружие. Он гипнотизирует, а иногда — просто 
парализует».
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desires. Sorokin frequently bemoans the lack of attention to material 
details in Russia’s literary heritage, declaring that his own artistic 
originality blossoms exactly in this field:
There was no body in Russian literature. There was an excessive 
amount of spirituality. When one reads Dostoevsky, it’s 
impossible to feel characters’ bodies: how Prince Myshkin was 
built, how Nastasʹia Filippovna’s bust looked. I wanted very 
much to fill Russian literature with corporeality: the smell of 
sweat, muscle movements, body fluids, sperm, shit. As Artaud 
once said, “When it smells like shit, it smells like life.” (Semenova 
2002, 4)4
However, this discussion is not simply Sorokin’s magnification 
of the body over the spirit, the soul, and the philosophical and 
moral themes typical of Russian literary culture. More significant 
for the present essay is his trademark transformation of verbal 
concepts into corporeal images, or more generally, the translation 
of discourses and rhetorical constructions into body language. The 
gesture-phrases of this somatic tongue relate either to the “lower 
bodily stratum”—eating, defecating, vomiting, copulating (which 
frequently provokes interpretation through the lens of Bakhtin’s 
“carnivalization”)—or to naturalistically depicted violence, graphic 
representations of the human body in mutilation. In Sorokin’s own 
words,
I work constantly with liminal zones where the body invades the 
text. For me, this borderline between literature and corporeality 
has always been of foremost importance. As a matter of fact, my 
texts always raise a question of literary corporeality, and I try 
to resolve the problem of whether literature is corporeal. I take 
4 «В русской литературе вообще тела было очень мало. Духа было выше 
крыши. Когда читаешь Достоевского, не можешь почувствовать тела 
героев: сложение князя Мышкина или какая грудь была у Настасьи 
Филипповны. Я же очень хотел наполнить русскую литературу 
телесностью: запахом пота, движением мышц, естественными 
отправлениями, спермой, говном. Как сказал Арто: ‘Там, где пахнет 
говном, пахнет жизнью’».
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pleasure in the moment when literature becomes corporeal and 
nonliterary. (Roll 1996, 123–24)5
Dirk Uffelmann, in his periodization of Sorokin’s oeuvre, 
defines the writer’s first phase as “the materialization of metaphors, the 
second positivism of emotions and the third fantastic substantialism” 
(2006, 109; emphasis in the original). I aim to argue that the 
discursive deployment of bodily gestures, which can be only 
partially described as the materialization of metaphors, serves as 
Sorokin’s master trope and can be traced across his works from the 
earliest to the most recent. I would like to call this tactic carnalization 
(from the Latin carnalis), not to be confused with “carnivalization” 
or “canalization,” although some parallels are invited. In my view, 
carnalization represents the core of Sorokin’s individual method 
of deconstruction applied to the authoritative discourses, symbols, 
and cultural narratives. We might wonder, observing the hygienic 
operation: How does carnalization acquire deconstructive faculty? 
What are the symbolic implications of this trope? What is its 
heuristic potential? Seeking answers to these questions, I will first 
present an overview of Sorokin’s uses of his master trope and then 
attempt to provide its interpretation.
D i r e c t  C a r n a l i z a t io n
Sorokin’s early works are populated by direct carnalization, denoting 
the materialization of metaphors and idioms. Most exemplary in 
this respect is probably Norma (The Norm, 1979–83). In the novel’s 
first part, the idiomatic expression to eat shit (govna nazhratʹsia) is 
materialized through scenes depicting various walks of Soviet life, 
each invariably including the characters’ consumption of their daily 
5 «Я постоянно работаю с пограничными зонами, где тело вторгается 
в текст. Для меня всегда была важна эта граница между литературой 
и телесностью. Собственно, в моих текстах всегда стоит вопрос 
литературной телесности, и я пытаюсь разрешить проблему, телесна 
ли литература. Я получаю удовольствие в тот момент, когда литература 
становится телесной и нелитературной».
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norma—a brick of processed children’s feces. In the seventh part of 
Norma, which bears the name “Stikhi i pesni” (“Poems and Songs”), 
Sorokin—or rather, his “substitute author”—invokes direct 
quotations from Soviet songs and poems in each short narrative. 
Thus, the trite poetic line about a sailor who leaves his heart with 
a girl transmutates into the girl’s delivery of a jar holding a pulsating 
heart to the police station. A pair of zolotye ruki (“golden hands,” an 
idiom for a jack-of-all-trades), the pride and joy of a boy from flat 
no. 5, are melted down and exchanged for a foreign-made device 
that will complete a humongous monument to Lenin atop the 
Palace of Soviets. The ideologically charged idiom to breathe one’s 
motherland (dyshatʹ rodinoi) is sarcastically reconfigured in a scene 
where, due to a lack of oxygen, members of a submarine crew press 
a map of the USSR to their faces: “Everyone was pressing to the face 
a map of his native region and breathing, breathing, breathing . . .” 
(Sorokin 1998, 1:241).6 Similar literalizations of metaphoric and 
idiomatic expressions may be found in Pervyi subbotnik (The First 
Saturday Workday, 1979–84; for instance, in “Sanʹkina liubovʹ”) or in 
Serdtsa chetyrekh (The Hearts of the Four, 1991), with its memorable 
materialization of the idiom ebatʹ mozgi (“to fuck the brains,” i.e., to 
bullshit) in the novel’s conclusion.
Direct carnalization does not entirely disappear in Sorokin’s 
later output. One might recall the scene in Moskva (Moscow, 2000) 
where Lev is tortured with an air pump: Aleksandr Genis (2002, 
104–5) was the first to notice that this bit of savagery literalizes the 
idiom odin zhulik nadul drugogo—one crook cheated (literally, pumped 
up) another. In The Ice Trilogy, the ceremony of the Light brothers is 
woven around the idioms voice of the heart (golos serdtsa) and speak 
with your heart (govori serdtsem) as carnalized discourse, manifesting 
the fetishization of ultimate sincerity that commandeered the 
liberal rhetoric of the perestroika period and the ’90s. For instance, 
the election campaign of 1996 bred the abundant slogan Golosui 
serdtsem, “Vote with your heart.”
6 «Каждый прижимал ко рту карту своей области и дышал, дышал, 
дышал. . .»
F l e s h i n g / F l a s h i n g  t h e  D i s c o u r s e :  s o r o k i n ’ s  M a s t e r  t r o p e 113
Nariman Skakov noted, during a discussion of this article at 
the Aarhus conference on Sorokin in 2010, that the nibbling and 
licking of the titular sugar Kremlin in Sorokin’s 2008 collection 
of short stories responds to the first installment of Norma by 
presenting another new set of variations on the consumption and 
internalization of repressive rule. However, one may also detect in 
the imagery a direct materialization of the sweet taste of power (sladostʹ 
vlasti); the same expression is invoked in Denʹ oprichnika when 
Komiaga debates Mandelstam’s line “Power is abject, like a barber’s 
hands.”7 Finally, the entire myth-world оf Metelʹ, with its populace 
of giants and midgets, seems to derive from a cultural idiom vital to 
nineteenth-century literature: the malenʹkii chelovek (“insignificant 
person”), especially relevant to Metelʹ given the numerous stylistic, 
plot, and characterological references to the works of Pushkin, 
Tolstoy, and Chekhov.
Usually, these carnalizations have been received as Sorokin’s 
mockery of authoritative idioms and symbols, especially when their 
relation to Socialist Realism and official Soviet discourse is blatantly 
obvious. However, as one may notice, even in Sorokin’s early 
works these discursive sources of carnalization are not necessarily 
marked ideologically. Rather, through carnalization, Sorokin 
declaratively introduces his overriding theme: the corporeality of 
language, especially, but not exclusively, as represented by various 
authoritative discourses, cultural and political alike. Using Dirk 
Uffelmann’s apt definition, one may detect in Sorokin’s quest 
“the ontological presupposition [. . .] that nothing exists beyond 
metaphors (and their materializations) that (textual) reality is 
creative by (destructive) language” (2006, 109).
From this perspective, Sorokin’s plunge into theater and cinema 
seems not only natural but necessary: these media are able to lay 
his major theme bare by drawing a visible corporeal dimension to 
the texts. Tellingly, the novelist-turned-scriptwriter highlights the 
transformation of the textual into the corporeal by using readily 
7 «Власть отвратительна как руки брадобрея» (from Mandelstam’s poem 
“Ariost,” 1933).
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recognizable works of classical literature as the pre-texts of his stage 
and screen work: Shakespeare’s plays for Dismorfomaniia (1989); 
Chekhov’s for Iubilei (Anniversary, 1993) and Moskva; Dostoevsky’s 
novels for Dostoevsky-Trip (1997); Andersen’s “Lykkens Kalosker” 
(“The Galoshes of Fortune”) for Kopeika (Kopeck, 2001); Tolstoy’s 
Anna Karenina for Mishenʹ (Target, 2011) . . . Through these allusive 
intertexts, he underscores the transformation of the exemplary 
literariness of the classical discourses into the contemporary 
corporeality of filmic representation.
It is hardly surprising that Sorokin’s entire oeuvre, from early 
aperitifs to the present course, is peppered by what may be called 
metacarnalization, representing a body of discourse in a generalized, 
yet literal, form. For instance, in the short story “Zaplyv” (“Heat”; 
written in the early ’80s, published in 1999’s Goluboe salo), Sorokin 
imagines a levitating excerpt from some official documents compiled 
by torch-wielding military swimmers. Analogically, the entire five-
hundred-page breadth of Roman (1985–89), stylized as a nineteenth-
century Russian novel, may be read as a metacarnalization of the 
theorized death of the novel (smertʹ romana), a subject of wide 
debate in the 1950s–70s.
I n d i r e c t  C a r n a l i z a t io n
Sorokin, in addition to these direct carnalizations, intrepidly 
explores the possibilities of indirect carnalization—corporeal imagery 
that manifests, rather than a familiar idiom, a hidden discursive 
logic. Pervyi subbotnik was probably Sorokin’s first exercise of such 
a technique. The stories in this collection seem to have two faces: 
one a conventional, middlebrow Soviet narrative, and the other 
violence, brutal sex, and gibberish: “In the 1980s, I used to make 
little binary literary bombs consisting of two incompatible parts: 
a Socialist Realist one and the other built on real physiology; as 
a result, an explosion followed, and it did fill me as a litterateur 
with a flash of freedom” (Voznesenskii 2006).8 The jarring shifts 
8 «В 80-е годы я делал бинарные литературные бомбочки, состоящие из 
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between these tones suggest that the connection between them is 
not arbitrary but guided by a purposeful inner logic. In the most 
characteristic examples, a corporeal action appears as the extension 
of a discourse.
For instance, in “Sergei Andreevich,” a devoted schoolboy 
absorbs with admiration all the banalities that his teacher spouts— 
a discipleship taken to the point of nausea (more or less literally) 
when the student diligently eats his teacher’s feces. In another 
teacher-student story, “Svobodnyi urok” (“A Vacant Lesson”), 
a female teacher tames a schoolboy’s pubescent energy by 
manipulating him and exhorting him to “grow up,” while schooling 
the lad in sexuality by forcing him to touch her genitalia. “I am 
doing this for you, stupid!” (Sorokin 1998, 1:506)9 she repeats, 
obviously enjoying the act far more than he. While the studious 
feasting on an instructor’s shit appears to be a profane form of the 
Eucharist, the other student’s rape is matched by the teacher’s not-
so-secret pleasure. Such motifs appear in these stories as two sibling 
expressions of didacticism, which many conceptualists (as in Lev 
Rubinshtein’s and Dmitrii Prigov’s writings) considered the core of 
the Russian cultural tradition.
It is noteworthy that in “Sergei Andreevich,” as well as in many 
other stories in this book (“Otkrytie sezona,” “Pominalʹnoe slovo,” 
“Proezdom,” “Pervyi subbotnik,” and others), the transformation 
of the intangibly discursive into the corporeal bears a sense of ritual, 
pointing toward a transcendental meaning. But this meaning is 
transcendental only because it is situated beyond the discourse. This 
is why Sorokin inserts, along with sex and violence, healthy doses 
of zaumʹ—nonsensical language—and a rich helping of obscenity, 
as in Pervyi subbotnik, Norma, and the play Russkaia babushka 
(Russian Grandmother, 1988). Similarly, the dialect of power borders 
on drivel in Serdtsa chetyrekh and the plays Doverie (Confidence, 
двух несоединимых частей: соцреалистической и части, построенной на 
реальной физиологии, а в результате происходил взрыв, и он наполнял 
меня, как литератора, некой вспышкой свободы».
9 «Для тебя же стараюсь, балбес!»
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1989) and Zanos (Drift, 2009). I have a suspicion that Sorokin 
employs Chinese words and expressions for the same purpose, first 
in Goluboe salo and later in Denʹ oprichnika, Sakharnyi Kremlʹ, and 
Mishenʹ.10
The chain of transformations, from the discursive through 
the corporeal and into the transcendental, is represented best in 
Goluboe salo (1999). The titular “blue fat,” a mystical substance 
emitted in the act of writing by clones of the great Russian writers, 
serves as the material equivalent of Russia’s famed spirituality. 
In Aleksandr Genis’s words, it is “the Russian Grail, the spirit 
transformed into flesh” (2003).11 As the carnalized sacred, the blue 
fat appears to be equally resonant with the desires of a scientific 
cosmopolitan society of the future and a retro-utopian nationalist 
community of zemleeby (literally, “earth-fuckers”), as well as an 
alternative, bloodless totalitarianism in which Stalin and Hitler 
are allies, and where sexuality and drugs are not repressed but 
celebrated.
Furthermore, in Sorokin’s early and recent texts alike, 
one may detect relatively stable affinities between the treated 
discourse and the form its carnalization takes. For instance, the 
traditionalist, nationalist discourse of love for all things Russian 
is almost inevitably embodied in ceremonial massacres, where 
sadistic mass murder is the ultimate expression of Russophilic 
sentiment. This connection first appears in the third part of Norma, 
in which a Buninesque narrative about returning to a demolished 
aristocratic household gives way to “Padezh,” a story depicting 
collectivization as an ecstatic festival of accelerating violence and de- 
struction.
The very same linkage appears in Roman. Ritualized violence 
erupts at a provocative moment in the narrative: Roman and Tatʹia-
na’s wedding night. The artfully stylized discourse of the Russian 
classical novel does not leave a place for sexuality. Thus, a scene 
charged with sexual expectation ruptures that discourse and floods 
10 For more on zaumʹ in Sorokin’s oeuvre, see Marusenkov (2012, 71–140).
11 «русский грааль: дух, ставший плотью».
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it with nondiscursive violence, which resonates simultaneously 
with the hidden logic of the traditionalist discourse. The fact that 
Roman’s rampage is triggered by two peculiar wedding gifts—an 
ax and a wooden bell—only bolsters this interpretation: both objects 
are sexually suggestive and at the same time marked as exotic, as 
somehow “truly Russian.” In short, due to the discursive roadblock 
set by the Russian classical tradition, Roman (the character and the 
novel) “makes love” to the Russian people with an ax, in lieu of 
having sex with Tatʹiana. There is nothing irrational, then, in Roman 
draping the entrails of his victims on icons—these are his sacred 
gifts of love.
 I believe that the same logic also underlies Denʹ oprichnika, with 
its stylized, quasi-archaic language, and scenes of orgiastic carnage 
ranging from the oprichniks’ assaults on “enemies of the state” to 
their collective dream shaped as a bylina (a traditional Russian epic 
poem) about the seven-headed dragon who rapes and burns with 
its purgative fire all of Russia’s foes across the globe.
C a r n a l i z a t io n  i n  R eve r s e
An interesting example of indirect carnalization is presented by 
Tridtsataia liubovʹ Mariny (Marina’s Thirtieth Love, 1982–84), where 
the corporeal ceases to function as an appendage of the discursive, 
obtaining its own agency. On the one hand, Marina’s bisexuality 
serves as a most tangible and glorious manifestation of the free-
minded attitude of the 1970s dissident circle. On the other hand, 
the same sexuality undercuts the dissident discourse that runs 
through the novel. The first orgasm that Marina experiences with 
a man, the Solzhenitsyn look-alike partorg (the head of the local 
party organization), not only drastically changes her life but also 
radically reorients the book’s narrative. After that unforgettable 
night, Marina tosses out all her samizdat and becomes a Socialist 
Realist poster girl; meanwhile the narrative, which before this 
juncture balanced Henry Miller and urban women’s prose, rapidly 
transmutes into an unending Pravda editorial. Tridtsataia liubovʹ 
incarnates this discursive logic but also introduces a countercurrent 
process: the transformation of the corporeal into the discursive, 
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or the disembodiment of the corporeal—the female orgasm with 
a patriarchal figure as a discursive switch. No wonder that Sorokin 
speaks about this novel as a turning point in his evolution: “This 
novel in many ways became a turning point for me: I completed my 
Sots-Art period and began exploring the problem of corporeality in 
Russian literature” (Shapoval 1998, 17).12
The exorcism of discourse from flesh also operates as the 
driving force of The Ice Trilogy (2002–5). The brutal crushing of 
a victim’s chest in order to extract the “voice of the heart” is a common 
refrain across the triplicate plot. This sacrament bloodily elevates 
a “meat machine” into a Brother or Sister of Light (or a pneumaticist, 
to adopt the Gnostic terminology), imbued with a spiritual love 
that encompasses only fellow Light siblings and forsakes everyone 
else. The amity extended by Brothers and Sisters of Light can 
envelop only those of their “kind” (by default, “meat machines 
are excluded”) and is emphatically void of any corporeality, being 
a purely spiritual phenomenon. It is no wonder that Aleksandr 
Genis defined this novel as “the fairy tale for Gnostics” (2004). The 
Gnostic code does indeed influence The Ice Trilogy: one may detect 
its traces in the conceptualization of the material world as evil and 
the human body as a prison for the spirit, in the metaphor of Light 
as a symbol of “alien” (introduced by the Tungus meteorite) but true 
life, in the motif of a “true spiritual name,” in the quest of the chosen 
“pneumaticists” who are spiritually equipped for Gnosis, and so 
on. The dictatorship of this mythology in The Ice Trilogy is quite 
palpable, and therefore the triad’s scenes of violence, customary for 
any reader of Sorokin, do not transcend the discourse but, on the 
contrary, serve as ritualistic illustration of the Gnostic mythological 
narrative. Thus, corporeal elements in these novels are transformed 
into discursive ones, while their vital (wild) energy is “disciplined” 
by the stern hierarchy of the Gnostic myth.
This is but one analytical jewel of disembodiment in the 
trilogy. Another can be seen in the tonal transition Sorokin’s 
12 «Вообще этот роман во многом стал для меня поворотным: я завершил 
свой соц-артистский период и вышел к проблеме телесности в русской 
литературе».
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narrative undergoes from its first entry (Led), the most corporeal, 
to its last (23,000), the most “spiritual” yet equally stereotype 
laden and lifeless. Elsewhere I have argued that, in drastic 
spite of his intentions, Sorokin has created in The Ice Trilogy 
a totalitarian metadiscourse, a universal formula for genocide-like 
“cleansing” in pursuit of a transcendental goal (see Lipovetsky 
2008, 625–37). The Brothers of Light fail to overcome the carnage 
that reigns in the world of “meat machines”; they manage only 
to elevate it to a new level. Their violence is justified by a sacral 
discourse, becoming “mythic”—that which, according to Walter 
Benjamin, serves as empirical proof of the existence of the gods 
(see Benjamin 1978, esp. 294–95). Sorokin’s twenty-three thousand 
Brothers of Light are these gods, whose existence is confirmed by 
mythic violence. Sorokin’s trilogy authorizes them to purge those 
incapable of the ascension from “meat machines” to Brothers 
and Sisters of Light. It is telling that, toward their sacral ends, the 
Brothers do not hesitate to employ both the Gulag and Nazi death 
camps.
Considered alongside Tridtsataia liubovʹ Mariny, this novel 
is hardly anomalous. Rather, it corroborates a recurring pattern 
in Sorokin’s oeuvre, one of which the author may not be entirely 
cognizant. As these texts affirm, a totalitarian discourse may surface 
on any basis (see, for instance, ecological totalitarianism in the play 
Shchi), but always emerges from a sort of decarnalization—an 
unpacking of the physical into the metaphysical, or the discursive, 
that is, a disembodiment. Thus, in Sorokin’s page-world, 
totalitarianism is reinterpreted as the autocracy of the spiritual—the 
bodiless and impersonal—over discrete human bodies and concrete 
lives, of the discursive over the nondiscursive. This formula derives 
not from the author’s ideology but from his immanent aesthetic 
logic, and therefore may conflict on occasion with his rationally 
designed themes, as has occurred in The Ice Trilogy.
S or ok i n  i n  t he  20 0 0 s
Contrasting Sorokin’s works preceding Goluboe salo (1999) with 
those following has become a clichéd practice among Russian and 
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Western critics alike.13 The consensus finds that Sorokin “mellowed” 
in the 2000s, became more reader-oriented, and for this reason 
jettisoned the most extreme aspects of his style—among them its 
gore, violence, and obscenities. In the carnalization department, 
however, Sorokin’s works of the new century diverge from his prior, 
conceptualist writings not in the sheer “quantity” of transgressive 
gestures but rather in the vector of these transgressions. If in the 
early period, each of Sorokin’s texts is dominated by a particular 
type of transgressive transformation—usually discourse-to-body—
then in the later period, the carnalization of the discursive and 
the disembodiment of the corporeal coexist. The most puissant 
examples can be found in Denʹ oprichnika, Sakharnyi Kremlʹ, Metelʹ, 
and Monoklon.
In Denʹ oprichnika, the neotraditionalist ideological discourse 
manifests in scenes of gang rape, social tripping on hallucinogens, 
group copulation (the “caterpillar”), and finally, mutual torture 
that consists of power drilling each other’s feet—thus presenting 
a full and resplendent spectrum of carnalizations. It becomes 
clear that the internal “unity” of the oprichnina is fashioned via the 
same means as its fearsome public authority. Although seemingly 
reserved for outsiders, violent sex and sadistic bloodshed serve as 
the cement reifying the “unity” of the brotherhood. At the same 
time, the gang rape of a boyar’s wife is immediately spiritualized 
when Komiaga preaches about the oprichnina’s moral purity: “Just 
understand, you idiot, we’re guards. We have to keep our minds 
cold and our hearts pure” (Sorokin 2011, 35).14 The ensuing scene 
of the oprichnina prayer in the Cathedral of Dormition represents 
the neotraditionalist discourse in a nutshell. Furthermore, the 
rape and arson depicted in the oprichnina’s pogrom of the boyar’s 
household resurge in the next chapter as the constituents of 
Urusov’s crime; what was initially coded as a legitimate ritual of 
13 See about this in Uffelmann (2006, 106–8).
14 «Пойми, дурак, мы же охранная стая. Должны ум держать в холоде, 
а сердце в чистоте» (Sorokin 2006, 21). An obvious reference to the Cheka 
motto allegedly authored by Dzerzhinsky makes this statement especially 
dubious.
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the oprichnina’s solidarity is refigured as a barbaric crime when 
undertaken as a private act, situated outside the realm of power 
and its discursive justifications—an obvious instance of ideological 
disembodiment.
These multidirectional transitions are typical for Sorokin in the 
2000s. Such switches from carnalization to disembodiment appear 
even in the short texts (“Volny” [“Waves”], “Gubernator” [“The 
Governor”], and “Tridtsatʹ pervoe” [“Thirty-First”], for instance). 
However, the ignition of this device never induces a discursive 
collapse as in Sorokin’s earlier works. The reason for this lies in 
the nature of the discourses that the writer taps. As the strength of 
recognizable authoritative discourses was waning in the post-Soviet 
period, Sorokin relocated his focus to synthetic quasi-authoritative 
discourses, whose functioning is founded in the coexistence of 
two mutually contradictory operations. While establishing their 
symbolic power (through the disembodiment of the corporeal), 
these discourses simultaneously and shamelessly deconstruct their 
own authority (through the carnalization of ideological constructs 
in self-gratifying, sexualized violence). One may argue that these 
synthetic discourses constitute a new cynical language of power, 
reflected by the writer. Notably, from this point of view, Sorokin 
hardly distinguishes between the neotraditionalist state ideology 
and its opponents (see “Tridtsatʹ pervoe,” “Underground,” and 
“Kocherga” [“A Poker”]).
Furthermore, Sorokin’s later works employ a cluster of 
recurring motifs that serve as metaphors for the endless reciprocal 
transformations of the corporeal into the spiritual, and vice versa. 
Just a few examples:
Food is arguably the ripest example of the peaceful fusion of 
cultural conventions and discourses with physiological needs and 
reactions. Beginning with Norma and Roman, Sorokin explored 
comestible imagery as depicting the literal digestion of culture 
(which is eventually processed into feces). However, in his later 
works, the writer emphasizes the transgressive potential of food 
with greater and greater zeal. This nutritional connotation emerges 
first in the sadistic Pelʹmeni (Dumplings, 1986), followed by the 
cannibalistic Eucharist depicted in Mesiats v Dakhau (A Month in 
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Dachau, 1990), which in turn precedes Goluboe salo with its fondue 
of human meat and the collection Pir (The Feast, 2000), opening with 
“Nastia,” a Buninesque story about the cannibalistic “initiation” of 
a sixteen-year-old girl. The 1995 play Shchi (Cabbage Soup) explores 
the degradation of the culinary art into crime under the regime of 
ecological totalitarianism. Edible transgression reappears in the 
script for Ilʹia Khrzhanovsky’s film 4 (2004), whose climax consists 
of a revolting old hags’ smorgasbord. Food appears here as a field 
of militant competition (rather than collaboration) between the 
discursive and the nondiscursive, with the focus carnalizingly 
shifting from the former to the latter.
Drugs: In a tongue-in-cheek polemic with the dominant 
perception, since Goluboe salo Sorokin has inscribed drugs into 
a totalitarian, rather than countercultural, context. In his alternative 
vision of Stalinism, drugs are legal and the image of Stalin toting 
a syringe is iconic. The same license applies in Denʹ oprichnika, in 
which certain drugs are not only legal but serve as the foundation 
of the nation’s internal comfort, eternally tendering the masses’ 
illusion of freedom. To invoke Sorokin’s self-commentary, “Before 
the revolution, cocaine was sold in [Russian] pharmacies. In the 
new Russian state, this is a compensation for the iron curtain. We 
deprive you of the West, this forbidden fruit, but we are giving you 
this instead. You don’t need any West, go to the pharmacy and buy 
cocaine. You will be happy. And in the West, all this is forbidden” 
(Novikova 2008, 14).15 In the author’s logic, as material substances 
of psychological and even spiritual influence, drugs effect the 
disembodiment of the corporeal, and are, therefore, essentially 
totalitarian. Yet the countercurrent, that toward carnalization, is 
apparent here as well. For instance, in one of his interviews Sorokin 
directly compares literature with drugs: “I am engaged in literature, 
because since my childhood I was addicted to this drug. I am 
15 «До революции кокаин продавался в аптеках. В новом российском 
государстве это компенсация за железный занавес. Мы вас лишаем 
Запада, этого райского плода, но мы вам даем зато вот это. Можете 
получить удовольствие. Вам не нужен никакой Запад: идите в аптеку, 
покупайте кокаин. Будете счастливы. А на Западе как раз это запрещено».
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a literary addict, like you, but I also can cook these drugs, which not 
everyone can do” (Kochetkova 2004, 11).
Tellingly, the blue fat of Goluboe salo, as the material quiddity of 
Russian literature, is also advertised as a superdrug, which Stalin 
eventually injects squarely into his brain. We find a similar analogy 
between literature and drugs in Dostoevsky-Trip and Metelʹ (little 
pyramids). Much like literature, psychoactive substances allow 
Sorokin’s characters to transcend their physicality, either becoming 
the Other individually (as in Metelʹ) or merging with the collective 
Other (Denʹ oprichnika, Sakharnyi Kremlʹ). As such, even when 
legalized, drugs accommodate transgression—and, therefore, the 
dangers of freedom. The latter motif is most obvious in Sorokin’s 
script for the film Mishenʹ: a huge astrophysical aggregate, a relic of 
the Soviet era, emits a euphoric intoxication, which, in turn, inspires 
a sense of limitless freedom in the characters. This empowerment 
is invariably (self-)destructive. Symptomatically, in Sorokin’s later 
texts, drug-induced trips also fashion a new collective body—one 
that appears to be necessarily monstrous, as exemplified by the 
seven-headed dragon in Denʹ oprichnika and the sleuth of man-
eating bears in “Underground.”
Ice/snow: According to Sorokin, “Snow is our wealth, like oil 
and gas. This is what makes Russia herself, even to a larger degree 
than oil and gas. Snow mystifies life, it, so to speak, conceals the 
earth’s shame” (Rudik 2008).16 This frigid leitmotif emerges for the 
first time in Serdtsa chetyrekh, where the objective of the protagonists’ 
ordeals is to process their hearts into frozen cubes, marked as dice, 
which a mechanical gambler rolls onto a field coated with the (also 
frozen) “liquid mother.” Far from merely a macabre metaphor of 
fate, this scene can be interpreted as a manifestation of the heroic 
(or transcendentalist) discourse compressed into material form. The 
frozen matter thus serves as the substance of the transcendental, 
a liminal zone between discursive and corporeal realities.
16 «Снег — наше богатство, как и нефть, и газ. То, что делает Россию Россией 
в большей степени, чем нефть и газ. Снег мистифицирует жизнь, он, так 
сказать, скрывает стыд земли».
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The latter suggestion correlates well with The Ice Trilogy, where 
the cosmic ice induces metaphysical transfigurations and serves 
as the tool for the selection of the Brothers of Light. In Metelʹ, 
similarly, the snowstorm operates as a metaphor of the resistance 
of the nondiscursive—that is, the natural, transcendental, or 
violent elements—to the discourse of modernization. The final, 
symbolic rape of the modernizer, Dr. Garin, by a ginormous 
snowman vividly demonstrates the significance of this motif. 
Another example worth mentioning in this context is the 
monologue of the therapist Mark in Moskva, in which he compares 
the Russian collective unconscious with pelʹmeni: frozen under 
the Soviet regime and melted into a formless mess in post-Soviet 
time. Similarly, in his comments on Mishenʹ, Sorokin mentions 
that it depicts Russia in a slightly frozen state (podmorozhennaia 
Rossiia; Nuriev 2011). Thus, the ice/snow motif metaphorizes 
a discourse that has obtained a (murderous) materiality but has 
not yet become a living body—it remains suspended in a liminal 
state.
A certain parallel to this theme can be detected in Sorokin’s 
unofficial motif-trilogy of clones, which opens in Goluboe salo, then 
resurges in Deti Rozentalia and concludes in 4. Human clones here 
represent, like the frost imagery elsewhere, a discourse whose 
carnalization is incomplete. Due to their liminal status, clones in 
Goluboe salo and Deti Rozentalia yield sacred objects as a natural 
byproduct of their notably brief existence. In 4, however, a mob of 
clones that has reached old age assumes the guise of a Boschian 
carnival, where corporeality is equidistantly severed from justifying 
discourses and nondiscursive vitality, supplanted by a nightmarish 
parade of living death.
A n  At t e m pt  a t  I nt e r pr e t a t io n
The radicalism of Sorokin’s master trope is far more profound 
than his critics think. His work does not set out simply to deflate 
everything lofty and authoritarian, and drive it down to the gutters 
of obscenity, gore, and gibberish. No; he aims at the very core of the 
logocentric paradigm.
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The ritualistic connotation draped on Sorokin’s carnalizations 
of the discursive highlights the connection between these tropes 
and the foundational Christian dictum: the incarnation of the Word 
(Logos) in Christ’s flesh:
In the beginning was the Logos
The Logos was with God
And the Logos was God
He was with God in the beginning
Through him all things came to be
Not one thing came into being without him.
All that came to be had its life (zoe) in him
And that life was the light (phos) of men
A light that shines in the darkness
A light that darkness did not overcome it.
[. . .]
And the Word became flesh and lived among us and we have 
seen his glory, the glory as of a father’s only son, full of grace and 
truth.
(John 1:1–5,14, New International Version)
Situated in this context, Sorokin’s carnalizations deeply 
resonate with a deconstructive reading of the dictum of Word 
becoming Flesh. Sorokin transforms the corporeal into a radical 
mockery and critique of the Logos. From this perspective, one 
could contest that Sorokin’s method presents a kynical reaction to 
the cynical manipulations of authoritative discourses in Soviet and 
post-Soviet—or, generally speaking, of modern and postmodern—
culture. In The Critique of Cynical Reason, Peter Sloterdijk finds the 
foundations of kynicism in Diogenes’s philosophizing through 
obscene body gestures. Sloterdijk appraises this strategy as 
the only viable alternative to modern cynicism: “Cynicism can 
only be stemmed by kynicism, not by morality. Only a joyful 
kynicism of ends is never tempted to forget that life has nothing 
to lose except itself” (1987, 194). Sloterdijk argues additionally 
that the kynic possesses a particular sort of shamelessness. In 
the given context, shamelessness implies the rejection of moral 
taboos surrounding bodily functions, the equation of intellectual 
and corporeal activities—in short, “existence in resistance, in 
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laughter, in refusal, in the appeal to the whole of nature and a full 
life” (218).
All of these characteristics perfectly fit Sorokin’s carnali- 
zations. In fact, his artistic strategy may be interpreted as one 
of the most vivid and philosophically provocative examples 
of neokynicism in all contemporary Russian culture. Where 
Diogenes lampooned theoretical doctrines with his “philosophic 
pantomimes,” Sorokin mocks the power of authoritative discourses 
and ideologies through what may be defined as corporeal charades, 
reminiscent of one of the most popular intelligentsia games of 
the 1980s–2000s. These charades not only lay bare the discursive 
mechanisms but also strip discourses of their symbolic status. 
When performed on the level of somatic gestures, a discourse ceases 
to seem invisible and unnoticeably interiorized, and materializes 
as a body, that is, as a radical Other. As Jean-Luc Nancy argues, 
“A body is always ob-jected from the outside, to ‘me’ or to someone 
else. Bodies are first and always other—just as others are first and 
always bodies. [. . .] An other is a body because only a body is an other. [. . .] 
Other is not even the right word, just body” (Nancy 2008, 29, 31; 
author’s emphasis). Thus, the carnalization of a discourse leads 
to the defamiliarization of—and, eventually, to emancipation 
from—the discourse’s hypnotic power. In other words, the 
process of fleshing out the discourse becomes the scandalous act 
of flashing.
However, this kynical mirroring of the chief logocentric 
principle in Sorokin’s prose produces an unexpected side effect. 
According to Staten, in John’s hyperliteral discourse, Christ’s ascent 
is inseparable from his descent, his journey toward death; and the 
Eucharist is not much different from cannibalism: “‘Unless you eat 
the flesh of the Son of Man and drink his blood, you have no life 
in you’ (6:53). Bread is meat, water is wine, and wine is blood, and 
there is no horror in all this if it is understood as the fleshly passion 
of the Logos and the agapetic action of spirit” (1993, 50). From 
this perspective, we can argue that while Sorokin’s carnalizations 
deconstruct the discursive pretense of manifesting the universal 
and eternal truth, they do not entirely divest his own narrative 
of transcendental meaning. In other words, while deconstructing 
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logocentrism by kynical mirroring, the writer also reproduces 
certain aspects of the sacramental logic manifested in the incarnation 
of the Logos into Flesh.
In Sorokin’s works, then, the sacred, much in agreement with 
Julia Kristeva’s Powers of Horror, is inseparable from the abject, 
thanks to the externalization of what is typically hidden within 
the body: “For abjection, when all is said and done, is the other 
facet of religious, moral, and ideological codes. [. . .] Such codes 
are abjection’s purification and repression. But the return of their 
repressed make up our ‘apocalypse,’ and that is why we cannot 
escape the dramatic convulsions of religious crises” (Kristeva 1982, 
209). I would like to suggest that Sorokin presents the sacred in 
the form of a discursive apocalypse, wreaked through the revelation 
of the discourse’s abject (somatic) side. What I have defined as 
Sorokin’s master trope, carnalization, is the essential element of this 
apocalypse.
As to the meaning of Sorokin’s sacred, it can be described as “the 
manifestation of the divinity of flesh, of universal lifedeath” (Staten 1993, 
50; author’s emphasis)—or zoe, bare life—to use once again Staten’s 
treatment of John’s Gospel. In Sorokin’s oeuvre, this is always 
the complement of the discursive apocalypse, the potentiality, or 
the nondiscursive undertow of his texts, secretly countering their 
rationally articulated “message.” The presence of this undercurrent 
in Sorokin’s works reveals a utopian aspiration, akin to that of 
radical feminism, as, for example, in Luce Irigaray’s words, “We 
have to renew the whole of language. [. . .] To reintroduce the 
values of desire, pain, joy, the body. Living values. Not discourses 
of mastery, which are in a way dead discourse, a dead grid imposed 
upon the living” (as quoted in Mulder 2006, 91). However, citing 
Sloterdijk’s characterization of Diogenes once more, Sorokin’s zoe 
philosophy does not go “primarily through the head; he experiences 
the world as neither tragic nor absurd. There is not the slightest 
trace of melancholy around him. [. . .] His weapon is not so much 
analysis as laughter” (Sloterdijk 1987, 160). This is why Sorokin 
failed in The Ice Trilogy when he endeavored to construct a somber 
mythic discourse around the principally nondiscursive sacred of 
bare life.
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Other Sorokin’s texts exhibit positive, albeit tangential, 
manifestations of this nondiscursive theme of lifedeath. For instance, 
in the finale of Ocheredʹ (The Queue, 1983), the celebration of sexuality 
displaces the abstract and undefinable “transcendental signified” of 
the queue (and the entire narrative). Other examples include the 
rapture and eroticism of the characters’ self-destruction in Serdtsa 
chetyrekh; the infinity of metamorphoses triggered by the blue fat 
in Goluboe salo (notably, the novel closes on the mention of Easter); 
the fierce carnivalesque luxury of feasting scenes, from Roman to 
Denʹ oprichnika; the wedding with two brides and one groom at the 
end of Moskva; and the pregnancy of Komiaga’s mistress, the only 
bit of news that he cannot recollect at the end of his long, “almost 
happy” day. One might assert that the whole procession of events 
in 4 bears an apocalyptic temper following the death of Zoia (Zoe), 
one of the four sister-clones (the four apocalyptic riders). From 
this perspective, it is possible to explain even Sorokin’s ire toward 
his former peers and friends as expressed in the infamous Denʹ 
oprichnika passage where Komiaga listens to Western radio stations: 
the author’s imaginary oprichniks seem to possess a much greater 
affinity for zoe as the horrifying and exciting sensation of bare life 
than for cerebral abstractions or post-structuralist obscurities.
Yet most importantly, Sorokin’s proclivity for zoe manifests itself 
through his master trope—the carnalization of the discursive, which, 
as I have tried to demonstrate, methodically forces the discourse to 
overcome itself in pursuit of the nondiscursive dimension. On this 
plane, the distinction between the abject and sacred, corporeal and 
transcendental, vanishes. Sorokin’s carnalizations thus correspond 
to the politicization of bare life, as described by Giorgio Agamben: 
“Once their fundamental referent becomes bare life, traditional 
political distinctions (such as those between Right and Left, 
liberalism and totalitarianism, private and public) lose their clarity 
and enter the zone of indistinction” (1995, 122).17
17 Agamben adds, “The ex-communist ruling classes’ unexpected fall into the 
most extreme racism (as in the Serbian program of ‘ethnic cleansing’) and 
the rebirth of new forms of fascism in Europe also have their roots here” 
(1995, 122).
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Prigov used to say that he staged discourses as a theater director 
manipulates actors. Sorokin does the same, but he also saturates these 
rhetorical figures with bare life, thus transforming carnalizations into 
self-sufficient performances. The meaning of these performances is 
paradoxical: while operating through discursive means, the writer 
nevertheless creates the illusion of transcending the discourse, if 
only for a while, into a nondiscursive state of bare life, or zoe. As 
a result, the reader, absorbed by Sorokin’s text, effectively finds her- 
or himself in the position of the homo sacer, who stays within bare 
life and personalizes it—be it as the humiliated victim of the state of 
exception or the oprichnik whose power stems from this very state. 
In this respect, Sorokin’s performances of discursivity resonate with 
Agamben’s notion that modern society “does not abolish sacred 
life but rather shatters it and disseminates it into every individual 
body, making it into what is at stake in political conflict” (1995, 124). 
Sorokin delivers this comprehension to the level of acute, almost 
physiological sensation.
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P u s s y  r i o t  a s  t h e  t r i C k s t a r
The Pussy Riot performance in the Cathedral of Christ the Savior 
(hereafter CCS) has been discussed and dissected from a vast 
panoply of perspectives through literally hundreds, if not thousands, 
of articles, comments, and blog entries. The members of the punk 
collective presented themselves as, and indeed were viewed as, 
heirs to the political dissension of the 1960s–70s and successors to 
the tradition of holy fools. Their taboo-bursting CCS performance 
in February 2012 was seen immediately as a challenge to the Putin 
regime and a protest against the political alliance between the 
Russian Orthodox Church and the Russian state.1 Others treated 
the punk prayer as a revitalization of the avant-garde’s political 
activism and as a wholly valid episode in the postwar history of 
political and anticlerical performances, worldwide (beginning with 
the Lettrists’ Notre-Dame Affair of 1950) and in Russia specifically.2
My approach to Pussy Riot is far less ambitious: I see this 
group, and its infamous punk prayer, as the cultural return to and 
rebirth of the trickster,3 a trope that wielded intense potency in 
1 For a review of these approaches, see Willems (2013), Gessen (2014), and 
Ponomariov (2013).
2 For a review of these approaches, see Epshtein (2012).
3 For the mythological functions and features of the trickster see: Kerenyi 
(1972), Jung (1972), Babcock-Abrahams (1975),  Doty and Hynes (1993).
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the Soviet period but drastically ebbed in post-Soviet times. Such 
an interpretation, I believe, situates Pussy Riot in Russian cultural 
history as a legitimate, yet radically novel, phenomenon.
I argued in my book Charms of the Cynical Reason: The Trickster’s 
Transformations in Soviet and Post-Soviet Culture (2011) that the 
trickster constitutes one of the sturdiest staples of twentieth-century 
Russian culture. Since the 1920s, this archetype has been upheld 
by such extremely popular literary characters as Ehrenburg’s 
Julio Jurenito, Babel’s Benia Krik, Olesha’s Ivan Babichev, Ilʹf and 
Petrov’s Ostap Bender, Aleksei Tolstoy’s Buratino, Bulgakov’s 
Woland with his host of tricksterish demons, Tvardovskii’s Vasilii 
Terkin, Venedikt Erofeev’s Venichka and Gurevich, and Iskander’s 
Sandro, to name just a few.
Soviet tricksters became bona fide superstars of Soviet society 
(in its official and unofficial provinces alike): they served as the 
cultural justification for dangerous, unheroic, and cynical survival, 
by elevating this existence through their virtuoso performances 
to a level of joyful, cheeky, and, most importantly, free play. They 
waved a hand and transformed shameless mimicry into a basically 
nonpragmatic art of transgressive living. Using Peter Sloterdijk’s 
dichotomy, we might say that these characters validated Soviet 
cynicism by matching and usurping it with kynicism—instigating 
the tradition that Vladimir Sorokin would continue with his master 
trope of carnalization. We remember Sloterdijk’s dictum “Cynicism 
can only be stemmed by kynicism, not by morality” (1987, 194). 
This, exactly, is what Soviet tricksters managed to do. Thus, they 
simultaneously legitimized the “self-subversive nature of the Soviet 
system” (Ledeneva 2002) and offered a viable, and profoundly 
appealing, alternative to its practical cynicism.
Characteristically, almost all Russo-Soviet tricksters are male. 
The prevalent absence of female tricksters testifies to the profoundly 
patriarchal character of Soviet culture, even in its nonconformist 
spheres. The trickster is simultaneously transgressive and 
sympathetic—but transgressions that are basically acceptable for 
men are incompatible with the alleged “proper” woman, and in the 
context of patriarchy their perpetration inevitably forecloses any 
empathy with the female transgressor.
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Given this dilemma, Pussy Riot’s members have revolutionarily 
introduced to Russian culture a collective incarnation of the 
trickstar—a female trickster, who undermines not only sociopolitical 
fixtures but, first and foremost, the gender regime of the society, 
challenging sexism and gender repression. According to Marilyn 
Jurich, coiner of the term, “The trickstar frequently aspires to self-
determination for other than personal reasons; she hopes to expose 
the hypocrisies and stupidities in the social establishment. [. . .] 
Tradition, however—that tradition supported by male power—
often prefers to see the trickstar as menacing, her tricks as self-
serving” (1998, 30, 33).
1.
The cynical countenance of social survival not only refused to fade 
in the post-Soviet years but in fact became a proud social norm. 
During this period the trickster trope visibly lost its transgressive 
and liberating faculty, although the late-Soviet and post-Soviet 
years have admittedly been marked by the monumental, lifelong 
trickster act of Dmitrii Aleksandrovich Prigov (1940–2007). 
A few other winning examples of post-Soviet trickstership have 
also arisen, most prominently and originally at the hands of such 
performance artists as Oleg Kulik, Vladislav Mamyshev-Monro, 
the Blue Noses Group, and collectives like E.T.I. and Voina. 
Notably, a few female tricksters appeared both in popular culture 
(Masiana from Oleg Kuvaev’s animated films series, and Vika 
of Moia prekrasnaia niania [My Fair Nanny, the Russian remake of 
CBS’s The Nanny]) and in postmodernist literature (the werewolf 
A Huli in Pelevin’s Sviashchennaia kniga oborotnia). Outside of 
these successes, the tricksters’ waning prominence in culture has 
been (over)compensated for by the surge of tricksteresque figures 
on the political and social scene, from the ever-popular Vladimir 
Zhirinovsky to the cinematically lionized Boris Berezovsky and 
Sergei Mavrodi, to the now-forgotten Dmitry Yakubovsky (“the 
general Dima”), or Duma deputy Viacheslav Marychev.
The dissipation of the trickster’s deconstructive power came 
about most likely in response to the ulterior, blat-based economy 
and sociality speeding to the forefront of society (see Ledeneva 
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2002), leaving in their dust the qualities typically associated with 
tricksterdom to be processed into the normalized, mainstream 
conditions of success and capitalist efficiency—at least in the 
public consciousness and media representation. Furthermore, 
the trickster’s transgression and liminality presuppose a sturdy 
conception of societal boundaries and taboo, a demarcation which 
vanished in the 1990s.
I do not hesitate to concur that the members of Pussy Riot 
are direct heirs to the trickster lineage in Soviet and post-Soviet 
culture. The punk prayer was openly ambivalent and therefore 
provocative; the group members operated as mediators and posed 
their transgressions as nonpragmatic, artistic gestures, establishing 
an unorthodox (paradoxical, in fact) relationship with the sacred 
(see Makarius 1993)—all critical functions of the trickster. Especially 
illuminating is the acceleration of the balaclava, after Pussy Riot’s 
CCS affair, into a worldwide symbol of cultural protest: with its 
carnival-like array of face-concealing colors, the balaclava icon not 
only unifies wearers into a collective trickster body—open for all 
willing to join—but furthermore designates an internal liminal zone, 
shared by all participants of the action (which, I believe, explains 
why members of the group sans balaclava are so different, both in 
manner and discourse, from Pussy Riot as a collective trickster).
It is also no accident that Nadezhda Tolokonnikova considers 
Dmitrii Prigov to be her entry to the world of contemporary art. 
The Prigov performance she attended in Norilʹsk at age sixteen, by 
her own acknowledgment, determined the subsequent course of 
her life, and to one of the court sessions she brought a homemade 
poster featuring a quotation from Prigov’s poetry. In addition, her 
own writing style, intertwining sophisticated post-structuralist and 
gender-sociology vernacular with irreverent slang, is strikingly 
reminiscent of the writings of the fox-trickster from Pelevin’s 
Sviashchennaia kniga oborotnia—whose name, A Huli, is no more 
decent to the Russian ear than Pussy Riot is to the English.
However, since the trickster’s business acquires new 
characteristic forms and new ramifications under each cultural 
era and in each individual trickster, we must briefly sketch the 
new cultural significance of the trickstar narrative of Pussy Riot. 
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Obviously, the punk-protest collective endowed the trickster 
trope with a renewed deconstructive force, but along with the 
classic trickster fare they also achieved the unprecedented power 
of political transgression. In Kevin Platt’s words, “While response 
to the open-ended nature of the happening generated at times 
potentially contradictory significances and alignments, this is surely 
a symptom of the success of Pussy Riot’s strategy” (2012). Mikhail 
Iampolʹskii adds, “Such actions gain meaning only in the context of 
the reaction that they prompt. One might even say that the reaction 
is virtually the main component of the action” (2012).
Responses and reactions to Pussy Riot comprised tremendous 
public debate surrounding both the CCS performance and the 
subsequent trial of the performers. What aspects of Pussy Riot’s 
cathedral concert triggered such powerful effects, effects that are 
sometimes artistic, sometimes ideological, sometimes political, but 
always incredibly explosive?
2.
Seeking the answers to such questions, many sympathetic 
commentators of the Pussy Riot CCS performance drew on the image 
of the holy fool.4 Tolokonnikova herself, in her closing statement, 
directly invoked this cultural model: “We were searching for real 
sincerity and simplicity, and we found these qualities in the yurodstvo 
[the holy foolishness] of punk” (“Pussy Riot’s Closing Statements” 
2012). This is a very curious choice of words, considering that a holy 
fool is anything but sincere. Conversely, Sergei Ivanov, an eminent 
expert in holy fools and the author of a cultural-history tome on 
their significance in Byzantium and beyond (see Ivanov 2005 and 
2006), argued that this parallel is inadequate on multiple counts—
chiefly because a holy fool’s prank necessarily demonstrates 
a higher truth, next to which all other “truths” and values appear 
dingy, disposable, fit only for ridicule and utter degradation.5 In his 
4 See, for example, the video recording of the seminar “Pussy Riot i iurodstvo,” 
Volkova (2016), Muravʹev (2012), Satarov (2012), Strelʹtsov (2012).
5 See the video recording of the discussion “Pussy Riot i iurodstvo” at the 
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book, while noting the kinship between holy fools and mythological 
tricksters (or “sacred clowns”), Ivanov stresses the difference 
between the holy fool’s work and jest: “A jester is all in a dialogue, 
a holy fool is monological by the principle; the jester immerses into 
the holiday time, while the holy fool is outside of time; jest is similar 
to art, while the holy foolishness is foreign to art” (2005, 16). I would 
top off this argument with the observation that, although a holy 
fool is indeed a trickster, his or her act is wholly locked within the 
religious paradigm.
While Pussy Riot’s recital in the Cathedral of Christ the Savior 
is most certainly not contained by religion, it is also not entirely 
extramural to this paradigm. After all, the trickstar-rockers did 
not put icons to the ax, as did Avdei Ter-Oganian in his 1998 
performance “The Young Atheist”; they prayed to the Mother of God 
in the country’s main cathedral. On the other hand, their famous 
music video repeatedly switches registers from Orthodox prayer 
and pious bowing to punk-rock gyration and riotous singing, with 
the refrain Sranʹ gospodnia (God’s shit) rhythmically replacing the 
traditional Halleluiah. The piece’s visual palette paradoxically fuses 
the hallowed church gilding with the bright colors of the performers’ 
dresses and balaclavas. As Iampolʹskii notes, not only are Pussy 
Riot’s outfits reminiscent of the late paintings of Malevich, but the 
group’s entire aesthetics is based on rapid shifts between sacred 
and profane signifiers, which is quite characteristic of the Russian 
avant-garde.6 Mariia Alekhina’s and Tolokonnikova’s closing 
statements only enhanced this impression of conscious oscillation 
between holy and base; held under accusations of blasphemy, they 
demonstrated deep knowledge of the Gospels.
Thus, the trickstar Pussy Riot staged its transgressive prayer 
on the borderline between sacred and profane, between church 
and counterculture, thereby revealing a liminal, ambivalent, and 
Sakharov Museum in Moscow, June 16, 2012, http://www.sakharov-center.
ru/discussions/?id=1663.
6 Iampolʹskii (2012) analyzed numerous deep connections of the Pussy Riot 
performance with the avant-garde.
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explosive region of contemporary Russian society and politics. 
Boris Grois emphasizes this quality of the CCS concert/recording 
session in his perceptive commentary:
And if, for example, Pussy Riot perform an action—and not 
even really an action, as they are simply gathering material that 
they use in their video—then it’s unclear whether or not they 
are breaking the law. This is a controversial question related to 
the law, to boundaries between secular and religious legislation, 
and so on. In other words, this action exposes a problem that 
hitherto had not been at the center of attention, and had never 
been thematized. This action is consistent with the meaning of 
contemporary art. It has brought out a certain contemporary 
order of things. A contemporary order of things that is unclear 
[. . .] Pussy Riot has drawn society’s attention to the complicated 
relationship between the sacred and secular space, between art 
and religion, and art and the law. They have made this zone 
visible. Thus society has been riled up and started to discuss 
it. If they hadn’t done it, there would have been no resonance. 
(Saprykin 2012)
The consequent persecution of the group has only confirmed 
the ambivalent tether between secular and sacred, political and 
clerical. The incendiary meaning of this ambivalence became 
agonizingly obvious when Alekhina, Tolokonnikova, and Ekaterina 
Samutsevich were charged in criminal court with offending the 
Christian feelings of believers, while their actual and admitted 
offense targeted the union between the Orthodox church and Putin’s 
state (and, of course, Putin himself); when the “experts” cited, in 
their educated conclusions, the rulings of the Laodicean (363 CE) 
and Trullan (691–92 CE) synods; when the secular court used these 
arguments to justify the criminal verdict; and so on.
The construction and exposure of various zones of ambivalence 
and liminality is every trickster’s true calling. Considering Pussy 
Riot from this vantage, one may expand on Grois’s analysis and 
say that the disclosure of vague and ambivalent bonds between the 
secular state and the Orthodox church, as the events and discussion 
pursuant to the CCS affair demonstrated, has not been the sole effect 
of Pussy Riot’s trickstar transgression. In fact, their performance 
achieved such tremendous success because it managed to reveal 
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multiple layers of ambivalence and indecision, apparently not limited 
to the messily intersected grounds of “sacred and secular space, art 
and religion, art and law.”
The venue, naturally, contributed in great measure to this 
virtual supernova of ambivalence. After all, the CCS is far more than 
just the symbol of a newfound alliance between the Putinist state 
and the Orthodox church, or of the Church’s corruption and cynical 
entrepreneurship. Demolished in 1931 and rebuilt from brick one 
between 1994 and 1997, it epitomizes the overarching post-Soviet 
project: the restoration of the “national tradition” and traditional 
values—in other words, neotraditionalism (see Sidorov 2000). Since 
the early 2000s, Boris Dubin and Lev Gudkov have warned that 
a hazy, yet decidedly conservative, conception of neotraditionalism 
had effectively united the majority of intelligentsia and siloviki:
“The rebirth of the great power” has become that sole symbolic 
thesis on which liberal Westernizers, Communist patriots, 
and crusaders for “holy Orthodox Rus” can come together. 
Its component elements, the definition of the great power’s 
“majesty,” as well as the means for achieving this goal, may vary 
greatly, but the general programmatic composition is unchanged. 
(Gudkov 2004, 660)
Institutions and organizations that could be considered secular 
and modern spark the population’s mistrust and dissatisfaction, 
while Russians connect a positive orientation and evaluation 
with the remaining meanings of a realm that is outside of any 
competition, that is special and that appeals to the past, to 
traditions, to authority, and particularly to ritualistic and the 
ceremonial. (Dubin 2011, 255)
If in the 1990s the models for past authoritative traditions 
were found in pre-Soviet Russia, in the 2000s this fount of 
neotraditionalism was supplemented by a burgeoning nostalgia for 
Soviet greatness, and with it a longing for the Great Empire across 
the ages. As Gudkov and Dubin have shown, the neotraditionalism 
launched by democrats in the 1990s paved the way for nostalgia for 
the great imperial power and, essentially, for the presiding Putin 
regime’s cultural rhetoric and politics.
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From this perspective, the clericalization of Russian politics 
and its swelling religious fundamentalism are just one side of the 
neotraditionalist ideology that is the true object of Pussy Riot’s CCS 
engagement. The “indecent” language and behavior brought to the 
house of God, the inappropriate and “provocative” clothing, the 
support for gay rights (gei-praid otpravlen v Sibirʹ v kandalakh, “Gay 
Pride is sent to Siberia in chains”), the sarcastic assault on widespread 
patriarchal convictions (chtoby Sviateishego ne oskorbitʹ, zhenshchinam 
nado rozhatʹ i liubitʹ, “In order not to offend His Holiness, women 
must give birth and love”), and the explicit appeal to feminism 
(Bogoroditsa, Devo, stanʹ feministkoi, Stanʹ feministkoi, feministkoi stanʹ, 
“Mother of God, become a feminist!”)—all of these were aimed not 
at Putin’s collusion with the clergy per se, but at neotraditionalist 
values in general. These ideals embrace and exacerbate the inclination 
toward authoritarianism and fundamentalism, toward homophobia 
and patriarchal repression against women, toward antifeminism—
toward the vision of “culture” as an omnibus of the “harmonious” 
masterpieces of old, and toward the negation of the “ugly” and 
“immoral” art of today.
Characteristically, many of those Russian celebrities and 
intelligenty who allegedly supported Pussy Riot and expressed their 
discontent with the trial and the verdict later felt the need to confess 
that they either were personally offended on religious grounds 
or found the performance immoral and aesthetically disgusting. 
Such statements typically partnered or alternated with apologetic 
remarks, according to which the defense of Pussy Riot members 
as victims of the system did not annul the despicable aesthetic 
composition of the performance, which was deemed appalling, 
talentless, and tasteless. In other words, these supporters of the punk-
protest coalition resisted political violence, but silently accepted 
and sincerely promoted the following neotraditionalist axioms: 
(a) art and any other form of cultural activity is to be judged by the 
criteria of morality, while the latter is defined, predominantly if not 
exclusively, by the religious, that is, Russian Orthodox, standard; 
(b) nonclassical and especially contemporary art is not art at all, 
does not belong to the sphere of culture, and must be treated as acts 
of “petty hooliganism.”
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Among those liberals who expressed their opposition to the trial 
of Pussy Riot, Boris Nemtsov, Boris Grebenshchikov, Alfred Kokh, 
Anastasiia Volochkova, Aleksei Navalʹnyi, Andrei Makarevich, and 
Elʹdar Riazanov, to name the most famous ones, submitted such 
opinions. Apparently, while criticizing the system for its political 
prosecution of Pussy Riot, these liberal “supporters” would not 
rue the band’s (certainly less harsh) social persecution for moral, 
religious, and aesthetic malfeasance. Religious and aesthetic 
indignation was also voiced with ardor by other prominent cultural 
personages of openly conservative persuasion, who, unlike liberals, 
favored the defendants’ harsh persecution—Patriarch Kirill, Nikita 
Mikhalkov, Stanislav Govorukhin, Valentin Rasputin, Vladimir 
Krupin, Elena Vaenga, Vladimir Solovʹev, Mikhail Leontʹev, Oleg 
Gazmanov, Tamara Gverdtsiteli, Sergei Lukʹianenko, Dmitrii 
Puchkov (Goblin), Iosif Kobzon, Aleksandr Prokhanov, and many 
others.
Apart from these “minor disagreements,” there is a third 
protuberant problem area in the liberal intelligentsia’s perception 
of Pussy Riot and their actions: the group’s feminism. Pussy Riot’s 
members have consistently emphasized the feminist core of their 
artistic strategy. Yet the feminist component of their musical 
performance (including the chromosomal resemblance of Pussy 
Riot to such Western groups as Guerrilla Girls, Bikini Kill, and 
other Riot Grrrl bands7) is typically and unpardonably overlooked 
in Russia. Even, for instance, by addressing their prayer not to 
Christ (in whose name the cathedral that hosted the performance is 
7 See on this subject Gapova (2012); Akulova (2013). Ekaterina Samutsevich 
says, “We were just hanging and watching performances, works of the 
Western feminist artists Guerrilla Girls, Riot Grrrl, etc. We absorbed this all, 
then started playing with words, and in such a way the name Pussy Riot was 
conceived. We decided to write songs in the punk style, punk feminism. This 
is a well-known trend, for instance, in the United States” («Мы просто сидели 
и смотрели акции, работы западных художниц-феминисток «Гирилья 
Герлз», «Райот Герл» и т. д. Мы впитывали все это, потом начали играть 
словами, и так было придумано название Pussy Riot. Решили, что будем 
писать песни в стиле панк, панк-феминизм. Это хорошо известное 
направление, например, в Америке»; Sobchak and Sokolova 2012).
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consecrated) but to the Mother of God, the group clearly expresses 
the desire to challenge patriarchal authorities, in secular and 
religious spheres alike. It is also no accident that the members’ 
visual self-presentation, while clearly feminine, is deprived of 
anything that could be twisted into the sexist objectification of 
a woman. Samutsevich says, “Our image is rather androgynous— 
a creature in a dress and colorful tights. Somebody like a woman 
but without a woman’s hair and face. An androgyn that looks like 
a cartoon character or superhero” (Sobchak and Sokolova 2012).8 
This fluid, though recognizably female, semblance is that of the 
trickstar: liminal figure, transgressive mediator, provocateur of 
ambivalence.
In March 2012, Daniil Dugum aptly remarked that “Pussy Riot 
is necessary to liberal society as an anti-Putinist project, rather than 
an antipatriarchal one,” a diagnosis that the development of the 
public discourse on Pussy Riot has unmistakably confirmed. The 
strongest discursive leitmotif unifying the comments of many liberal 
“supporters” of Pussy Riot presumed the group’s gender-based 
intellectual inferiority. The artists were treated—first, foremost, 
and almost universally—as innocuous “silly girls.” The degree of 
intellectual deficiency ascribed to them in statements by fair-weather 
fans ranged from durochki (fools) and ne ochenʹ dumaiushchie (small-
minded or “little-thinking”) to debilki (retards). Aleksei Navalʹnyi, 
one of the leaders of the protest movement, while supporting Pussy 
Riot politically, articulated his attitude toward their performance 
in the following terms: “The action in the CCS was idiotic, no 
argument there. To put it mildly, I wouldn’t like it very much if, 
when I was in church, some crazy girls ran in and started circling 
around the altar. The indisputable fact is that these are idiots who 
engaged in petty hooliganism for the sake of publicity” (“Navalʹnyi 
vstupilsia za Pussy Riot” 2012).9 “Idiotic action,” “crazed girls,” 
8 «У нас скорее андрогинный образ — некое существо в платье и цветных 
колготках. Что-то похожее на женщину, но при этом без женского лица, 
без волос. Андрогин, похожий на героя из мультиков, супергероя».
9 «Акция их в ХСС—идиотская, и спорить тут нечего. Мне бы, мягко говоря, 
не понравилось, если в тот момент, когда я в церкви, туда забежали какие-
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“idiots,” “petty hooliganism for the sake of publicity”—this suite 
of assessments sounds no kinder than Dmitry Medvedev’s famous 
“I feel like throwing up” (menia toshnit) prefacing his plea (the 
prime minister’s plea!) to soften the verdict leveled on Pussy Riot. 
In truth, such reactions are typical among witnesses to trickstars’ 
movements in patriarchal society: “Trickstars as wise fools rarely 
occur. Rather, women are generally depicted as simply foolish—
ignorant, gullible, incompetent. While they are fooled by tricks, 
they are not the conscious players of tricks” (Jurich 1998, 38).
Pussy Riot was further qualified repeatedly as lacking any sense 
of agency, operating in actuality as someone’s puppet. Curiously, 
this pattern grouped some liberals near all conservatives. The 
difference was even rather technical, since liberal blogs and media 
assigned the role of the “girls’ (male) master” either to Petr Verzilov, 
as their alleged “producer,” or to hidden enemies of the Patriarch 
Kirill, while in conservative circles Pussy Riot was asserted to be 
manipulated by “the West” or Boris Berezovsky or the leaders of 
political opposition. Yet even among some liberals, the closing 
statements of Alekhina, Tolokonnikova, and Samutsevich were met 
with suspicion: Who has written the script for these girls?
The gender terror against Pussy Riot reached its zenith in the 
promotion of physical punishment over imprisonment. The idea of 
the preferable, or even merciful, spanking of Pussy Riot’s members 
was advanced by many “supporters,” beginning with the known 
leader of the protest movement, Boris Nemtsov, and seconded by the 
actor and director (famous by his obscurantism) Ivan Okhlobystin, 
as well as the Communist leader Gennady Ziuganov—to name 
a scant few, given that 27 percent of individuals polled by VTsIOM 
supported this brilliant proposition. No wonder Kirill Kobrin was 
inspired to make his sardonic commentary: “There’s that tone in 
some Russian liberal quarters—the arrogant, macho disdain for the 
opposite sex, which posits that woman, by definition, is incapable 
of conscious action. . . . Here I see a stark disconnect between their 
то чокнутые девицы и стали бегать вокруг алтаря. Имеем неоспоримый 
факт: дуры, совершившие мелкое хулиганство ради паблисити».
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democratic, liberal views and the profoundly macho, and, when it 
comes down to it, profoundly Soviet authoritarian consciousness” 
(Sharogradskii 2012).10
3.
These aftereffects of Pussy Riot’s CCS performance have been 
no less significant than the intended revelation of the state’s 
unwillingness to separate “offense to the King” from “offense to 
the feelings of believers.” The discourse launched by Pussy Riot 
within the liberal intelligentsia reveals the hypocrisy of the liberal 
opposition, which supported the “girls” only insofar as they served 
as an irritant to common enemies, while not-so-secretly deriding 
them as silly, puppeteered pawns who ought to face corporal 
punishment for their shameful misconduct. Furthermore, these 
discussions laid bare the responsibility of neotraditionalist thinking, 
shared by many representatives (if not a sheer majority) of the liberal 
intelligentsia, for the Putin era’s ideology and growing Orthodox 
fundamentalism.
To sum up, the Pussy Riot debate has exposed such flaws in the 
liberal discourse as the tacit equation of moral values with religious 
doctrines; hierarchical, essentialist, and, basically, premodern 
understanding of culture (rejecting contemporary art for its lack of 
“harmony”); and, most importantly, stalwart allegiance to patriar-
chal stereotypes. The shared values that are responsible for these 
flaws appear not so different from the conservatives’ rage against 
“blasphemy” and the assault on national “spiritual ties” (dukhovnye 
skrepy, to use Putin’s words), and their aggressive “defense” of 
“eternal” moral-religious ideals, epitomized by the disgust toward 
contemporary art. In Mikhail Leontʹev’s words, “The targets 
are chosen quite simply: the church, traditional morality, state 
10 «Вот этот тон части русской либеральной общественности — высокомер-
ное мачистское неуважение к другому полу, исходя из которого женщи-
на, по определению, не может произвести сознательного действия [. . .] 
Я вижу здесь абсолютное несовпадение их демократических, либераль-
ных убеждений с глубоко мачистским и глубоко, по сути дела, советским 
авторитарным сознанием». See also Verigina (2012); Rossa (2012).
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institutions, political power, and they are covered almost literally 
in shit, and this is set forth as an act of art” (“[Mikhail] Leontʹev” 
2012).11
Thus, Pussy Riot has realized the zone of ambivalence not 
only between the state and church, art and religion, religion and 
aesthetics, and so on, but also, and most significantly, between the 
opposition to the Putin regime and its supporters. This achievement is 
soaringly comparable with that of the Soviet tricksters, though in 
an inverted form. As mentioned above, Soviet tricksters culturally 
justified via their artistic transgressions a hidden layer of Soviet social 
and economic reality, proving through their kynical performances 
that “underground” activities are vital for the survival of the 
official system. Pussy Riot, willingly or not, has demonstrated the 
opposite: that the forces that seemingly undermine the authorities 
in fact share their most fundamental values, coinciding in a basic 
interpretation of moral, cultural, and gender hierarchies, and differ 
only in a tactical understanding of political issues. The patriarchal 
tune uniting critics and supporters of the punk group turns out 
to be the decisive factor: indeed, in the long run, it validates the 
autocratic regime better than any political rhetoric.
Marilyn Jurich suggested that the trickstar’s strategy 
characteristically transforms (gender) powerlessness into a trick: 
“Woman by virtue of gender alone has been marginalized; and 
the trickstar is a twice-marginal figure. The difference is that 
the trickstar uses marginality for her advantage, is intentionally 
impertinent and indecent, violating norms in order to invigorate 
society” (1998, 34). Pussy Riot matches this description to the letter, 
yet with an important qualification: their trick manifests itself 
through the most blatant acknowledgment of their powerlessness—
in the courtroom that has become the spectacle of lawlessness and 
11 «Выбираются просто цели: церковь, традиционная мораль, 
государственные институты, политическая власть и обливаются почти в 
буквальном смысле говном, причем это выдается как акт искусства».
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in the public discourse that has exploded into a similar parade of 
sexist repression.12
Dmitry Bykov wrote in his improvised commentary in verse to 
the Pussy Riot arrests of March 2012:
И, куда страшней для всякой гнуси
Всенародно чаемый итог—
Чтобы вместо riot of the pussy,
Тут случился riot of the cock.
What would be worse that such a strange and fussy
scandal sparked by performers of punk rock,
Could only be if a riot of the pussy,
Were replaced with a riot of the cock13
In contrast to this wishful thinking, Pussy Riot has exposed an 
uncanny symmetry between the authoritarianism of the Putin 
regime and the patriarchal neotraditionalism of its opponents 
(and some of Pussy Riot’s supposed advocates). In this respect, the 
“riot of the pussy” appears to be much more radical than a “riot 
of the cock.” It seems that, for contemporary Russia, the trickstar’s 
transgression delves much deeper and produces much more 
profound effects, than that of the male trickster.14
12 Tellingly, even sympathetic and overtly liberal Kseniia Sobchak could not 
understand how Pussy Riot members in their spare time could discuss such 
issues as sexism (see Sobchak and Sokolova 2012). See Borenstein’s (2012) 
commentary to Sobchak’s symptomatic “cluelessness.”
13 Translated by Eliot Borenstein. See Bykov’s reading of this poem, “Grazhdanin 
poet: Eksprompt Bykova na arest Pussy Riot,” March 3, 2012, http://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=UikMqS9sA30.
14 This proposition can be convincingly illustrated by the comparison of 
Pussy Riot with the subject of analogous discussion in Slavic Review: Borat, 
of Sacha Baron Cohen’s feature film. See “Borat: Selves and Others” (2008), 
especially on Borat as the trickster, and Kononenko and Kukharenko (2008); 
D. Leiderman (2008).
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Th e f o r m a l  I s  Pol I T Ic a l
S e e k i n g  a  C o n s t r uc t ive  P r i nc i p l e
The principles of poetic language become most palpable when 
they are seemingly hidden by ideology, since ideological narratives 
unwittingly reproduce similar principles. This is especially obvious 
in today’s Russia, where ideology is returning, proving that its 
apparent departure was itself an artistic device. The formalists have 
won. At least in today’s cultural climate, Bakhtin and even Lotman 
look much more questionable than Tynianov, Eikhenbaum, and 
Jakobson. Shklovsky is above any competition.
Although equations of the aesthetic and political are frequently 
shaky, their very popularity reveals a new tendency distinguishing 
today’s interpretations of formalism from its historical sources. 
Formalists were careful enough to hide the political meaning of 
poetics (in exceptional cases—like their articles about Lenin’s 
language—they could speak of the poetic principles of the political). 
Today, not only theorists but writers as well are fully aware of the 
political meaning of their poetics. Indeed, the correlation between 
the author’s rejection of rhymed syllabotonic verse and participation 
in anti-Putin protests, or striving toward the “new realism” and 
a progovernment position after the annexation of Crimea, is too 
marked to be ignored. This situation is quite novel, since back in the 
1980s, as well as during perestroika and in the 1990s, writers who 
were close to nonconformist circles or influenced by them preached 
the superiority of literature that was independent of any kind of 
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political or ideological position. Vladimir Sorokin recalled in 2006, 
“I was influenced by the Moscow underground, where it was 
common to be apolitical. This was one of our favorite anecdotes: as 
German troops marched into Paris, Picasso sat there and drew an 
apple. That was our attitude—you must just sit there and draw your 
apple, no matter what happens around you” (279–80). Naturally, 
this attitude was inseparable from the rejection of Soviet aesthetics, 
with its ideological dictatorship along with its mirroring by the 
dissident discourse.1 The writer and one of the founders of the 
Russian Internet Sergei Kuznetsov, in a recent lecture for the online 
Open University, mentioned that Dovlatov’s witticism about the 
mutual mirroring of Soviet and anti-Soviet rhetoric served as the 
motto for his (my) generation, and that the sense of freedom from 
politics and ideology rapidly increased after 1991, when allegedly 
“we”—that is, liberally oriented, anti-Soviet, and antitotalitarian 
forces—won (2016).
Yet in the mid-2000s and especially after the winter protests of 
2011–12, something radically changed, leading to a new attraction 
of literati to politics. A symptomatic example of an unavoidable 
politicization of the literary text despite the author’s best intentions 
is Viktor Pelevin’s recent novel The Seer (Smotritel’, 2015). In this 
book, Pelevin tries to restore the understanding of literature as 
freed of politics and spectacularly fails. The Seer, oddly enough, 
constitutes a rare case of a modern utopia. Pelevin’s heroes—the 
Russian emperor Paul I and the father of American democracy 
Benjamin Franklin among them—have managed to create a parallel 
reality, the Idyllium, which, though woven together from cultural 
and religious quotations, is nonetheless possessed of an undoubted 
vitality and, most importantly, enjoys autonomy from the flow 
of earthly history. The novel’s protagonist, Alex, successfully 
negotiates each of his trials and eventually asserts his power over 
the Idyllium. Despite his becoming aware of the illusory nature 
not only of the latter but also of his own personality, Alex never 
develops the desire to return to the reality of “Old Earth.” Insulated 
1 See Oushakine (2001).
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from history, the Idyllium becomes an ersatz for the universe, 
an abstraction of all its requisite features. Oriental mysticism 
is intermingled with European occultism of the eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries, monastic rituals with their masonic 
counterparts, and Pelevin’s brand of Buddhism with mystical 
interpretations of modern computer software.
Pelevin, who has made his name by writing postmodernist satires 
about post-Soviet politics, possesses a unique sensitivity to changes 
in the tenor of the time. Possibly due to a feeling that the meaning of 
political writing has changed and an understanding that he is unable 
to reform himself in sync with these changes (or perhaps realizing 
the risks of such an endeavor), Pelevin attempts to write a novel 
without politics. However, it’s precisely this kind of involved utopian 
fantasy that—perhaps contrary to Pelevin’s own wishes—takes on 
the dimension of a political metaphor in the current social context. 
The combination of the belief that the “other” is only a reflection 
(distorted or imperfect) of what is “mine,” and, simultaneously, 
that “my world” encompasses all the diversity of existence—this is, 
in fact, the formula of imperial consciousness. Replace “Old Earth” 
with the no less nebulously frightening “West,” and the panorama 
of the Idyllium depicted by Pelevin bears an imprint of the collective 
imaginary offered up by contemporary Russian politics. Pelevin’s 
Idyllium, therefore, represents an imperial imaginary raised to 
the level of philosophical utopia. Escape from politics leads only 
to its “cleansing” of cynicism, villainy and blood. A better filter 
than metaphysics for such an undertaking would be difficult to 
find. In other words, Pelevin remains a political writer even as he 
strives to get away from politics. This time around, however, satire 
is displaced by utopia. Pelevin has, without realizing it himself, 
metamorphosed from the most mordant critic of the contemporary 
cultural-political regime into its promoter.
Pelevin’s example better than any other demonstrates that 
literature’s engagement in politics is not a fashion, but a large-
scale paradigmatic shift that took about thirty years to develop. 
An emerging paradigm suggests a new deep connection between 
the language, or rather the form (in the formalist interpretation), of 
contemporary Russian literature and the political. I would like to 
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argue that even the feminist slogan from the 1960s “The personal 
is political” (attributed to Carol Hanisch), frequently quoted by one 
of the most prominent Russian sociologists of culture, Boris Dubin, 
seems to be too limited for the situation today. Instead, one may 
claim—with a good helping of wishful thinking—that “the formal 
is political,” or rather suggest that it has always been political. Now 
this aspect of the literary form has been laid bare. Furthermore, it 
is a radicalized, estranged form that functions as a political force in 
today’s cultural condition. When political conservatism originates 
from and finds its greatest support in the cultural mainstream 
(inherited from the late-Soviet period and creatively adjusted to 
the post-Soviet condition), any resistance to and subversion of 
the cultural mainstream obtains political significance. Most likely, 
it was Pussy Riot’s punk prayer that set the example of the new 
political art (see above), in which the form serves as the explosive 
vehicle for political subversion; notably, it was not the words of the 
punk prayer but the “devilish jumping” (diavol’skoe dryganie) аnd 
punk-rock music that caused the most intense reactions of outrage 
from conservatives.
However, today many critics of and participants in the cultural 
process speak about the penetration of postmodernist devices into 
the government’s political discourses and rhetoric. Pussy Riot’s 
Nadezhda Tolokonnikova suggests that today “political actionism 
loses its strength every day because the state has confidently 
hijacked the initiative: now it operates as an artist and performs 
whatever it wants with us. Boris Grois would have said that Putin 
continues the tradition of the Stalinist total work of art (read his 
Gesamtkunstwerk Stalin), when a whole country is one person’s work 
of art.”2 Does this mean that the postmodernist form has become 
automatized, that is, absorbed by the mainstream (political and 
cultural alike) and that more radical estrangements are required? 
I answer this question elsewhere (see “Post-Soc” in this volume and 
Lipovetsky 2016), but in a nutshell I believe that postmodernism 
2 Facebook post, August 8, 2014,  
https://www.facebook.com/tolokno/posts/792897714074449:0.
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is broad and diverse enough to produce alternatives to those of its 
forms that have been hijacked and automatized by official culture. 
Further, I will focus on several such alternatives and discuss their 
possibilities and limitations.
T he  M i nor  L i t e r at u r e
According to Shklovsky and Tynianov, form organizes poetic 
language by shifts and dislocations palpable only in relation to 
preexisting cultural languages. The dislocation of language is more 
visible and more prominent in poetry than in prose, which explains 
why in the 2000s and 2010s, for the first time since the 1960s, poetry 
rather than prose took priority in aesthetic innovation.
This happened despite powerful institutional stimulators, 
such as literary prizes, honorariums, and chain bookstores 
that predominately support prose rather than poetry, let alone 
dramaturgy. I mentioned the 1960s, yet today’s situation is 
drastically different from that during the Thaw, since the growth 
in poetry is not accompanied by liberatory tendencies in the public 
sphere (quite the contrary), and because the majority of innovative 
poets belong to what Boris Dubin has defined as the “minor 
literature.” Following Deleuze and Guattari’s characterization of the 
minor literature by “the connection of the individual to a political 
immediacy” (1986, 18), Dubin wrote in 2009, “This is a marginal 
culture, a culture of semantic and aesthetic quest. It addresses 
itself to very narrow circles of the readership, a big part of which 
is made up of the authors themselves” (278). However, Dubin also 
believed that such literature strives to achieve “ultimately universal 
forms and meanings” (279–80) pertaining to existential or even 
anthropological dimensions of humanity. I find the latter qualifier 
questionable, yet the definition of experimental and intellectually 
innovative literature as the “minority within a minority” that is 
political by default is also novel for post-Soviet literature; in fact, 
this is a definition of the underground in the 1970s–80s, only 
transposed into the public space of the Internet, small-run presses, 
and a few journals, including Novoe Literaturnoe Obozrenie (New 
Literary Review) or Translit.
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The relationships between contemporary Russian “minor 
literature” and the mainstream paradoxically both agree and 
disagree with the logic of literary forms’ evolution as described by 
Tynianov in his articles “The Literary Fact” (1924) and “On Literary 
Evolution” (1927): “Large forms, when getting automatized, 
emphasize the significance of small forms (and vice versa); an 
image providing a verbal arabesque or semantic shift, while being 
automatized, clarifies the meaning of the image [. . .] (and vice 
versa)” (1977, 262).
The automatization of the large form, its replacement with 
a “verbal arabesque,” “semantic fracture,” a fragment, a ruin 
of the totality testifies to the shift toward a worldview based on 
the intentional rejection of teleological explanations of history 
and linear historical narratives. Tynianov, as we all know, 
demonstrated this shift through the new role acquired by informal 
and nonliterary genres in the first quarter of the nineteenth 
century—first and foremost, private letters: “Here, in these letters, 
we find the most flexible and most needed phenomena that with 
incredible force highlighted new constructive principles: reticence, 
fragmentariness, hints. The ‘domestic’ small form of the letter 
motivated the introduction of petty detail and stylistic devices as 
opposed to/in contrast to the ‘grandiose’ devices of the 18th century” 
(1977, 265).
If one tries to apply Tynianov’s principles to the contemporary 
literary situation, the result will be self-contradictory. On the 
one hand, today the automatization of the large form appears 
inseparable from its mass success. Extremely telling is the story 
of the novel Zuleikha otkryvaet glaza (Zuleikha Opens Her Eyes, 2015) 
by the newcomer Guzelʹ Yakhina (b. 1977). This novel by a 2015 
graduate of the Department for Scriptwriters of the Moscow Film 
School has become a literary sensation. Awarded the Big Book and 
Yasnaya Polyana prizes, it was also short-listed both for the Booker 
and the NOS (Novaia slovesnost’; New Literature) prizes, having 
very strong support in all possible literary circles, conservative and 
liberal, gravitating to “thick journals” and to the Internet media. 
Published with a laudatory foreword by Liudmila Ulitskaya, it 
was also praised by critics from opposing camps, such as Anna 
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Narinskaya and Pavel Basinsky. What caused such excitement? The 
novel offers a melodramatic story inhabited by one-dimensional 
characters and placed against the background of collectivization. 
Instead of estrangement it offers the reader numerous comfortably 
recognizable clichés collected from Soviet literature of both liberal 
and orthodox brands. Close scrutiny reveals that beneath an 
ostensible multiculturalism focused on a Tatar female peasant, 
we have a classic case of Orientalism; in the best Socialist Realist 
fashion, Zuleikha, the female protagonist, leaves behind her national 
culture, which is represented as repressive, and finds a higher truth 
in her love for the Russian hero (a Communist and NKVD officer). 
The post-Soviet author obviously recycles Soviet literature not 
only thematically but also stylistically. Consider, for example, such 
a description:
Ignatov never was a womanizer. Tall, slender, ideologically 
correct—the women themselves cast flirtatious glances at him, 
trying to catch his attention. But he didn’t rush to attach himself 
and his soul to anyone. He had just a few women in his life—
shame to admit, the fingers of one hand would be enough to 
count them all. He had no time for them. In 1918, he enrolled in 
the Red Army—and hadn’t stopped fighting since then: first, it 
was the Civil War, then he mowed down the basmachi in Central 
Asia [. . .]. He would still have been cutting down enemies, if not 
for Bakiev. [. . .] It was he, who returned Ignatov to his native 
Tataria. Come back, Vanya, he told him, I badly need people I can 
trust—I can’t cope without you. (Yakhina 2015, 119; trans. Irene 
Masing-Delic and Helen Halva)3
3 «Игнатов никогда не был бабником. Статный, видный, идейный — 
женщины обычно сами приглядывались к нему, старались понравиться. 
Но он ни с кем сходиться не торопился и душой прикипать тоже. Всего-
то и было у него этих баб за жизнь — стыдно признаться — по пальцам 
одной руки перечесть. Все как-то не до того. Записался в восемнадцатом 
в Красную армию — и поехало: сначала Гражданская, потом басмачей 
рубил в Средней Азии [. . .]. До сих пор бы, наверное, по горам шашкой 
махал, если бы не Бакиев. [. . .] Он-то Игнатова и вернул в родную 
Татарию. Возвращайся, говорит, Ваня, мне свои люди позарез нужны, 
без тебя — никак».
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Generally speaking, such a novel would have perfectly fit in 
with Soviet literature of the 1960s and could have been written by, 
say, Chingiz Aitmatov or his imitators (Ulitskaya mentions this 
similarity as well). Although there are aspects that would have 
made publication impossible in the 1960s (the detailed portrayal of 
collectivization and the Gulag), this text today reads as a script for 
a multiserial tearjerker (which will surely be produced in no time). 
This novel’s success is similar to the hysterical newly discovered 
fascination of the Moscow and, more broadly, Russian public with 
Valentin Serov’s paintings4 (although Serov is much more complex 
than Zuleikha): it is driven by the desire to find some simple and clear 
cultural phenomena that would counterbalance the aforementioned 
disturbing fusion of nationalist and conservative politics with 
elements of postmodernist rhetoric.
At the same time, in full agreement with Tynianov’s logic, in 
today’s Russian culture social media, such as first LiveJournal and 
later Facebook, have appropriated a role similar to that of the private 
letter in formalist theory. One could observe the rise of minor genres, 
autobiographical notes, vignettes, and anecdotes (in Pushkin’s 
sense) since the late 1980s. Pioneered by Sergei Dovlatov’s Zapisnye 
knizhki (Notebooks), which formed the cultural idiom of the “last 
Soviet generation” (Yurchak 2006), this genre flourished in books by 
Mikhail Gasparov, Aleksandr Zholkovsky, Mikhail Bezrodnyi, Lev 
Rubinshtein, and Grisha Bruskin, among others. Simultaneously, 
a powerful tradition of in-between prose (promezhutochnaia proza) 
has been shaped as a radical cultural phenomenon. Epitomized by 
Lidiia Ginzburg, it absorbed Vasilii Rozanov’s Fallen Leaves, Kornei 
Chukovskii’s and Mikhail Kuzʹmin’s diaries, on the one hand, as 
well as Andrei Siniavskii’s, Pavel Ulitin’s, and Evgenii Kharitonov’s 
works, on the other. Blogging has connected these processes with 
4 A recent Serov exhibition in Moscow was attended by a half million people, 
more than any other art exhibition in post-Soviet history. People stood 
in line at the Tretyakov Gallery for three to five hours outside in subzero 
temperatures. See, for example, “Vystavka Serova v Moskve ustanovila 
rekord poseshchaemosti,” BBC, February 5, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/
russian/news/2016/02/160205_serov_expo_record.
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the intelligentsia’s newly discovered means of communication, 
thus offering a new resonance to the “in-between” genre, or rather 
metagenre of today’s minor literature. Aleksandr Ilʹianen’s recent 
novel Pensiia (The Pension, 2015) offers an illuminating example. 
Ilʹianen has been literally writing this novel online, through his 
VKontakte microblog. Actually, the result was not all that different 
from his previous works, which fully belong to the in-between 
prose context. Judging by the resonance of this novel (a special 
cluster of articles in NLO, short-listing for the NOS literary prize), 
this strategy proved to be quite effective.
The Internet, despite optimistic or pessimistic forecasts, failed to 
change the nature of literature. We are still reading linearly and not 
hypertextually. Visuality also has not completely replaced verbal 
art but rather absorbed it—offering powerful miniseries available 
on reading devices as the persuasive substitute of serialized novels 
of the past. Russian Facebook and LiveJournal have proven to be 
especially suitable for literary experimentation, since these services 
are less pragmatically oriented than, say, in the United States 
and less dominated by youngsters. Russian blogs and microblogs 
represent all generations and do not exclude philosophizing, 
literary criticism, short essays, or any of the microgenres listed 
above. They are truly heterotopic in the Foucauldian meaning of 
the word; by interweaving diverse fragments, uncountable subjects, 
documents, fakes, intimate confessions, supershort comedies and 
tragedies, analytical texts and sarcastic (or rude) comments, they 
create “the disorder in which fragments of a large number of 
possible orders glitter separately in the dimension without law and 
geometry” (Foucault 1970, xvii). Unlike TV screens, these media 
are predominantly verbal. We have here the revanche of literature-
centrism, if you wish.
Heterotopias, according to Foucault, “Secretly undermine 
language, because they make it impossible to name this and that, 
because they destroy ‘syntax’ in advance, and not only the syntax 
with which we construct sentences but also that less apparent syntax 
which causes worlds and things [. . .] to ‘hold together’” (1970, 
xviii). In many ways, this is a perfect characterization of the political 
meaning of contemporary Russian poetry, which explains why it 
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confidently inhabits Facebook and similar services. Communication 
between authors and readers through the microblog, where new 
texts appear almost in a daily regime, has become routine for such 
prominent poets as Stanislav Lʹvovskii and Andrei Rodionov, 
Elena Fanailova and Polina Barskova, Linor Goralik and Boris 
Khersonskii, Galina Rymbu and Roman Osminkin, Kirill Medvedev 
and Mariia Stepanova, among others. Similarly, the New Drama 
as a cultural phenomenon has been shaped by Internet forums 
and competitions; the docudrama frequently theatricalizes online 
debates as, for example, in Elena Gremina and Mikhail Ugarov’s 
play September.doc (2005).
I am far from the thought that today’s Russian poetry and drama 
are derivative of the Internet. However, I believe that Internet media 
underscore and “lay bare” those features of poetic and dramaturgic 
texts that facilitate the political functioning of their form. A poem 
posted on Facebook sounds different from the same poem on a book 
page. As a part of the news feed, it is integrated into the process of 
communication and can be expected to receive direct reactions from 
readers. This communication also includes a performative element 
since the poem is contextualized by truly performative gestures 
that surround it in the news feed, such as political and personal 
statements, greetings, calls for help, and so on. The online status 
of a poetic or, more broadly, literary text, by default implies the 
illusion of authenticity and even “documentality”; the text appears 
as something that the author has written minutes or hours ago and 
is sharing with you personally.
This performativity is not a new aspect of Russian poetry; 
however, it obviously has been becoming more and more important 
within the last two decades. In minor literature, where Facebook 
postings and small-size readings acquire the role of major forms 
of publication, the communicative and performative capacities of 
poetry are radically enhanced. It would be valid to see in complex 
poetry and the readers’ ability to enjoy it a shibboleth that facilitates 
belonging to a tight community of the like-minded. At the same 
time, one can observe the growing influence of Dmitrii Prigov and 
his method based entirely on performativity, which is perceived 
within minor literature as a fertile model for new poetry and, more 
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generally, for poetic self-realization. Last but not least, an example 
set by Dmitri Bykov and Mikhail Efremov’s project Citizen Poet 
proved that performed poetry possesses unforeseen political 
potential—which, by the way, could not be realized without the 
Internet. What is the relation of performativity and the illusion of 
authenticity to the emerging constructive principle in contemporary 
literature, the one that enforces the political meaning of its forms?
Aut he nt i c i t y  or  Pe r for m at iv i t y?
Ellen Rutten recently wrote the informative book Sincerity after 
Communism (to be published by Yale University Press), in which 
she meticulously traces the perturbations and transformations of 
the chase for authenticity and sincerity in post-Soviet culture. As 
follows from her analysis, this quest, despite its declarative anti-
postmodernist rhetoric, in many cases proves to be a form of 
postmodernism’s self-critique leading to radical innovations, as it 
was in the case of Prigov’s “new sincerity” (1984–86), which resulted 
in his most brilliant and still underappreciated performance “Appeals 
to Citizens” (see also Skakov 2016). Sorokin’s step in this direction 
with his Ice Trilogy led to his later politicized postmodernism. The 
desire for authenticity is also responsible for the New Drama theater, 
which—despite its leaders’ claims—belongs to the postmodern 
cultural paradigm and cannot be reduced to “truth-speaking” of the 
kind that we had in perestroika aesthetics.
At the same time, Ellen Rutten mentions (although she does not 
elaborate) that many of those who desired sincerity above all riches 
ended up in the ultraconservative camp, from Dugin to Prilepin. 
Indeed, this is an interesting paradox, especially considering that 
since the 1960s the banner of sincerity served as a euphemism for 
a liberal worldview. Nowadays, sincerity can mean solidarity with 
xenophobic, nationalist, imperialist, and similar ideologies. The 
claim or rather rhetorical signifiers of sincerity seem to release the 
author from any moral or even logical obligations. For example, 
consider this text by the famed playwright Evgenii Grishkovets, 
written and published soon after the annexation of Crimea and 
Russia’s attack on the Ukrainian revolution:
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I think that that which took place in Kiev at the end of last year 
and now is taking place in the whole country has no relation 
whatsoever to a struggle for freedom. [. . .] The referendum there 
[in the Crimea] was just, but illegal. [. . .] It was illegal to annex the 
Crimea. That is what I think. But what else could we have done? 
I don’t know! The annexation was unlawful, but it was done 
beautifully. Masterfully. [. . .] And I also think that it is fair that the 
Russian fleet now stands in Sevastopol and does not have to pay. 
It stands there illegally but justly. It is just that the ships of NATO 
won’t be standing there. They have no right to be there. [. . .] The 
government of Ukraine is unlawful. I think it lacks independence 
and is criminal. Criminal in its lack of independence. [. . .] 
I think that Obama is an untalented and stupid person. He is an 
ambitious and weak politician. Oversensitive and absurd. [. . .] 
Europe bears the marks of obvious degeneration, but refuses to 
see that, continuing to follow old habits and sticking to its old 
ways and ambitions, like an old man who refuses to acknowledge 
that he has no strength anymore and is enfeebled, both his brain 
and his muscles. [. . .] The decision about the embargo of food 
imports, I think was a really strong move. I saw that myself in 
Greece.5
5 «Я думаю, то, что происходило в Киеве в конце прошлого года, а теперь 
происходит во всей стране, никакого отношения к борьбе за свободу не 
имеет. [. . .] Референдум там [в Крыму] был справедливый, но незаконный. 
[. . .] Крым аннексировать было нельзя. Я так думаю! А что было делать? 
Я не знаю! Аннексировать было нельзя, но аннексировали его красиво. 
Мастерски. [. . .] И ещё я думаю, что справедливо то, что в Севастополе 
теперь стоит русский флот без аренды. Незаконно стоит, но справедливо. 
Справедливо, что корабли НАТО там стоять не будут. Нечего им 
там делать. [. . .] Руководство Украины незаконно. Думаю, что оно 
несамостоятельно и преступно. Преступно своей несамостоятельностью. 
[. . .] Я думаю, что Обама бездарный и глупый человек. Он амбициозный 
и слабый политик. Обидчивый и нелепый. [. . .] Европа несёт в себе 
явные признаки вырождения, не желая их замечать и продолжая 
жить по привычке, с прежними замашками и амбициями, как старик, 
отказывающийся признать, что силы его покинули и одряхлели, 
как мозг, так и мышцы. [. . .] Решение с продовольственным эмбарго, 
я думаю, был сильный ход. Я сам это видел в Греции». First published 
on Grishkovets’s blog at Ekho Moskvy, September 4, 2014, http://echo.msk.
ru/blog/evgeniy_grishkovetz/1393294-echo/. See also http://odnovremenno.
com/archives/4952. Translated by Irene Masing-Delic and Helen 
Halva.
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In the late 1990s, “human documents,” masterfully presented 
by Grishkovets in his one-man show How I Ate a Dog, triggered an 
aesthetic revolution in Russian theater and became the precursors 
of the New Drama (despite Grishkovets’s animosity toward this 
movement). Grishkovets created a new theatrical discourse based 
on the “sincerity” of a personal utterance and establishing a new 
distance between the author/character/actor and the audience.6 
The almost twenty years that have passed since the premiere of his 
first show transformed Grishkovets’s sincerity into an automatized 
discourse, applicable to various subjects: from love for a woman (The 
Planet) to love for death (Dreadnoughts), from exalted love for the 
motherland (+1) to no less exalted love for property (The House). The 
quoted text employs the same technique to express Grishkovets’s 
sincere and authentic love for the government, its new course, 
coupled with a humble desire to continue milking the Ukrainian 
audience. After this quasi-individual and therefore self-parodic 
performance of sincerity that serves as a license to guise or disguise 
political servility as independence of thought (“Ia tak dumaiu!” 
[“That’s my opinion!”]), one can hardly insist on the congruence 
between authenticity and truth. Authenticity appears as a set of 
devices (in Grishkovets’s palette, these are unfinished sentences, 
ellipses, an intimate intonation, soft self-irony, and infantilism) that 
can be attached to any statement, no matter how deindividualized 
and ideologically engaged it may be.
Unfortunately, Grishkovets is not alone. One of the fathers of 
the New Drama, producer and director Eduard Boiakov, today 
produces an exhibition entitled “Orthodox Russia, My History, 
20th Century: From the Great Shocks to the Great Victory” in the 
Moscow Manege and expresses joy about Russia’s “rejection of the 
liberal civilizational paradigm” in these terms: “We have rejected 
the liberal civilizational paradigm. One can say we shut the door on 
it. Personally, I feel happy about this. [. . .] We are on the threshold 
of a new revolution. We can no longer cancel it. We can make it 
symbolic and mental rather than bloody” (Kovalʹskaia 2015). Initial 
6 See Beumers and Lipovetsky (2009) for more detail.
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attachment to sincerity as the weapon against postmodernist 
perversions served as the marker of the so-called New Realists 
(Zakhar Prilepin, Sergei Shargunov, Roman Senchin) and their 
inspiration Eduard Limonov, which perhaps explains why these 
former rebels so ardently support Putin’s course now. An overlap 
between the cult of sincerity and the new political discourse once 
again proves that contemporary Russian ideology is not just a pile 
of formalized dogmatic statements. Unlike in Soviet times, in full 
correspondence with Slavoj Žižek’s concept of ideology (1989, 
1–56), it articulates a shared unconscious phantasm rather than 
certain ideas and programs. In this respect, it is indeed incredibly 
sincere and therefore radioactively effective.
At the same time, one can hardly fail to notice the surge in interest 
about documentary forms and genres; documentary theater has 
become just one of the first symptoms of this wide-scale exponential 
process. How is an awareness of the illusory and constructed nature 
of authenticity to be combined with attentiveness to “nonfictional” 
forms? Typically, the rise of documentary forms serves as an omen of 
an impending aesthetic revolution. It signifies the moment when all 
existing cultural languages seem to have become automatized and 
therefore unusable. Mariia Bashkirtseva’s diary, so popular in its 
time, played no lesser a role in the approximation of the modernist 
revolution than Chekhov. Rozanov’s quasi-documentary prose 
contained the embryos of the Soviet and émigré modernism of the 
1920s–30s. Rozanov’s experimentation was passed on by Shklovsky 
and Ginzburg to today’s neo- and postmodernists. There is no need 
to remind anyone that it was Solzhenitsyn’s Gulag Archipelago, 
an “experiment in documentary investigation,” that ultimately 
invalidated Socialist Realism.
Probably, we are today witnessing something similar: 
dramaturgic and especially poetic forms marked as documentary 
turn into self-parody when they are presented as vehicles of 
authentic truth, yet when released from such an ambition, they 
function as formalized gestures of rejection of existing cultural 
languages. This is exactly what happens in contemporary poetry, 
which broadly adopts signifiers of authenticity, while at the same 
time problematizing the category of authenticity. Symptomatically, 
t h e  F o r m a l  I s  P o l i t i c a l 159
Kirill Medvedev, whose poems frequently reproduce the stylistics 
of a blog, in one of his manifestos declared the dead end of the “new 
sincerity”:
The new sincerity, or, more precisely, the new emotionalism, 
has rejected the worst aspects of postmodernism. [. . .] But it 
also rejected its undeniably positive qualities: its irrepressible 
critical outlook and its intellectual sophistication. [. . .] The new 
emotionalism reconciles those same market interests with the 
resurrected figure of the author, bringing forth today’s endless 
stream of ventriloquism (lyrical, essayist, “political,” whatever), 
in which any effort at analysis, any possibilities of differentiating 
positions and actions simply drown. It’s a stream in which it’s 
impossible to separate sincerity from hack work, because one 
is in the employ of the other: emotions cover up ideological 
bankruptcy (and the death of rational argument), and ideology in 
turn excites emotions and captivates the masses. (2012, 237)
In the theater, and especially in docudramas (exemplified by 
Teatr.doc), theatricality serves as the most powerful tool for the 
problematization of apparently desired and carefully designed 
illusions of authenticity. Notably, today’s documentary plays, while 
relying on actual documents, do not avoid using phantasmagorical 
elements as well—which reflects playwrights’ and directors’ 
awareness of authenticity’s functioning as a formal rather than 
semantic element of this dramaturgy. In Teatr.doc signifiers of 
authenticity initially mark the departure from the perspective of the 
intelligentsia along with a desire to appropriate a point of view and 
language of either the marginalized and disenfranchised (migrants, 
the homeless, prisoners) or, conversely, the new elites (spinmasters, 
TV producers, oligarchs). Yet recently the situation has changed 
drastically: the documentary form has stabilized as the marker of 
confrontation with the government’s discourse and actions. In other 
words, the documentary form has become unequivocally political.
Teatr.doc’s most famous productions of recent years deal with 
trials and the persecuted—the trials of Pussy Riot and of Sergei 
Magnitsky, or the victims of the Bolotnaia Square clash between 
the police and demonstrators; these events the theater puts on as 
its own, performative trial. In some cases, such a trial includes the 
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enactment of the Last Judgment of judges and their henchmen (as 
in Chas vosemnadtsatʹ [Hour and Eighteen] by Elena Gremina); in 
others, nondisclosed court debates are transposed into the space of 
the theater, where actors playing witnesses of the prosecution have 
to defend their positions against the audience (as in Svoimi glazami 
[With My Own Eyes] about the Pussy Riot trial).
From this standpoint, one cannot help noticing the kinship 
between contemporary poetry and contemporary drama, not only 
because many contemporary poets design their texts for openly 
theatrical presentations. Along with the aforementioned Citizen 
Poet, one may here refer to Andrei Rodionov, Psoy Korolenko, and 
Roman Osminkin, who sing their poems in a highly theatrical manner; 
Osminkin also makes video performances accompanied by his 
poems. Many contemporary poems collapse into microperformances 
of various subjectivities (such as Elena Fanailova’s famous long 
poem Lena i liudi [Lena and People] or Stanislav Lʹvovskii’s cycles 
Chuzhimi slovami [Rendered by Alien Words] and Sovetskie zastol’nye 
pesni [Soviet Drinking Songs]) or present lyrical internalization of 
multifigured theatrical performances (Mariia Stepanova’s cycle 
Chetyre opery [Four Operas] may serve as an illuminating example). 
Others “stage” poetic or documentary quotations as dramaturgic 
pieces, as happens in many of Polina Barskova’s poems, most 
spectacularly in her Spravochnik leningradskikh poetov-frontovikov, 
1941–1945 (Directory of Leningrad Front Poets, 1941–45). A deeper 
correlation between contemporary poetry and drama stems from 
the combination of a formalized illusion of authenticity with two 
major aspects of postdramatic theater as defined by Hans-Thies 
Lehmann: transgression and the focus on a singular, individual, 
and unreproducible experience (2006, 177–79).
In docudramas transgression is associated with “dangerous” 
or unspeakable subjects and “obscene” language. In contemporary 
poetry, the departure from recognizable elements of poetry 
(rhyme, syllabotonic meters) initially produced a transgressive 
effect, which has obviously worn off by now; it was replaced by 
predominantly thematic means. For example, recently, young poets 
have rediscovered leftist discourse and revolutionary rhetoric as 
a highly transgressive factor for the readers of Russian poetry. The 
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St. Petersburg poet Roman Osminkin most playfully employs such 
transgressions:
. . . на этом месте должен быть припев
про сильный и организованный пролетариат,
который исполнит мессианскую роль
и спасет наше общество от рабства отчуждения,
но припев натолкнулся на моральную дилемму,
где найти сегодня такого субъекта
который пришел бы и сказал бы довольно
но без разжигания классовой розни. 
(2016, 138)7
However, most transgressive in the new poetry is the absence 
of the postulated unity of the poetic persona and, most importantly, 
the lack of the author’s metaposition. The focus on the personal 
and singular in this context presupposes not only a departure from 
grand narratives and impersonal ideologies toward micronarratives 
that, nevertheless, are frequently inscribed in epic-like frames (as 
in Faina Grimberg’s or Boris Khersonskii’s poetry). It goes much 
further and suggests the rejection of any stable identity and the 
refusal to find comfort in belonging to any set of group ethics, 
problematizing it instead:
Я не считаю себя лучше
Моя претензия круче
Я считаю себя другим, другой, другими
Как в кино с таким названьем
С Николь Кидман в главной роли
(Fanailova, Lena i liudi [2009, 156])8
7 “Here there is meant to be a chorus / about a strong and organized proletariat 
/ that will fulfill its messianic role / and save our society from the slavery of 
alienation / but the chorus stumbled into a moral dilemma / where can such 
a subject be found today / which would come and say ‘enough’ / but without 
inflaming class antagonisms,” trans. Jon Platt (Osminkin 2016, 139).
8 “I don’t consider myself better than others. // My claim is tougher than that / 
I think I’m different—male, female, others / Like in the movie by that name 
/ With Nicole Kidman in the lead” (Fanailova 2009, 156; Eng. trans. Genya 
Turovskaya and Stephanie Sandler).
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Tellingly, after this declaration in her poem Lena i liudi, Elena 
Fanailova presents a scene of the antiritual nonparticipation in the 
national celebration of the New Year:
В поезде Москва-Воронеж
С китайскими рабочими
У них год крысы наступает в феврале
И они легли спать в одиннадцать
И я с ними заснула
В отличие от привычки
Засыпать в четыре
(ibid.)9
To be the other means in this context to accept an estranging position 
of the subaltern, to accept for oneself the status of “foreigner” in 
one’s own country (or elsewhere). The reference to Alejandro 
Amenábar’s The Others (2001)—“Kak v kino s takim nazvanʹem / 
s Nikolʹ Kidman v glavnoi roli”—offers a radical metaphor for this 
gesture of distancing: the central characters in this clever horror 
movie fight against ghosts inhabiting a spooky Victorian mansion, 
only to learn (together with the viewer) at the end of the film that 
they are ghosts themselves.
At the same time, the gesture of detachment from any stable 
identity, time-honored discursive position, or ideological truth in 
this poetry produces not a longing for such unity but a new sense 
of freedom—uncomfortable, painful, but freedom nevertheless; 
perhaps this sense of freedom is best described as the refusal of 
nonfreedom, as in this poem by Galina Rymbu:
. . . мы расщепляемся в недрах и все что мы видим
это не рай не ад это политическая система, суть которой: 
огонь
суть которой повтор и неузнавание до смерти,
9 “I spent this New Year’s Eve / On a train / From Moscow to Voronezh / With 
Chinese workers / Their Year of the Rat begins in February / And they went to 
sleep at eleven / And I fell asleep with them / As opposed to my usual habit / 
Of staying up until four” (ibid., 157).
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повтор, пока жир и ужас не сойдут с наших людей
с наших сограждан [. . .]
они бросили тело мигранта на рельсы
они заживо снимают кожу с наших друзей
они накачали ляжки и приходят убить
они изнасилуют пока ты конспектируешь биографию 
Лермонтова
они убьют и бросят на рельсы пока ты мечтаешь о карьере 
физика мечтаешь выкрутиться
пока ты думаешь о пилотируемых полетах к другим 
галактикам
они закроют флагом смертельным все небо и словно там 
ничего не было
нет никаких галактик
и ты, может быть, кое-как дописав свой конспект, пойдешь 
насиловать,
пойдешь заживо снять кожу с мигранта или с бомжа
или крикнешь бизнес — это любовь
потому что они это ты




без любви, без силы, без секса, без времени, без 68-го. . .
(Rymbu 2014a, 57–58)10
10 “We uncouple ourselves in the depths and everything that we see / is not 
paradise not hell it’s the political system, the essence of which is: conflagration 
/ the essence of which is repetition and non-recognition until death / repetition, 
until fat and terror disappear from our people / our fellow citizens. // [. . .] they 
threw the body of the migrant onto the tracks / they skin our friends alive / 
they have girded their loins and come to kill / they rape while you make notes 
reading a Lermontov biography / they will kill you and throw you on the 
tracks while you are dreaming of the career of a physicist dreaming / to get 
out of a scrape / while you think of piloted flights to other galaxies / and you 
too, perhaps, having finished your haphazard notes will go and rape, / will 
go to skin alive a migrant or tramp / or you will shout out that business—that 
is love / because they are the same as you / because there is no class enemy / 
only cruelty is the class enemy / only treachery is us / only silence is I / devoid 
of love, with no strength, without sex, without time, without 1968 . . .” (trans. 
Irene Masing-Delic and Helen Halva).
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Lehmann argues that the postdramatic theater achieves 
the ultimate effect of the performative (also characteristic of 
contemporary art) through a “production of presence” (Gumbrecht 
2004) that rejects representation and collapses the distance between 
the author, viewer, and character. By this means, the postdramatic 
theater, according to Lehmann, strives “to allude to the somehow 
nonperformative in the proximity of performance” (2006, 179).
If we project this definition onto new Russian poetry and 
drama, what can stand for the nonperformative in the proximity 
of performance? Most likely, affects—strong and isolated psycho-
physiological reactions—whose connection to the symbolic seems 
to be insignificant (at least, at first sight) in comparison with their 
transferable tangibility. Today’s drama and poetry both situate the 
affect on the place of memory, selfhood, identity, or history. Affects 
associated with violence (as, for example, in Andrei Rodionov’s, 
Mariia Stepanova’s, and Elena Fanailova’s poetry) most typically 
stand for the social, while material objects substitute for the 
historical (Boris Khersonskii and Stanislav Lʹvovskii). Yet sexual 
affects appear to be most important as they simulate (and stimulate) 
interaction with the reader. Galina Rymbu speaks about this most 
blatantly when she writes about Faina Grimberg: “Via erotic trust 
comes the faith in the tellable, for both author and reader. Only 
when we have slept with the text (the narrator) are we able to 
believe in the genuineness of his tales. Via sexuality, too, there is 
a self-affirmation of writing. The desiring body here acts as the cause 
of the tale, the cause of any conversation” (Rymbu 2014b, 7–8).
Frequently intertwined, these three types of affect make a text 
performative, since they involve the reader on a somatic, rather 
than intellectual, level. However, as the affect scholar Eugenie 
Brinkema emphasizes, “Affect is not the place where something 
immediate and automatic and resistant takes place outside of 
language. Turning to affect in the humanities does not obliterate 
the problem of form and representation [. . .]. We require a return to 
form precisely because of the turn to affect, to keep its wonderment 
in revolution, to keep going” (2014, xiv, xvi). This is why the 
apparently isolated nature of affects reproduces the same principle 
of fragmentation and multivoicedness that Facebook exemplifies as 
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a cultural phenomenon. Yet “affective management” (to use Serguei 
Oushakine’s joking term11), despite fragmentation, is able to create 
the feel of the entire epoch, as, for example, in Stanislav Lʹvovskii’s 
poem:
разговаривать и шептаться между волков, ночь, 
полустанция гдов
где неподалёку собак, тут же троица, псков, рублёв триста 
кусков
кошка, кот, хлебзавод, рыбзавод, первый отдел, аэродром 
смуравьёво
ледяная вода по утрам, самогон, суглинок, неурожай, 
жэк, газопрóвод. [. . .]
полустанция гдов, где ноябрь холодно, голодно, голо.
менты о пяти головах, о шести лапах местный рублёв
член союза художников, старожил, богомол
богомаз, член партии, живописец, болиголов
нам живописует: по дорогам железным ползёт последом 
броска
чёрноверхая белая масса: звери, птицы, дети, конвой
подконвойные, подотчётные, бухгалтера, вертухаи, воры, 
зэка —
и не разобрать кто живой тут, кто неживой
полумёртвые мёртвые скачут прямо на нас, прямо в рай 
из кино сквозь простынное марево слуха раскрываются 
пазухи лётных полей, волчьих снов, но наружу ползёт 
ледяная вода, требуха и проруха.
так мы прикончили первую, а тут остановка. курицу прямо 
в купе, в окно с перрона суёт глухая старуха.
мы говорим давай сюда, мать, это ж гдов только, нам 
трястись тут ещё, она берёт деньги, бормочет в ответ.
поезд набирает скорость, в окне, за лесопосадками разгорается 
солнце, — такой невечерний, осенний свет.
11 Serguei Oushakine has been most active in introducing the “affective turn” to 
our field. See, for example, Oushakine 2013a, 2013b, and 2010a.
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мы разворачиваем курицу, открываем вторую поллитру 
и тут понимаем, что гдов позади, смерти нет.
(Lʹvovskii 2012, 71–72)12
In reference to this poem, the words of the poet and critic 
Evgeniia Suslova seem to be very fitting: “The catastrophe implies 
that it is impossible to expect any conventional reactions to what 
is happening. Therefore, the catastrophe is associated not with the 
event per se, but rather with the annihilated position of the subject 
and with the process of its recomposition” (Suslova 2013). The “real” 
generated by the means of the affect does not restore the wholeness 
of the authorial subject, who remains fluctuating between multiple 
subjectivities and fictitious identities. Furthermore, this decentered 
subject deprived of a metaposition is presented as the performative 
of an ongoing catastrophe—of constant passing through Gdov, in 
Lʹvovskii’s words. This cultivation of an unresolved, catastrophic 
split is deeply political by its logic and results. According to Jacques 
Rancière, “The essence of politics is the manifestation of dissensus, 
12 “To talk and whisper amongst wolves, night, the intermediate station of 
gdov / with dogs nearby, and a trinity too, pskov, rublyov, three hundred 
bits and pieces / cat, tomcat, breadfactory, fishfactory, first section, the airport 
gloomish, / ice-cold water in the mornings, moonshine, crop failure, zhek, gas-
pipeline / [. . .] the intermediate station of gdov where November, cold, bare. 
/ cops with five heads the local rublyov with six paws / member of the union 
of artists, a longtime resident, pilgrim / icon painter, member of the party, 
painter, hemlock / we are offered paintings: along railway tracks following 
a thrust there crawls / a black-topped white mass: animals, birds, children, 
a convoy / sub-convoys, subordinates, book-keepers, prison guards, thieves, 
prisoners— / and it’s hard to decide who’s alive, who’s not alive / the half-
dead the dead jump straight at us, right into paradise out of the movie-house 
/ through the sheet haze of hearing there open up the armpits of flight fields, 
wolf dreams, / but ice water, guts and cuts / [. . .] so this is the way we finished 
off the first one, and then there was a stop. a deaf old woman pushes a chicken straight 
into the compartment through the window from the platform / we tell her, give it 
here, mother, it is just gdov now, we have yet to shake here in this train, she takes the 
money, mumbles something in response. / the train speeds up, through the window 
beyond the newly-planted trees the sun is blazing—such a non-evening autumnal 
light. // we unwrap the chicken, open the next bottle and then we understand 
that gdov is behind us, / and there is no death” (trans. Irene Masing-Delic and 
Helen Halva).
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as the presence of two worlds in one. [. . .] The essence of politics 
is dissensus. Dissensus is not the confrontation between interests or 
opinions. It is the manifestation of a distance of the sensible from 
itself” (2001). The contemporary poet internalizes this dissensus in 
the construction of subjectivity and shares it through “postdramatic” 
performative.
“A constructive principle strives to transcend its customary 
borders, since, when staying within them, it swiftly becomes 
automatized,” Tynianov warns and emphasizes in italics, 
“A constructive principle generated within a given area strives to expand 
and spread to maximally broad areas” (1977, 267). “The affective 
performativity” as a constructive principle has already transcended 
the borders of New Drama and fertilized New Poetry, while being 
catalyzed itself by contemporary art (Pussy Riot, Pavlenskii). Not 
to become automatized, this principle has to invade other areas 
and genres of literature. We can already detect similar processes 
in “smaller” prose such as Linor Goralik’s ongoing cycle Koroche 
(Briefly, 2008–present), as well as in essays included in Polina 
Barskova’s book Zhivye kartiny (Living Pictures / Tableaux Vivants, 
2015). Yet it is not obvious whether this principle is transferable to 
a novel. (A direction exemplified by Ilʹianen’s novel Pensiia is too 
idiosyncratic to generate the following.) Nevertheless, I expect 
the most daring and most provocative texts to be created in this 
direction. This is where discoveries of contemporary poetry and 
(docu)drama can fully realize their political potential; this is how 
contemporary “minor” literature can define its place in the history 
of Russian letters and make a mark in a broader cultural context. 
Certainly, we all remember Tynianov’s words about the futility of 
predicting developments in Russian literature: Ei zakazhut Indiiu, 
a ona otkroet Ameriku (“It will be ordered to discover India, but it 
will find America”; 1977, 166). However, America would have been 
discovered much later if not for expecting India.
ilm
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In July 2002, Izvestiia printed a lengthy front-page article on the 
Kievan debut of a new comic book based on Molodaia gvardiia (The 
Young Guard), Aleksandr Fadeev’s famous Socialist Realist novel 
from 1945, and, indirectly, on the equally famous 1948 film by Sergei 
Gerasimov. The sponsor of this new graphic adaptation was a thirty-
five-year-old Ukrainian liberal parliamentarian and businessman 
named Viktor Kirillov, who was appalled by the complete 
disappearance of Fadeev’s heroic images from the purview of 
younger generations. This ambitious legislator hoped to expand the 
revival project, transitioning from comic books to motion pictures. 
He even tried to negotiate the production of an animated Molodaia 
gvardiia film with Disney Studios, but due to the insurmountable 
expense, resorted to Ukrainian producers. Explaining his decision 
to invest in this project, Kirillov said,
* I wrote this article in 2003, which explains dated examples, but, alas, not 
tendencies. At first, I thought that I needed to update it, but while rereading 
I realized that the connections and parallels between “Post-Soc” of the late 
1990s–early 2000s and today’s political and media mainstream are so obvious 
that they do not require any additional comments or updates.
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We conducted a contest among schoolchildren and other 
youngsters at the Krasnodon Museum of “The Young Guard”: 
they drew pictures of their heroes. When I saw those pictures 
[maliunki], I was flabbergasted: Liuba Shevtsova—a complete 
sex-bomb, like Marilyn Monroe: breasts like melons, tight 
clothes, a sheen of sweat, with distinct anatomic detail; Uliana 
Gromova—a gypsy beauty. Oleg Koshevoi—a slick, high-
class dandy, fascists—jocks with biceps. This is how today’s 
children see history. I watched attentively and decided that we 
shouldn’t be scared; instead, we should talk to kids using their 
own language. Obviously, the majority of them know neither 
Fadeev nor the history of the Great Patriotic War. So they can 
learn the truth about the Young Guard from comic books. They 
don’t read Gaidar either, but they have some idea of the Civil War 
from a cartoon about Malʹshish-Kibalʹshish [a hero from Arkadii 
Gaidar’s fairytale]. (Sokolovskaia 2002, 1)
In other words, the new generation of children has no memory 
of the socialist past, their minds now molded predominantly 
by Western mass culture and video games. Hence, it becomes 
a simple (and lucrative) matter to package Socialist Realist plots and 
images in forms of presentation characteristic to the pop culture of 
the West. This approach seems to be profitable both commercially 
and politically—especially in Russia, as evidenced by the interest 
Izvestiia (and other Russian media) paid to the “foreign” initiative.1
In fact, one may detect a paradoxical “double encoding” here, 
to use Charles Jencks’s term. For adults, the graphic exploits of 
Oleg Koshevoi and Liubka Shevtsova will restore the ruined 
national pride and construct lofty exemplars of heroism and 
patriotism. Younger readers, meanwhile, will enjoy another set of 
action sequences, hopefully no less interesting than the business of 
American cartoons; for them, the Molodaia gvardiia comic book will 
be no more tethered to any kind of reality, past or present, than 
the X-Men or Spider-Man. The adaptation’s organizers understood 
that this was how their product would be perceived (no wonder 
1 A Hollywood-like multi-episode TV remake of Molodaia gvardiia was produced 
by Russia’s First Channel in 2015 (dir. Leonid Pliaskin).
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they refer to Gaidar’s fairy tale as a model). This project, initially 
motivated by the contemporary youth’s allegedly impoverished 
worldview, would be addressed to all generations. According to the 
article in Izvestiia, three versions of the comic were to be launched 
simultaneously: a “hard” version for the youth, a “moderate” one 
for the intelligentsia, and a “softer” edition for the older generation 
who once idolized the “molodogvardeitsy.”
This double, or rather multiple, encoding can be read as 
nothing but postmodernist. For this reason, the conservative 
audience perceives the Molodaia gvardiia comic book as blasphemy: 
“How can one turn something that is dear and sacred to the people 
into a joke?” asks the indignant pop/folk singer Larisa Chernikova 
(Sokolovskaia 2002, 10). Yet the postmodernist recycling of Socialist 
Realist models and myths represents one of the most distinctive 
trends in Russian mass culture of the late 1990s–early 2000s. The 
pattern was launched by the show Starye pesni o glavnom (Old Songs 
about the Main Things, a 1995 one-off later serialized), in which the 
day’s pop and rock stars playfully—sometimes ironically, but with 
obvious ardor—perform old Soviet hits. The title of the program 
(and the entire ironic/nostalgic sentiment attached to it) acquired 
new significance during the governmental campaign to restore the 
old Soviet anthem. We might recall, for example, Lev Rubinshtein’s 
astute reaction to these events in his essay “Dym Otechestva ili 
Gulag s filʹtrom” (translated by Joanne Turnbull as “The Smoke of 
Fatherland, or A Filter Gulag”):
So then, a filtered Belomor. With the same sickeningly familiar 
picture on the pack. A new wine in an old wineskin. The 
appearance of this remake evokes a bright bundle of meaningful 
metaphors. That his gimmick belongs to the “old-songs-about-
the main-thing” class is clear. Perhaps even too clear. What isn’t 
associated today with those ill-fated “songs”? This hackneyed 
formula seems to have enveloped our entire time and space 
symbolically. In other words, our space is going through a time of 
“old songs”—our own inevitably specific and local recension of 
postmodernism. . . . Meanwhile, the new and improved Belomor 
is this: typical socialism with a human face. Or, to put it a bit more 
crudely: a filtered Gulag. It is like other large and small features 
of the “velvet” restoration, the same thing as today’s Stalinist 
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anthem without the Stalinist words: the anthem, too, has been 
fitted with a kind of filter. (Rubinshtein 2001, 143–44)
By no means do I wish to equate the postmodernist wave of 
Socialist Realist mythologies and structural patterns with the 
political restoration of totalitarianism. On the contrary, there is 
an important difference between the deconstruction of Socialist 
Realism, appearing in the classical forms of Russian postmodernism 
(conceptualism, sots-art), and the novel attitude toward totalitarian 
discourses that we could observe in such productions of the late 
1990s–early 2000s as Starye pesni o glavnom and the Molodaia 
gvardiia comic book, as well as the musical Nord-Ost (North-East) 
by Georgii Vasilʹev and Aleksei Ivashchenko (and produced by 
Aleksandr Tsekalo, known for scripting Old Songs about the Main 
Things), such films as Brat 2 (Brother 2, 2000) and Voina (War, 2002) 
by Aleksei Balabanov, Sibirskii tsiriulʹnik (The Barber of Siberia, 1998) 
by Nikita Mikhalkov, Zvezda (The Star, 2002) by Nikolai Lebedev, 
Ekhali dva shofera (A Tale of Two Drivers, 2001) by Aleksandr Kott, 
Oligarkh (The Oligarch, 2002) by Pavel Lungin, and novels such as 
Pavel Krusanov’s Ukus angela (The Angel’s Bite, 1999) and even, 
to a certain extent, Vladimir Sorokin’s Led (Ice, 2002). Unlike 
other texts of Russian postmodernism, these films and novels do 
not try to expose the absurdity or the violence hidden beneath 
Socialist Realist mythology. Their target audience does not include 
nostalgic diehards; rather, these works aim to please the middle-
aged generation, for whom Socialist Realism is more associated 
with childhood memories, and they are especially addressed to the 
first post-Soviet generation, for whom this aesthetic is distant and 
even exotic.
It is no wonder that the mass culture texts listed above 
mostly perceive Socialist Realism as an agreeable experience. 
First of all, Socialist Realism serves as a recognizably “native,” 
and therefore intensely appealing, form of mass culture; second, 
it is a predominantly positive culture, emphasizing optimism and 
affirmative values over the critical tone, deconstructive tendencies, 
and “chernukha” (dark and grim discourse) of the post-Soviet decade; 
third, the utopian aspect of totalitarian discourse is reevaluated in 
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the aforementioned texts therapeutically, distracting the viewer or 
reader from everyday troubles. Irony is present in all these works, 
but never bites as hard as it did in the works of Prigov or early 
Sorokin, or even in Sergei Anufriev and Pavel Peppershtein’s 
novel Mifogennaia liubovʹ kast (The Mythogenious Love of the Castеs, 
1999/2002) or the film Okraina (Outskirts, 1998) by Petr Lutsik. This 
irony, unlike its fanged cousin, is soft and inviting: it is intended 
to string postmodernist quotation marks around borrowed aspects 
of the Socialist Realist system and to smooth the seams between 
these traditional patches and more recent fabric, represented by 
contemporary rock and pop stylistics in Starye pesni o glavnom, the 
conventions of the American action movie in Brat 2, or fashionable 
“historiosophic” mysticism in Ukus angela or Led.
Po s t - S o c :  A  Hy p ot he s i s
The metamorphosis of Socialist Realist models and myths into 
ideologically indifferent, yet extremely popular, forms of mass 
culture invites at least two mutually exclusive interpretations. 
Both are based on the assumption that in the late 1990s, 
postmodernism in Russian culture ceased to be a marginal form 
of artistic experimentation and had become mainstream. In turn, 
postmodernism as a popular form of expression began to affect 
mass culture: the commercial success of Pelevin’s and Sorokin’s 
novels, and the distinctly postmodernist bent of Boris Akunin’s 
ongoing project of historical fiction, are the handiest evidence of 
this transformation.
The first interpretation postulates that the merger of post-Soviet 
mass culture with Socialist Realism’s heritage, via postmodernist 
poetics, eventually decomposes the binary opposition between the 
post-Soviet present and the Soviet past, the polarity that founded the 
post-Soviet mentality of the 1990s. The discourse originated in (or 
rather, shaped by) Starye pesni o glavnom has rescued the traditional 
idioms of Socialist Realism from their totalitarian—and especially, 
Communist—connotations. New uses have deideologized them, 
thereby playfully, yet effectively, restoring historical continuity, 
connecting past and present with an axiologically neutral thread. 
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If this theory is accurate, then the popularity of recycled Socialist 
Realism may be attributed to the public need to treat, or at least to 
cover up, the disturbing trauma of the totalitarian past—the trauma 
that was not addressed in Russia as methodically and consciously 
as it was, for example, in post-Nazi Germany. Such a catharsis does 
not necessarily mean political recuperation: one may interpret this 
tendency in post-Soviet mass culture as a (remarkably efficient) 
portal to the postmodernist continuum of posthistory, where 
neither trauma nor responsibility matter any longer.
The second interpretation is less optimistic—which means 
more realistic. In essence, it suggests to see in Russian culture 
of the 2000s a rare case of postmodernism without postmodernity. 
As we know, postmodernist aesthetics in literature and the arts 
developed in spite of the fact that the late-Soviet and post-Soviet 
cultures are vastly distant from postmodernity as a type of culture 
and civilization shared by many a postindustrial society. Roughly 
speaking, post-Soviet cultural conditions exhibit certain central 
characteristics of postmodernity while aggressively rejecting 
others. For example, the post-Soviet cultural landscape, like that 
of postmodernity, appears “strikingly different from the confined 
space of its own automatic, purpose-subordinated pursuits. It 
appears as a space of chaos and chronic indeterminacy, a territory 
subjected to rival and contradictory meaning bestowing claims 
and hence perpetually ambivalent” (Bauman 2001, 178; author’s 
emphasis). On the other hand, such critical postmodern discourses 
as feminism, multiculturalism, queer studies, and postcolonialism 
(all focused on the values of the Other) remained underdeveloped 
and widely abhorred in the Russian cultural mainstream of the 1990s. 
The term “heterophilia,” as opposed to “xenophobic sentiment,” is 
still inapplicable to the post-Soviet cultural and political climate. 
Postmodernity implies the most radical critique of the premises of 
modernity, whereas post-Soviet Russia primarily busies itself with 
modifying the unique Soviet brand of modernity on the basis of 
democratic, private, and personal values. The controversial and 
contradictory nature of this process distorts the perception of 
the cultural patterns of postmodernity in contemporary Russian 
culture.
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Quite predictably, the incomplete modernization of Russian 
culture causes severe suspicion and aggression toward the habits 
of “political correctness,” which appear in the West as a form of 
high-wire societal etiquette balancing the postmodernist radical 
deconstruction of cultural models and stereotypes rooted in the 
metanarratives of modernity. In the Russian cultural context, 
“political correctness” is invariably viewed as a “hypocritical” norm 
of censorship forced on free self-expression.2 In the Western theater, 
however, the notorious PC fixation reflects “the problem of rules 
[which] stays in the focus of public agenda and is unlikely to be 
conclusively resolved. In the absence of ‘principal coordination’ the 
negotiation of rules assumes a distinctly ethical character: at stake 
are the principles of non-utilitarian self constraint of autonomous 
agencies” (Bauman 2001, 186; author’s emphasis).
Granted, Russian postmodernism has generated its own mini-
postmodernity within the controlled bounds of an underground 
subculture. The country’s postmodernist current faced a substantial 
challenge upon finding itself in the role of a mainstream form of 
expression. It could not exist within underground circles any 
longer: it had to cope with, and appeal to, the tastes of the general 
public.3 This necessity has forced some artists to give up their 
postmodernist complexity, which had proved allergenic to the 
majority of the population. The need to lean back on something 
both simple and recognizable to the masses naturally led those 
Russian postmodernists who desired mass success to the (briefly?) 
deactivated codes of Socialist Realism. This new cultural turn 
induced a schism among Russian postmodernists, some deciding 
to eschew commercial success and instead preserve their artistic 
and cultural values, others forking over the toll of reductionism and 
anti-postmodernity in exchange for popularity.
At the present moment, one may only try to isolate this trend’s 
most visible manifestations, across an entire class of applicable 
works, in order to distill an accurate diagnosis:
2 See, for example, Tatiana Tolstaya’s satire “Political Correctness” (2002, 220–43).
3 For more on this paradox, see Lipovetsky 2002a and 2002b.
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1. The plot development issues from a pronounced contrast 
between “good” and “evil” characters, an unambiguous 
polarity of light and shadow. The viewer or reader is informed 
of the “goodness” of the former and the “evil” of the latter at 
the moment of their first appearance, and these designations 
are never questioned.
2. This type of plot development usually requires war as 
its catalyst. This function can be fulfilled by the Great Patriotic 
War (the official Soviet epithet for World War II); the Chechen 
War, or various warlike settings, such as the mafia-torn 
wastelands or the oligarchs’ struggle against the Kremlin foes. 
These incarnations and relatives of war typically involve an 
extensive arsenal of real and symbolic weapons, assassinations, 
explosions, threats, spies, and military specialists.
3. The representation of the protagonist stems from heroic 
(or epic) archetypes. The hero appears in the text already “shaped” 
psychologically, with the subsequent ordeals leading only to the 
“unfolding” of his character, rather than to any psychological 
transformations. Social and ethnic attributes clearly supersede 
other personal features, sometimes to the point of symbolic 
or literal erasure: he is a certified epic hero, therefore “finding 
his sublimity in the superpersonal plane, in and through the 
symbols of universally human values, and not in a plane of 
individual psychology” (Meletinskii 1975, 229).
4. Generally, romance and female characters play a negli- 
gible role and can be subtracted from the plot without 
consequence. Male friendship or respect for a male superior, 
however, frequently acquires the status of moral imperative. 
The majority of these works seem to follow Andrei Platonov’s 
ascetic maxim: “He who desires the truth cannot desire 
a woman” (“The Future October,” 1920).4
4 This quotation is borrowed from Eliot Borenstein’s book Men Without Women: 
Masculinity and Revolution in Russian Fiction, 1917–1929. His observations on 
the works of Olesha, Babel, and Platonov show that the gender dynamic of 
what I suggest to call Post-Soc is deeply rooted in the Soviet cultural tradition. 
According to Borenstein, “Not only are Babel’s and Olesha’s heroes physically 
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5. The mandatory presence of one or more recognizable 
quotations from the Socialist Realist canon constitutes a distinc-
tive hallmark of this trend, encompassing direct citations from 
Soviet films, Soviet-style songs, or even allusions to the appear-
ance or mannerisms of famous Soviet actors.
6. No less compulsory are references to genre conventions, 
as well as the telltale bells and whistles of Western mass culture: 
the representatives of this trend always “compete with” or 
rather declare their intention to supersede (“dognatʹ i peregnatʹ”) 
most kitschy Hollywood directors and TV producers and mark 
this desire by recognizable, if sophomoric, quotations.
If any future historian should desire to investigate this 
tendency, the above catalog will not suffice. However, this prospect 
should not discourage attempts to analyze the most characteristic 
works of this trend that are presently in stock, which, for the sake 
of brevity, may be called Post-Soc. Studying them, one faces a few 
essential questions: Is it possible to deideologize the elements of 
the totalitarian discourse completely? Do these elements retain 
memories and traces of the totalitarian climate to which they used 
to belong? Does the postmodernist recycling of Socialist Realism in 
post-Soviet popular culture deliberately or inadvertently actualize 
certain aspects of the totalitarian discourse? And if yes, which of 
these aspects should we expect to see animated anew?
In pursuit of answers, I will examine several films from the early 
2000s, and analyze the strategies and results of revitalizing Soviet 
cultural mythologies in the post-Soviet era, using Balabanov’s film 
Voina as a pivotal example.
inferior to the model revolutionaries who surround them, but they are also 
unable to join in the network of male relationships, the comradeships and 
pseudo-filial ties, that are formed by revolutionary men. [. . .] Comradeship is 
the expression of revolutionary male solidarity par excellence; though women 
can be, and often are, comrades in the literature of the 1920s, the experience 
of comradeship is based on traditional masculine values. [. . .] The virtues of 
the comradely bond are extolled by communists and fascists alike, while the 
public sphere takes priority over the family in both early Soviet ideology and 
the rhetoric of fascism” (Borenstein 2000, 5, 24, 35).
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T he  C h a r m s  o f  t he  Un i for m
When watching Russian films of this period (up until now, I should 
add), one cannot help but notice the abundance of military and 
semimilitary outfits. Uniformed soldiers and officers naturally play 
prominent roles in war flicks like Balabanov’s Voina and Lebedev’s 
Zvezda, but comparable costumes adorn the screen even in present-
day pictures like Govorukhin’s Voroshilovskii strelok. In the idyllic 
Ekhali dva shofera—set, as its jacket informs us, in the “glorious 
postvictory days”—a young truck driver receives a pilot’s uniform 
and wears it with pride. If we also recall the numerous TV series 
about men in uniform (Agent natsionalʹnoi bezopasnosti [The National 
Security Agent], Muzhskaia rabota [Men’s Work], Spetsnaz [Special 
Army Unit], Uboinaia sila [The Killing Power], Granitsa/Taezhnyi roman 
[The Border/The Taiga Romance]), which almost entirely supplanted 
Latin American soap operas during prime time, then the strange 
infatuation of the post-Communist culture with military dress 
codes becomes all the more apparent.
Even in films that apparently confront their Post-Soc proclivity, 
such as Kukushka (The Cuckoo, 2002) by Aleksandr Rogozhkin, 
Nezhnyi vozrast (Tender Age, 2000) by Sergei Solovʹev, or Liubovnik 
(The Lover, 2002) by Valery Todorovsky, the military past of the 
characters plays a key part in the plot development—as do the 
uniforms that signify this past. Military attire appears to serve 
in these films as a quasi identity, accidentally assumed by or 
forcibly impressed on the hero, which he struggles to shirk. In 
Kukushka, the World War II confrontation between Finnish and 
Soviet soldiers is rendered meaningless by the comedic plot. In 
Nezhnyi vozrast the protagonist Ivan (Dmitrii Solovʹev, also the 
movie’s scriptwriter) finds himself embroiled in the Chechen War 
in search of a distraction from his turbulent love life, much like 
the protagonists of the Russian classics. At the climactic moment, 
however, he apprehends the gap between his expected military 
function and his personality: responding to a radio signal, he 
screams, “What goddamn ‘arrow’? I’m not an arrow, I’m Gromov!” 
(Kakaia ia tebe na khren strelochka! Ia Gromov!). In Liubovnik, a retired 
military officer (Sergei Garmash), contrary to popular stereotypy 
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of career officers as thick-skinned bores, turns out to be a far more 
sensitive and tragic soul than his rival, a professor of linguistics 
(Oleg Iankovskii) who failed to notice his late wife’s infidelity and 
double life.
Contrastingly, in the films of Balabanov, Lebedev, Govorukhin, 
and Kott, the heroes’ uniform is equivalent to their personal identity. 
Voina’s Ivan remains a soldier, taking up arms against the Chechens 
even after his demobilization. The fact that he is prosecuted for the 
murder of “citizens of the Russian Federation,” having almost single-
handedly eliminated an entire platoon of Chechens and released 
their hostages, is presented as unjust and hypocritical. According 
to the film’s logic, Ivan fulfills his duty as a soldier, even if he is 
not affiliated with a standing military unit—how could anyone call 
him a murderer? In Lebedev’s Zvezda, a reconnaissance squad’s 
brand-new uniforms (appearing despite the setting of 1944, when 
anything brand-new was rather scarce) dramatically dissolve the 
members’ personal and social differences by molding them all into 
a single organism. In Voroshilovskii strelok, Ivan Fedorovich’s (Mikhail 
Ulʹianov) military shirt, vaguely military cap, and weathered old 
jacket, bedecked with veteran’s medals, visually underscore the 
gravity of his intentions; his mission statement follows suit: “It’s 
war. I just can’t figure out who’s fighting whom” (Voina, ne poimu 
ia tolʹko, kto s kem voiuet). Tellingly, the vengeful protagonist defines 
his foes—the New Russian rapists and corrupt authorities—as 
“occupiers” and “blood-suckers,” or, in other words, as aggressive 
and undesirable Others. His most pointed, poison-tipped question 
is “Where did they come from?” (Otkuda oni berutsia?). In Ekhali dva 
shofera, the pilot’s uniform endowed to Kolʹka (Pavel Derevianko) 
almost automatically places him in competition with an actual 
pilot for the affection of a beautiful woman: paradoxically, the 
masculinized heroine’s love for Kolʹka proves that he is in fact a real 
pilot (much like the nastoiashchii polkovnik—“the real colonel”—from 
Alla Pugacheva’s popular song), though he commands a rundown 
truck instead of an airplane.
Hence, the military uniform aids the authors of these films 
in performing a significant displacement: a problem of personal 
identity is silenced by a statement of collective identity. The haziness 
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of “self,” quite natural for a period of drastic historical changes, 
is swapped for the triumphal emergence of “we,” the euphoria 
of “belonging” to an aggregate body. Uniform is cinematically 
enlisted as a (however unconsciously) recognizable signifier of 
Soviet military discourse, with its characteristic mixture of class 
and patriotic rhetoric and its master myth of the “heroic struggle 
of the Soviet people” against whomever. In the words of Evgenii 
Dobrenko,
Military discourse is the cultural equivalent of the totalitarian 
regime (in agreement with Orwell’s classic formula: “Peace is 
war”). [. . .] Those qualities of Soviet mentality and Soviet culture 
that defined the “face of the Soviet man” for the future half-
century were forged in the crucible of war. [. . .] In a totalitarian 
culture, much like in a system of war, “a part,” by definition, 
should cease being the whole, should die as an individual, and 
must enter the “unity of a lower order” (a sort of “ant-hill”). [. . .] 
The cultural model formed by Socialist Realism, in its main 
parameters, is certainly that of a war machine. (Dobrenko 1993, 
210, 214, 215; author’s emphasis)
Another tried and true Socialist Realist trope further augments 
the ethos of deindividualization in Post-Soc films: synecdoche 
between characters and their tools or instruments. Given this 
analytical scent to follow, the scenes of passionate firearm 
selection in both Voina and Voroshilovskii strelok, and the thoughtful 
adjustment of weaponry and camouflage before the raid in Zvezda, 
are pungent indeed. In Ekhali dva shofera, the contest between Kolʹka’s 
ramshackle truck and Raika’s (Irina Rakhmanova) pristine “Ford,” 
with interference from a postal airplane, reproduces the human 
love triangle on a vehicular scale, while simultaneously displaying 
the totemic ties between each character and their “tool.” It is no 
wonder that Kolʹka proposes marriage to Raika not after dating or 
even kissing her but after helping her with a spot of car trouble and 
being allowed to drive her truck as a reward. Since these characters 
act as appendages to their automobiles, professional cooperation 
serves as a legitimate substitute for intimacy: Raika gladly accepts 
his proposal. The film critic Natalʹia Sirivlia astutely described this 
situation:
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The “attachment” of all the characters to their labor tools and 
means of production is all the more striking due to the complete 
absence of any industrial plot in the film. Neither socialist 
competition, nor a struggle for the best results, neither heroic 
battle with nature, nor the fulfillment of civil duty [. . .] Everything 
that constituted the dramatic backbone in Soviet movies about 
truck and tractor drivers, construction workers, etc., is totally 
eliminated from this film as superfluous details. Only that which 
can be amusing today remains intact—namely, the naive love 
and suffering of charming human cogs, the side dish that was 
traditionally served for the “warming” of an industrial plot. 
As a result, the film’s action finds itself in a dead end. It can 
develop neither according to the logic of the psychological film, 
nor according to the mythological models of Socialist Realism. 
(Sirivlia 2002a, 48)
Despite the absence of Socialist Realist ideology, Kott 
inadvertently breathes new life into the forgotten and happily 
buried “conflictlessness” of postwar cinema and literature: in his 
film, there are no “bad people,” only “nice guys,” as Kolʹka puts 
it. The struggle between “good and better” as depicted in this 2002 
feature is not, however, as toothless as it appears at first glance. 
Supported by the stylized setting, reproducing not an actual Soviet 
province of the late 1940s but rather a Socialist Realist mirage of 
provincial life, the movie delivers a deeply nostalgic wallop. Even 
the artificiality of the film’s plot is presented as a reminiscence on 
the lost naiveté and purity supposedly basic to postwar mores. In 
complete accordance with the logic of “restoration nostalgia,” Ekhali 
dva shofera “builds on the sense of loss of community and cohesion 
and offers a comforting collective script for individual longing” 
(Boym 2001, 43).
However, another aspect of this “restoration nostalgia” is 
largely based on various conspiracy theories: “The mechanism of 
this kind of conspiracy theory is based on the inversion of cause 
and effect and personal pronouns. ‘We’ (the conspiracy theorists) 
for whatever reason feel insecure in the modern world and find 
a scapegoat for our misfortunes, somebody different from 
us, whom we don’t like. [. . .] ‘They’ conspire against ‘our’ 
homecoming, since we have to conspire against ‘them’ in order 
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to substitute for the conspiracy itself” (Boym 2001, 43). This 
worldview necessarily engages the discourse of war; Kott’s film, 
in truth, declares war on the implied present, which is “immoral” 
and “corrupt.” The covert strategy of his picture becomes overt in 
the majority of Post-Soc films addressing different kinds of war: it 
is always war against the present (present chaos, disgrace, dege- 
neration, etc.).
Applying Boym’s definition of nostalgic conspirology to the 
works of Balabanov, Govorukhin, Lebedev, and Lungin, we must 
also define the supplementary concept of “homecoming” in Post-
Soc: I would like to argue that “homecoming” refers here not to 
a territorial or temporal loss but, first and foremost, to the lost 
collective identity. The paradox of Post-Soc is thus found in the 
juxtaposition of two opposing modalities: the affirmation of the 
missing collective identity (through various spigots of military 
discourse) combined with an aching nostalgia for it. Of course, 
in this viscous thematic stew, the heroic declaration of belonging 
to some communal body (a “we”) cannot aspire to more than 
a postmodernist simulacrum—the meaning of “we,” today, 
happens to be annulled. This explains the Post-Soc affair with 
the military uniform: the outfit is a sheer simulacrum, a pure 
sham, a surface charade of joint identity that shifts the focus away 
from personal identity and masks the disheartening dearth of 
a collective to which the hero could proudly adhere—a costume, 
indeed.
Nevertheless, this nostalgic yen constitutes the raison d’être 
for the heated warfare of Post-Soc. First, because war itself, as 
the Soviet historical experience proves, can efficiently forge 
a collective identity: in his review of Zvezda, Iurii Gladilʹshchikov 
maintains that “war again emerges as the single unifying idea for 
the film’s characters and the film’s audience, that which allows 
them to feel that ‘we are of one blood.’ [. . .] We lack another 
unifying idea. [. . .] Unable to find another way to attract viewers 
to domestic film, Russian cinematography inevitably returned to 
war” (Gladilʹshchikov 2002a). And second, because war is one of 
the few phenomena able to sculpt a monolithic identity, as opposed 
to the kaleidoscopic and transient nature of postmodern (as well as 
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postrevolutionary) identities.5 In war, the identification problem is 
drastically simplified: “we” have a common enemy, the enemy is 
our common denominator; hence, “we” are not “they.” As Susan 
Buck-Morss writes, “To define the enemy is, simultaneously, to 
define the collective. Indeed: defining the enemy is the act that brings 
the collective into being” (2000, 9; author’s emphasis). This principle 
of totalitarian identification is wholeheartedly adopted by the Post-
Soc aesthetic. Fulfillment reaches the Post-Soc character only when 
he learns to recognize “the enemy.” Moreover, he becomes a hero 
only when he proves able to act like the enemy: paradoxically, he 
obtains—or rather, fashions—his share in the collective identity 
(since his personal identity remains invariably diminished) after his 
actions become indistinguishable from the actions of the enemy—
that is, criminal, by definition. War acquires a new function here: an 
ultimate justification for this equation. “John, it’s war. No think at 
war,” says Ivan, in broken English, in Balabanov’s Voina; the line is 
probably the most blatant exemplification of the inner mechanisms 
of the Post-Soc wars for identity.
Voina :  The War for  Ident ity
The plot of Balabanov’s Voina (2003) is quite straightforward: 
a Russian sergeant named Ivan (Aleksei Chadov) is held in Chechen 
captivity and treated as a slave. He meets his fellow hostages—
Captain Medvedev (Sergei Bodrov Jr.), paralyzed as a result of 
a concussive head injury, and two English actors kidnapped during 
5 “In our postmodern times [. . .] the boundaries which tend to be simultane-
ously most strongly desired and most acutely messed are those of identity: 
of a rightful and secure position in the society, of a space unquestionably 
one’s own, where one can plan one’s life with the minimum of interference, 
play one’s role in a game in which the rules do not change overnight and 
without notice, act reasonably and hope for the better. As we have seen, it 
is the characteristic of contemporary men and women in our society that 
they live perpetually with the ‘identity problem’ unresolved. They suffer, 
one might say, from a chronic absence of resources with which they could 
build a truly solid and lasting identity, anchor it or stop from drifting” 
(Bauman 2001, 208–9).
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a trip to Tbilisi, John (Ian Kelly) and his fiancée, Margaret (Ingeborga 
Dapkunaite). The leader of the Chechen captors, Aslan (Georgii 
Gurguliia), releases Ivan because no one is able or willing to pay his 
ransom. Concurrently, he frees John while keeping Margaret, on 
the condition that John will gather a ransom of two thousand British 
pounds and return for her. In England, John manages to collect 
only part of this sum, a significant portion of which constitutes an 
advance received from a TV station in payment for filming his visit 
to Chechnya. He fails to obtain any support whatsoever from the 
authorities—the British and Russian bureaucrats alike heartlessly 
reject his pleas for help.
Understanding that he is unable to negotiate with Aslan or 
travel to Chechnya by himself, John hurries to Tobolʹsk—the 
hometown of his former prison mate Ivan. The sergeant has already 
been discharged, and we find him rather downcast in his return to 
civilian “peace”: many of his friends have been killed in gang wars, 
his Chechen tenure numbs the meaning of any prospective job, and 
he does not know what to do with his life and freedom. When John 
arrives to beg for his help, Ivan lends it—not because he is lured 
by the Briton’s promise of an honorarium but because he wants to 
rescue Captain Medvedev, who trilled Ivan’s heartstrings as a true 
“father-commander”: “Nobody can break or twist him. If only all 
the commanders were like him!”
Ivan and John travel to Moscow, where they secure military 
equipment and weapons with the Englishman’s funds. When their 
Vladikavkaz “contact” from the FSB (Federal Security Service, the 
heir to the KGB) turns out to be a crook, scheming after John’s 
wallet, Ivan assumes command. His first decree is to pay Aslan an 
unexpected visit. In a mountainside ambush, the duo captures an 
arms jeep belonging to the Chechens by killing its “passengers” 
(including, we should note, a woman). Later, Ivan takes a Chechen 
shepherd named Ruslan (E. Kurdizis) as a hostage, abusing and 
mistreating him, controlling him with beatings and threatening to 
murder his family. John is startled by Ivan’s cruelty, but the sergeant 
authoritatively explains that they understand only this language—
that is, the language of terror and violence—and John’s discomfort 
is quelled.
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With the shepherd’s aid, Ivan and John assault Aslan’s village. 
Ivan manages not only to suppress all resistance, killing the guards 
along with bystanders (an old man and a child), but also to take 
the unit commander himself prisoner. Defeated, Aslan praises his 
table-turning ex-captive: “You acted like a real mountain man!” 
Congratulations are cut short, however, when John discovers that 
Margaret has been gang-raped despite Aslan’s vow. Thrust into 
a state of uncontrollable rage, he shoots Aslan, thereby wasting the 
sole bargaining chip by which the heroes could have made their 
safe exit from the mountains.
Ivan, John, and Margaret, under the leadership of the immobile 
Medvedev, build a raft to carry them within the reach of Russian 
choppers. The generous and noble Ivan releases Ruslan with a com-
pensation of two thousand pounds. The rest of his honorarium he 
donates to Medvedev, who needs the money to treat his injured 
spine. However, in the denouement Ivan is not rewarded but 
punished. The footage shot by John incriminates the demobilized 
Ivan, and he is arrested and held in the Russian prison from which 
he has been narrating his odyssey to a visiting journalist. Ruslan 
testifies against him in court, and his sons, apparently illiterate in 
Russian, are admitted to Moscow University in exchange for bribes. 
Margaret, who has fallen in love with Medvedev in captivity, breaks 
up with John. Medvedev returns to his wife and daughter and is the 
only one who continues to fight for Ivan’s release.
According to the film’s logical schema, Ivan—as his folkloric 
name suggests—is a symbolic representation of Russia. As such, he 
equivalently opposes West and East. The latter is embodied by Aslan 
and his tribal morals: he remembers the names of his seven ancestors, 
and inherits their toils in his own struggle with the Russians. (The 
same morality is represented by Ruslan, for whom Aslan is a blood 
enemy after centuries of interfamilial feuding.) The West, of course, 
is epitomized by the English tourist: with his Western humanistic 
values, John is portrayed as weakness incarnate. His tantrums about 
“human rights” sound unbearably irrelevant against the backdrop 
of the cold-blooded beheading of captive Russian soldiers; of the 
ceaseless beating of the “slaves” (also captive Russian soldiers) by 
virtually everyone, including children; and of the severed fingers of 
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a Jewish businessman tortured “according to the laws of shariat.” 
John’s beliefs seem to make him, in a sense, impotent; no wonder 
Margaret prefers Medvedev, who retains his machismo even while 
paralyzed. By contrast, on Aslan’s side stands crude force, real and 
murderous power based on fear and blood. Ivan unambiguously 
chooses Aslan’s “truth”—and with it, defeats Aslan. As Natalʹia 
Sirivlia remarks in her review of the film, “Ivan’s ‘art of war’ is 
borrowed from the Chechens. His force is a mirror reflection of their 
barbaric power. This is not a conflict of two civilizations, rather 
a demonstration of their mutual similitude” (2002b, 212). True, it is 
amazing how nimbly Ivan, not long ago a slave himself, assumes the 
“master” role, and how much he enjoys thrashing and threatening 
his new slave, the shepherd.
However, the ease of this transformation can be explained by 
the fact that the absolutization of power and brute force similarly 
dominates under “peaceful” conditions—that is, the life Ivan knew 
before and knows after the war (as critics including Sirivlia, Bykov, 
and Slatina have observed). The strategy of control through terror 
is not foreign to his childhood friends, who have grown into mafia 
“muscle,” nor to the Moscow bosses, indifferent to others’ suffering, 
nor to the corrupt FSB officers, nor to Ivan’s father, who extols war 
from his deathbed—“I’d stand up and go to the war” (Schas by vstal 
i na voinu!), nor to any of the other transient characters in the film. 
Even Ivan’s affection for Medvedev—basically unmotivated—
claims this justification: in the captain, Ivan senses a commanding 
force, and elevates it as the “rightful” power. Symptomatically, 
Margaret’s fate is immaterial not only to Ivan but to the filmmakers 
as well—this part, played by one of the brightest stars of the post-
Soviet cinema, is virtually wordless! There is only one answer for 
this absence of both interest and articulation: because Margaret is 
“weak,” she can be only a victim and therefore must have nothing 
to say.
There is nothing novel or extraordinary in the “truth” of terror; 
it constitutes the norm of post-Soviet life. This is what, according to 
Voina, favorably differentiates Russia and Russians from the West 
and Westerners, who are seen as enfeebled by political correctness 
and other unnecessary restraints. Therefore, Ivan’s seemingly free 
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choice is not in fact very free—it is predetermined by the cultural 
logic of the post-Soviet lifestyle.
Ivan’s opposition to John and Aslan, despite its “geopolitical” 
coloring, distinctly reflects the disposition of social forces within 
post-Soviet Russia. Aslan, the anti-Russia militant, mentions that he 
owns two restaurants in Moscow and that he “milks Russians like 
goats.” Any obvious arguments in support of Chechen separatism—
for example, the struggle for national independence—are never 
used by him. The film wants us to believe that Aslan and his ilk are 
not actually striving for independence, that they really do belong 
to, or rather own, Russia’s politics and economics. Thus, Aslan is 
not depicted as a separatist, but as a new master of Russia—a “new 
Russian,” so to speak—who has used terror and violence to hijack 
real power in the country.
In contrast, John is presented despite his “foreignness” as 
a typical (or rather, stereotypical) Soviet, and especially as a post-
Soviet intelligent, able to mumble lofty locutions but radically 
unable to acclimate to coarse living conditions that do not match his 
culture-founded expectations. Symptomatically, he is victimized 
without end, helpless and hapless. It is quite illuminating how the 
Englishman collects his lover’s ransom: we might imagine that, as 
an actor and a man of public reputation, he would first organize 
a fundraiser or at least apply for bank loans and humanitarian 
grants. This would be the strategy of a person with Western 
experience. Instead, John acts exactly as a Russian intelligent would: 
he pleads for government support, and when the officials withhold 
it, he sells his own property and tries to borrow money from friends 
and relatives.
Squarely between Aslan and John—the new master and the old 
intellectual—the film places Ivan, an iteration of the “simple man,” 
another archetypal figure of Russian/Soviet cultural mythology. 
This archaic role is revitalized by Balabanov, as well as some other 
authors of the recent period, in the capacity of the ultimate victim 
of the post-Communist redistribution of power. The intelligentsia 
can incur only contempt from the perspective of the “simple man,” 
who remembers how the intelligenty strove to undo the “stagnant” 
but comfortable order of late-Soviet life, and as a result lost all their 
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own privileges and social status. The new masters of life, on the 
other hand, generate a mixed sensation of hatred and envy: the 
New Russians’ dominion over the “simple man” is not secured by 
state or ideology and more resembles the looting of a cunning thief 
and impostor who has managed to plunder the last penny before 
the others even arrive. Their rule is regarded as accidental and 
definitely illegal—though it surpasses that of the old Soviet elite 
considerably.
This triad—the simple man, the New Russian, and the 
intelligent—does not replace but rather overlaps the symbolic 
opposition of Ivan (Russia) to both Aslan (the East) and John (the 
West). Each of these juxtapositions is rather worn and stereotypical, 
but their combination in Voina produces a handful of unexpected 
results.
The transformation of the ternary correlation (Russia—East—
West) into a rigid polarity of terrorist power and weakness seems 
incompatible with postmodernist relativism and ambivalence. 
Instead, it appears to restore much more traditionalist and even, 
as Natalʹia Sirivlia suggests, precultural or at least pre-Christian 
paradigms. It is true that, in the Russian cultural tradition, war was 
never regarded as a justification for immorality. Following Tolstoy, 
until the best literary works of the former World War II “lieutenants” 
emerged in the 1960–70s, the conditions of war were treated as 
experimentation on the limits of humanity, with the conclusion 
that human transgression inevitably leads to human failure. In 
official Soviet literature, however, untempered cruelty toward 
enemies—external and internal alike—became a vital criterion for 
the hero’s integration into the collective body of the Soviet people: 
“The villain [in Socialist Realism] is a symbolic victim who must 
be purged in order for the microcosm to be purified. But this is not 
a complete explanation of the function of villainy. The tale of 
villainy is subordinated primarily not to the aim of social cohesion 
but to the initiation ritual” (Clark 2000, 186). The notorious concepts 
of “proletarian humanism” (as opposed to “abstract humanism”) 
and “class morality” (which justifies the physical elimination of 
class opponents, women and children included) were coined by 
the ideologues of the 1920s and ’30s specifically to validate terror. 
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No wonder the war with the Chechens shown in Voina acquires the 
meaning of class warfare. Dmitry Bykov rightfully noted that “in terms 
of contents and aesthetics, ideology and morality, etc., Balabanov’s 
film is a clone of Govorukhin’s Voroshilovskii strelok” (Bykov 2002);6 
the latter directly depicts class warfare by antagonizing an old 
proletarian with a New Russian, a decadent intellectual, and a web 
of corrupt officials, along with their children, who are responsible 
for the rape of his angelic granddaughter (no doubt, another symbol 
of Russia). Hence Voina is not entirely “savage” in its “morality”—
one may detect here the firm reinstitution of Socialist Realist 
models. Although the concrete meaning of the totalitarian ideology 
is drained, its “pure” logic of terror (preserved by the “memory” of 
forms, “memory” of discursive models) is resurrected intact.
However, in the Soviet tradition, warfare can be either class, 
against a resident threat, or patriotic, against external invaders. 
It cannot be both, since each type requires its own rhetoric: class 
warfare is justified with “proletarian internationalism” that is 
alleged to compensate for the destruction of traditional bonds 
(families, communities, and the entire society), while the patriotic 
war accentuates nationalism and even authorizes the rehabilitation 
of former class enemies, so long as they prove themselves true 
patriots. By combining these two models, Balabanov induces their 
mutual annihilation, observable in the inadvertently ambivalent 
position of Ivan, the hero, who, in agreement with epic archetypes, 
abhors ambivalence. The film consistently stresses his similarity to 
the enemy, Aslan (symbolizing Ivan’s unsentimental force), and his 
contradistinction from his ally, John (symbolizing Ivan’s rejection of 
moral reflections). Aslan, as previously mentioned, even applauds 
Ivan as a “mountain man” (gorets)—as one of his, Aslan’s, crowd—
while John is debased and humiliated, first driven to abandon his 
humanistic convictions and murder the unarmed Aslan, and then 
made responsible for Ivan’s imprisonment because of his “honest” 
documentary.
6 This parallel is also analyzed in Sitkovskii (2002, 31).
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The mutual annihilation of opposite models, both rooted 
equally in Socialist Realism, accounts for Ivan’s ultimate emptiness. 
Natalʹia Sirivlia argues that “Ivan does not have a world of his own. 
[. . .] It is no accident that the ideal Captain Medvedev has a broken 
spine. The hero’s father is also broken—he drinks, and doesn’t have 
any interest in life. [. . .] The only thing that remains for the hero 
is war, and in war he follows Aslan’s lessons. It is amazing how 
easily he absorbs the enemy’s wisdom” (2002b, 212–13). Dmitry 
Bykov interprets Ivan’s intellectual vacancy as a product of the 
“ideological vacuum” of the 1990s. Tatʹiana Moskvina’s view is 
similar to Bykov’s; however, she suggests a psychological rather 
than sociological interpretation for both Ivan’s emptiness and his 
involvement in the war:
What moves Ivan? Is he seeking profits? Not at all! He is driven 
by a far mightier engine—the absolute lack of knowledge about 
what to do with his life. [. . .] He needs nothing. He acts not “for 
the sake of,” there is nothing addictive in his behavior, only 
emptiness, cold, power, a lone man, by his free will eliminating 
an “enemy.” By the rules and without hatred. Calmly. With cold 
pleasure. (Moskvina 2002, 25)
Ivan holds neither convictions nor lasting interests. He hates 
the Chechens, but without zeal: if not for John’s proposal, he would 
never return to Chechnya, not even for the captain, let alone for 
Margaret. In Balabanov’s Brat diptych, the hero was driven by 
a “quasi-filial” sentiment based on the revisited “Great Family” 
concept. Only now, the Great Family is bonded not by common ide-
ology but by the connotatively vague adhesive of “brotherhood”—
semiracist, semi-gang-like (see Sirivlia 2002b). According to Susan 
Larsen, “Balabanov’s stubbornly loyal brothers [. . .] offer images 
of heroes whose cultural authority and sexual magnetism derives 
from their allegiance to a masculine moral code that equates patrio-
tism with filial and fraternal loyalty” (2003, 511). Next to these films, 
Voina is shocking for the happenstance nature of Ivan’s motives. 
Balabanov certainly could have invoked some grand, lofty—or, in 
fact, worldly and pragmatic—ideology for Ivan, be it nationalism 
(Russians vs. Chechens), neocolonialism (culture vs. savagery), or, 
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say, patriotism (the state vs. the separatists). Yet the director did 
not bundle Ivan’s emptiness into any of the available ideological 
banners; apparently, he preferred to present Ivan’s “way of the 
sword” as a paradoxical “nonideological” ideology—one that does 
not require rational justification or even snappy sloganeering, being 
attractive merely “by performance.”
Ivan displays a simulacrum of a hero, and his identity transitions 
into a simulative identity. This transformation explains Ivan’s allure 
and, so to speak, his innocence: nothing breaches him; nothing 
inspires him, with the exception of all scenarios of domination, battle, 
and violence, as the unswerving expressions of his nonideological 
vitality. Yet the same transformation invalidates the objective of 
the war for identity: the identity of the hero, forcefully composed 
through violence, is completely erased by this method—nothing is 
left, and we are invited to applaud and to pity . . . the victorious 
Zero!
Ivan’s simulative identity, by the same token, revalidates 
the role of violence in the film. Bloodshed breaks through all the 
oppositions erected by Balabanov: Ivan mimics the Chechens 
who enslaved and abused him; John mimics Ivan, as well as the 
Chechens who raped Margaret. The film intentionally obstructs 
the factor of Russian imperialist aggression (the devastation of 
Grozny, the concentration camps, the “cleansing” operations, and 
so on) that triggered this process of violent “mimetic desire.” Yet 
even this substitution—not obvious to the unprepared, including 
foreign audiences—does not alter the general impression that Voina 
imparts. The movie drives the viewer to a point where the main 
measure of distinction between Ivan, John, and Aslan becomes 
quantitative rather than qualitative: the number of people each has 
killed. Violence becomes the common denominator, uniting all the 
“members” of the contradictory “geopolitical” as well as “class” 
oppositions. Mutual butchery serves as the sole viable basis for 
a collective identity, an identity that necessarily implies the endless 
metamorphoses of victim into victimizer and vice versa, as René 
Girard suggests. A joint identity founded on aggression obliterates 
all the constitutive differences between East and West as well as 
those between the “man of culture” (John), the “man of power” 
F i l m192
(Aslan), and the “simple man” (Ivan). Thus, the entire film proffers 
itself as a self-sufficient ritual of violence, striving to involve the 
viewer in its sacral carnage.7
This is war, Balabanov’s fans would argue; but there is a great 
difference between war as a human tragedy and war as ritualized 
and poeticized violence. Despite the naturalism in its presentation 
of killing and torture, Voina leans toward the latter denotation—
because the authors do not even attempt to seek an alternative to 
war, because war is presented as a social norm and, moreover, as 
a norm of socialization.
It is easy to argue that the poetry of violence in Voina is 
derivative of the models of Socialist Realism, which apparently 
preserve totalitarian impressions despite “deideologization.” 
However, analysis of the picture reveals that, paradoxically, the 
accentuated binaries originating in these models in fact further 
enshroud the “fuzzy logic” of the film. The moral righteousness 
of the protagonist is undermined by his affect of hollowness and 
simulation. The hero’s unshaken certainty thornily intertwines 
with the moral ambivalence of his actions. His infallibility counters 
the radical absence of any graspable objective. Underneath, the 
“truth” harbors naked violence, presented as supreme, if divine, 
“force.”
7 This, probably, explains Balabanov’s enthrallment with the force, violence, 
and pathos of war as “a true man’s work,” as mentioned in several reviews 
of the film. For example, “You die today, and I’ll die tomorrow. You play by 
the rules, and I won’t. I can do everything, and you can do nothing. The one 
who has the power is the right one (hence, might makes right, and vice versa). 
This simple criminal code is absorbed by everyone during their teenage years. 
Alexei Balabanov and all his characters serve as mouthpieces for these so-
called ethics. There is no need to confuse them with patriotism, war, and other 
policies. [. . .] [Balabanov’s heroes] kill because they enjoy killing and don’t 
enjoy anything else. They enjoy other people’s fear and their own power” 
(Bykov 2003a). Also, “If in the earlier films Balabanov declared that ‘the force 
is in the truth,’ now he believes that ‘war makes a man out of a boy, and man 
(muzhik) is power.’ [. . .] So, is there truth in war? Aleksei Balabanov is a true 
artist, almost impeccable from a professional standpoint; he plays on popular 
xenophobia, provokes the viewer. [. . .] Balabanov’s cinema is alarming, 
because the director abhors pacifism, his films push the viewer not to save 
a friend, but to kill a foe” (Slatina 2002, 73).
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These metamorphoses hark back to the notion of postmodernist 
deconstruction, defined by its progenitor as “the whole theory of 
the structural necessity of abyss” (Derrida 1990). In actuality, Voina 
reveals vacuity, chaos, and disorder beneath all the structures of 
order, opposition, and organization it engages, be they geopolitical 
opposition or the post-Soviet social triangle, class competition, or 
patriotic warfare.
Yet this deconstruction of the neototalitarian premise occurs un-
wittingly—despite the author’s best intentions! Perhaps it happens 
exactly because the film’s creators, aiming to attract the widest con-
gregation of viewers, have cast their nets in all directions and ap-
propriated as many traditional cultural models as possible, Socialist 
Realist as well as classical. Each of these models, taken individually, 
invokes heroic archetypes, elevating the hero and humiliating his 
enemies; all together, they produce mutual annihilation.
It is important to emphasize, though, that the effect of the 
inadvertent deconstruction that Voina and other Post-Soc films 
undertake is not necessarily ripe for direct emotional perception 
and can be revealed only in the light of thorough analysis. The 
furtive and involuntary nature of the dissection separates Post-
Soc from postmodernism. More specifically, none of these works 
implies any desire to question the protagonist’s, let alone the 
author’s, “truth.” Post-Soc, in fact, simulates postmodernism by 
imposing postmodernist stylization, and even nostalgia, on the 
viewer, while demonstratively rejecting the postmodernist critique 
of authoritative discourses and “truth” of any kind.
Paradoxically, the place of Post-Soc between Socialist Realism 
and postmodernism, without actually belonging to either of these 
models, happens to be quite comfortable and profitable for those 
who aligned their careers with this trend. It is much harder, I would 
say, to be a hard-core conservative (like Prokhanov) abhorred by 
all the liberals, or a radical experimentalist (like Sorokin) scorned 
by all the conservatives. Post-Soc appeals to the intellectual public 
with its professionalism and its ability to employ select up-to-date 
postmodernist devices and, simultaneously, to the mass public, 
touched by the reminiscences of totalitarian—more generally, 
traditionalist—aesthetics.
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To some extent, the phenomenon of Post-Soc serves as 
a microcosmic metaphor for the whole cultural situation in Putin’s 
Russia, whose chief dilemma is not the blending of modern 
and postmodern flavors, but the fact that this mixture is not 
introspectively addressed, let alone interpreted as such. The lack 
of reflection in this case justifies intellectual cynicism when the 
opposite strategies (modern or postmodern) are used on demand—
defined, in turn, by the rationale of commercial or political needs.
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Wa r  a s  t h e  fa m i l y  Va l u e :  
M y  s t e P b r o t h e r  F r a n k e n s t e i n  
b y  Va l e r y  t o D o r o V s k y
The symbiosis of the theme of war with the representation of 
fatherhood in Soviet and post-Soviet culture is persistent but not 
logically self-evident. In the wake of such films of the 1960s as 
Sudʹba cheloveka (Destiny of a Man, 1959, dir. Sergei Bondarchuk), 
Kogda derevʹia byli bolʹshimi (When the Trees Were Tall, 1961, dir. Lev 
Kulidzhanov), Mir vkhodiashchemu (Peace to Him Who Enters, 1961, 
dir. Aleksandr Alov and Vladimir Naumov), and Otets soldata 
(Father of a Soldier, 1965, dir. Rezo Chkheidze), the understanding 
of the Great Patriotic War as a backdrop in which to beatify the 
father figure was solidified in Soviet culture. All these and many 
similar movies and books arose during the period of the Thaw, 
which had, on the one hand, deposed the supreme patriarchal 
authority of Stalin and commenced the task of scouring its cultural 
vestiges, yet, on the other hand, affirmed the nation’s victory in 
World War II as the most important if not the sole legitimization 
of the Soviet regime. Invoking the valorous war as the cornerstone 
of paternalistic authority, feature film directors of the sixties strove 
to replace the crumpled and debunked father figure of Stalin with 
a markedly less godlike image of the nuclear father and thus, in the 
same stroke, marshaled the totalitarian mythology of the war into 
a more democratic and humane mythology of the collective nation-
al suffering that was instigated by the war.
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Although the war significantly depleted the Soviet male 
population and inevitably transferred to women the principal 
responsibility for familial well-being, war films of the 1960s 
unanimously neglected to undermine or even to question 
patriarchal authority, and, moreover, rarely ventured to examine 
the correlation between the war and women’s changing social roles.1 
It is well known that the core of totalitarian culture was shaped 
by the prioritization of society’s interests over the interests of the 
nuclear family as well as by the mandatory sacrifice of individual 
values for the sake of collectivist ideologies. In contrast, the 
sixties’ reorientation from societal “fathers” to private father-child 
relationships reflected the comprehensive problematization of the 
entire system of Soviet values, a problematization that was generally 
indicative of the Thaw-era culture. Yet despite the anti-Stalinist 
ideology of the aforementioned films, the connection drawn in them 
between the war and its culture of violence and suffering with the 
symbolic capital of the father(ing) was merely a manner of rewriting 
Stalinist totalitarian mythologies. As Aleksandr Prokhorov argues, 
“The Thaw culture has inherited from Stalinism a family trope—
as a symbolic image of the Soviet society, and a war trope—as the 
symbolic image of this society’s main form of existence” (2007, 152). 
In Thaw-era cinema, the elementary structure of the totalitarian 
Great Family was preserved in the realm of the nuclear family—it 
was domesticated and divested of imperial grandeur, but it at least 
maintained, and arguably increased, its sacredness.
Thus, the war theme tilled a unique discursive field in the culture 
of the 1960s–80s, one in which the official state and alternative liberal 
discourses frequently merged, or at least tolerated one another. 
The mythos of the war—invariably held as the triumphal equinox 
of patriotism in which the interests of the state were no different 
1 Symptomatically, the texts that demonstrate how the war undermined and 
problematized the father’s role in the family and society—for instance, Andrei 
Platonov’s magnificent short story “Vozvrashchenie” (“The Return,” 1946)—
were consistently marginalized. Among these marginalized exceptions, the 
films Krylʹia (Wings, 1966, dir. Larisa Shepitʹko) and Dikii med (Wild Honey, 
1966, dir. Vladimir Chebotarev; based on the eponymous novel by Leonid 
Aiskii) should also be mentioned.
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from the interests of an individual or a single family—allowed the 
perpetuation of a balance, however fragile, between society and the 
individual of post-Stalinist Soviet culture. Moreover, the association 
of war themes with the father figure, or more precisely with the 
idealization of patriarchal values and corresponding models of 
social order, constituted the foundation of this poise.
The mythology of the Great Patriotic War not only retained its 
symbolic currency into the post-Soviet period but has been richly 
reinforced during the years of Vladimir Putin’s presidency. Cultural 
historian and sociologist Lev Gudkov, having analyzed numerous 
poll data from VTsIOM (the All-Russia Center for the Study of 
Public Opinion), argues that since 1995 and up to the present, “An 
extremely structured social attitude towards the war is incarnated 
and consolidated in the main symbol that integrates the nation: 
victory in the war, victory in the Great Patriotic War. In the opinion 
of Russia’s inhabitants, this is the most important event in their 
history; it is the basic image of national consciousness. No other 
event compares with it” (Gudkov 2005, 4). Gudkov convincingly 
suggests that the post-Soviet perception of the war, notwithstanding 
the newfound access to a wealth of formerly banned historical 
sources, still respires all the key features of the Soviet myth of the 
Great Patriotic War:
• the virtual repression of all traumatic aspects of the 
war and postwar experience (i.e., the Holocaust, the coercive 
labor, the chronic hunger and poverty, the ethnic repressions, 
etc.), combined with an emphasis on ecstatic victory celebra- 
tions;
• xenophobic overtones in the war mythos—victory in the 
war serves as proof of the superiority of Russia and Russians 
over the entire world: “Russians are not willing to share their 
triumph with anyone else in the world. Sixty-seventy percent 
of those surveyed [in 2003] believe that the USSR could have 
won the war even without the help of the allies. Moreover, as 
Russian nationalism is intensifying and the war is receding 
further into the past, it has gradually begun to be integrated 
into the traditional idea of Russia’s ‘mission’ and its ‘rivalry 
with the West’” (Gudkov 2005, 7);
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• “a number of unpleasant facts [. . .] repressed from 
mass consciousness: the aggressive nature of Soviet regime, 
Communist militarism and expansionism [. . .] the fact that 
World War II began with a joint attack of Hitler’s Germany and 
the Soviet Union; the human, social, economic, and metaphysical 
cost of war . . .” (ibid., 8);
• the justification of an extremely low valuation of human 
life: “The idea that mass losses were inevitable and that millions 
of victims somehow ‘are unavoidable’ are a constituent element 
of the general semantic complex of national exploits and 
general heroism. [. . .] Russians’ mass consciousness is unable 
to imagine a war where the military leaders would aim to save 
the lives of their subordinates at any cost” (ibid., 10);
• the legitimization of “people’s view of themselves as 
victims of aggression” (ibid., 9), which, Gudkov further notes, 
“was also expressed in a readiness to justify (but not to support!) 
any aggressive or repressive state police against other countries 
or territories withstanding the USSR or Russia” (ibid.), ranging 
from Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 to Afghani-
stan in 1979 and Chechnya in the ’90s and 2000s.
Bolstered by lavish jubilee celebrations of the victory in 2000 and 
particularly in 2005, and, moreover, fueled by the ceaseless media 
bashing of the Baltic countries and former Soviet satellites (Poland 
especially) that allegedly overslaughed the memory of Soviet 
“liberators” for the glorification of the Nazis, the Great Patriotic 
War myth in the twenty-first century, as Gudkov demonstrates, 
serves as the main basis for negative self-identification (“we” vs. 
“them”), which, in turn, emerges as the formative impetus for 
the mainstream of post-Soviet culture: “This confidence [in being 
constantly victimized by ‘enemies’] was routinized in an extra-
moral, socially primitive, archaic, almost tribal distinction between 
‘our people’ and ‘not our people’ as a basis for social solidarity” 
(2005, 9). It naturally follows that today “the repression of the war 
[myth] keeps spawning state-sponsored aggression—the Chechen 
war and the restoration of the repressive regime” (11). Furthermore, 
the potency of the war myth elevates the wartime condition of 
normalized violence to “a norm of symbolic self-identity” (10): of 
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present-day Russian citizens, 77 percent share the conviction that 
“Russians display their national character and mental qualities 
at the fullest in times of crisis, trial, and war [. . .] rather than in 
calm and happy times” (ibid.). These phenomena certainly help 
to illustrate the ties between Great Patriotic War mythology and 
the father figure as the symbolic reification of the “very principle 
of a ‘vertical’ construction of society, a mobilization, command-
hierarchical model of social order” (11).
In this context, exceptional significance befalls the engagements 
of contemporary Russian culture that problematize and deconstruct 
the symbiosis between the war myth and the myth of the patriarchal 
authority. Moi svodnyi brat Frankenshtein (My Stepbrother Frankenstein, 
2004)2 by Valery Todorovsky (b. 1962) exemplifies the cinematic 
breed of this rare species.3 Todorovsky’s film won three honors, 
including the Grand Prix, at the Kinotavr film festival in Sochi, was 
recognized as the best film of the Russian program at the Moscow 
Film Festival, and received the FIPRESCI award at Karlovy Vary 
2 Produced by Prior-Film and Rekun TV, producer Leonid Iarmolʹnik, director 
of photography Sergei Mikhalʹchuk, production designer Vladimir Gudlin, 
music by Aleksei Aigi.
3 Another important example is Svoi (Our Own, 2004) by the director Dmitrii 
Meskhiev and the famed screenwriter Valentin Chernykh. In this film, which 
is situated in the first months of the war, the opposition between “us” and 
“them” emerges as constantly lingering and problematic. The complex 
relationships between the newcomers and their host, a father figure, reveal 
the dialectics of the kinship and warlike hostility between the members of 
the “social” family. The father in Meskhiev’s film manages to save his family 
and create social solidarity between those who are “ours” by subverting the 
very foundations of the stereotypical Soviet requirements for “our man”: the 
father turns out to be a former kulak, who supposedly returned illegally to his 
native village from exile, and is the German-appointed starosta (elder) of the 
village. However, the film does not entirely deconstruct the Soviet myth of the 
“war father”; rather, Svoi releases it from Soviet stereotypes while preserving 
the mechanism of elevating the “vertical” patriarchal authority in the war 
setting. The father, though he embodies the antipode of the Soviet father 
figure, preserves a similar authority to distinguish between right and wrong, 
to define who is “ours” and who is the “enemy,” although his worldview 
has nothing to do with Soviet ideological or even nationalist systems. If Svoi 
inverts the Soviet myth of “father vis-à-vis war,” Todorovsky’s film presents 
a radical deconstruction of this foundational archetype.
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as well as several other prizes at various European film festivals 
(Rotterdam, Honfleur, Lecce). The movie’s originality is especially 
conspicuous against the backdrop of such reincarnations of Socialist 
Realist representation of the war as Nikolai Lebedev’s Zvezda 
(Star, 2000) and also particularly striking in contrast to popular 
portrayals of the war mythology’s defense of nationalist and neo-
imperialist ideologies such as Aleksei Balabanov’s Voina (War, 
2002) and Fedor Bondarchuk’s Deviataia rota (The Ninth Company, 
2005). Todorovsky’s film, based on an original screenplay by 
Gennadii Ostrovskii (b. 1960), depicts the invasion of a physically 
and emotionally maimed Chechen War veteran, Pavlik Zakharov 
(Daniil Spivakovskii), into the family of his alleged father, former 
Moscow physicist Iulik Krymov (Leonid Iarmolʹnik, also the 
producer of the film), who previously had not known of his son’s 
existence.
As follows from the picture’s title (and numerous textual 
signals), Todorovsky proposes a subversion of the Dr. Frankenstein 
story; it is not by accident that Todorovsky directly quotes the 1931 
classic Frankenstein, directed by James Whale and with Boris Karloff 
as the Monster. Moi svodnyi brat seems to place responsibility for the 
monstrosity—in this case a paranoid yet goodwilled and forgiving 
son—only on the father’s shoulders and, in a broader sense, on the 
conscience of the contemporary liberal intelligentsia, who have 
safely separated themselves from the violence and terror of the 
post-Soviet period. According to Todorovsky’s own description, 
there is more than one guilty party here:
This is a story that has no way out. Everybody in it is right and 
guilty at the same time. This is a story about father and son, as 
well as about society, and the desperate situation that we are all 
in. It’s a story about the war. Not any particular war, but war in 
general. The war that’s around us. (Khoroshilova 2004)
However, despite the political angle, Moi svodnyi brat Franken-
shtein escapes definition as a political film since it does not offer any 
clear answers to political questions and, moreover, avoids laying 
solitary and conclusive blame, whether it be on the intelligentsia, 
the authorities, soldiers, officers, or any other isolated group. On 
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the contrary, the movie unfolds in an atmosphere of permanent 
problematization, in which any assumption or interpretation that 
the viewer might take for granted is reversed in the next scene. This 
ambiance of uncertainty is conjured by the nervous musical score 
by Aleksei Aigi as well as by the style of acting—psychologically 
precise, yet devoid of the melodramatic theatricality so typical of 
Russian actors. Furthermore, one can argue that Todorovsky’s film 
transmediates to the screen the multivoiced, meditative, and at the 
same time intellectually charged and historically explosive into-
nation of Iurii Trifonov’s prose. The most important intelligentsia 
writer of the so-called stagnation period of the 1970s and early 
’80s, Trifonov relentlessly inquired in his novels about the hidden 
underpinnings and the historical and moral uncanny (Unheimlich)—
associated with Stalinist terror—of the comfortable intelligentsia’s 
life during the period of stagnation. In Moi svodnyi brat Franken-
shtein, Todorovsky reopens this investigation in the context of the 
present, post-Soviet stagnation.
To a cushy Moscow home arrives an abandoned son, dressed 
in tattered clothing, his face disfigured by terrible scars and an 
ominous black patch over his missing eye. He is the foreboding 
shadow of a war that the majority prefer to forget, at least as long as 
it does not affect their lives. Daniil Spivakovskii’s stunning portrayal 
of this all-but-orphaned son, Pavlik Zakharov, is perhaps one of the 
strongest examples of the post-Soviet uncanny. It is the war, or in 
other words, normalized and routinized violence, that epitomizes 
the ultimate uncanny of contemporary Russia, and especially of 
the Muscovite lifestyle. Pavlik’s jarring appearance in the life of the 
Krymovs tears down the barrier that keeps war at a distance from 
the comfortable “stabilization” of the 2000s. Pavlik naturally brings 
destabilization and eventually death into his newly adopted family. 
In the film’s finale, he takes his relatives hostage, sincerely believing 
that by doing so he is saving them from pervasive, invisible peril; 
during the subsequent police “rescue” operation, he is killed.
In Freud’s interpretation, the “uncanny is in reality nothing 
new or alien, but something which is familiar and old-established 
in the mind and which has become alienated from it only through 
the process of repression” (Freud 1955, 241). Specifying the most 
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typical meanings of the “repressed familiar,” Freud mentions 
various manifestations of death (including motifs of the double, the 
automaton, and the mask), as well as fear of castration (frequently 
associated with images of animated severed limbs and heads). 
All these themes are recognizable in the representation of Pavlik 
and are augmented by the parallels with Mary Shelley’s monster. 
Julia Kristeva argues that Freud’s vision of the uncanny “teaches 
us to detect foreignness in ourselves”: while it “creeps into the 
tranquility of reason itself and, without being restricted to madness, 
beauty, or faith anymore than to ethnicity or race, irrigates our very 
speaking being. [. . .] Henceforth, we know that we are foreigners 
to ourselves, and it is with the help of that sole support that we can 
attempt to live with others” (1991, 170). Thus, any textual presence 
of the uncanny inadvertently reflects the divisions and doublings of 
cultural/societal identity and, therefore, undermines the dominant 
societal/cultural mythos, usually promoting global and centripetal, 
rather than local and decentering, patterns of identity. The detection 
of the uncanny in the war-sanctioned father-son relationship 
defines the novelty of Moi svodnyi brat Frankenshtein and not only 
indicates the split within the identity of the intelligentsia but also 
undermines both the patriarchal mythology and the resurrected 
social mythology of the war as “a norm of symbolic self-identity” 
(Gudkov 2005, 9).
Wa r  a n d  Pe ac e :  T he  M i m i c r y  o f  O t he r i n g
Moi svodnyi brat Frankenshtein is reminiscent of numerous films, 
mostly American, that examine the posttraumatic stress suffered 
by Vietnam veterans—films such as The Deer Hunter (1978, dir. 
Michael Cimino) or even Rambo: First Blood (1982, dir. Ted Kotcheff). 
In Todorovsky’s picture we can easily behold society’s indifference 
to the needs of a physically and emotionally disfigured veteran. 
An official from the Ministry of Defense utterly refuses to accept 
any responsibility for Pavlik’s wounds, declaring him “healthy” 
so long as he does not wet his bed. Even the empathetic doctor at 
the military hospital says that she has a queue of maimed veterans 
just like Pavlik that could stretch from the hospital to the defense 
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ministry, and only to the tune of $20,000 can she treat Pavlik earlier 
than scheduled.
The film’s posttraumatic discourse is further manifested in the 
immense gap between the Krymovs’ peaceful middle-class lifestyle 
and Pavlik’s horrific and agitated perception of reality through the 
prism of his nightmarish war experience. As Iulik laments, “For 
him, everybody is the enemy.” Pavlik’s own actions corroborate his 
father’s observation: he is on permanent alert, constantly standing 
guard, scanning for “spooks,” and not thinking twice before 
attacking “suspects.” “They think that we are all dead, but there 
are three of us left,” he confesses to his former commander, Timur 
Kurbatovich (brilliantly played by Sergei Garmash). “They” are the 
“spooks,” or dukhi (ghosts, spirits)—the army argot first used in the 
Afghanistan campaign for “dushmans” or mujahideen, which also 
refers to first-year recruits in the Russian army. The way Pavlik uses 
this epithet makes it obvious that he almost automatically presumes 
the hidden enemy to appear in the ethnic Other: in one scene he 
nervously and at length eyes a non-Slavic fruit seller; in another, 
he beats up a “black-assed” stranger so brutally that he is arrested 
by the police, albeit only for a short while; and throughout the film, 
he suspects the neighbor’s boyfriend of being a spook and even 
mistrusts the Krymovs’ best friends when they come to a dinner 
party (“They could have poisoned your drink!”).4
4 The “posttraumatic” interpretation is supported by such sophisticated 
viewers of the film as the critic and film director Oleg Kovalov and the writer 
Tatiana Tolstaya: “Not raising his voice and rendering a somewhat ‘private’ 
story, Todorovsky demonstrates how the hypocritical and indifferent society 
betrays its children—at first transforming them into physical and moral 
freaks, and then contemptuously turning away from them. [. . .] This film 
is akin to Polish films of ‘moral anxiety,’ which are usually based on the 
seemingly impassive depiction of ‘family chronicles.’ The most conscientious 
and courageous socially engaged statement in the cinema of the recent 
years . . .” (Kovalov in “Seansu otvechaiut. . .” 2005). “Neither a good and 
decent Moscow bourgeois family, their circle, nor even society want to take 
responsibility for boys whom they themselves send every year to learn how 
to kill—for our security, what else for? You are the warrior, sonny, be proud 
of it. You are all covered in blood, freak, don’t dare to approach us. The elder 
son [Pavlik] is a top graduate of this school, an inhabitant of the world of 
shadows, who had elevated to the state of absurdity a natural archaic logic of 
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We might relate all these demented suspicions and paranoias 
to Pavlik’s dream of obtaining a diamond eye to replace his lost 
organ, which ultimately becomes a symbol for the distorted optics 
that haunt him. Pavlik himself, however, believes his point of view 
to be far from distorted—superior, in fact, or even transcendental. 
A definitive military etiology of this phantasmal perception may be 
inferred from the fact that only his war commander can share his 
dream, while Iulik and his wife Rita (Elena Iakovleva) simply shrug 
in embarrassment.5
However, unlike the Vietnam veterans depicted in American 
film of the 1970s, Pavlik does not feel alienated upon his return. Quite 
the opposite, when he joins Iulik’s other son Egor (Artem Shalimov) 
to watch Frankenstein—which Egor rented as a joke at the expense 
of his long-lost stepbrother—Pavlik apparently does not recognize 
himself in the Monster, “kind but unloved,” and, moreover, does not 
sense the hint of compassion directed at Karloff’s tragic fiend, and 
by extension at Pavlik. “Who could love such a guy!” he exclaims 
with poise. Rather than feeling estranged and reviled, Pavlik firmly 
believes that once he has secured his diamond eye, all women will 
fall irretrievably in love with him. Never lost or disoriented in his 
composure, he operates coolly and calmly on the faith that he alone 
knows the truth and, therefore, must protect his newfound family 
from dangers they are unable to perceive.
It is worth noting that several critics have detected in 
Todorovsky’s film a polemical response to Aleksei Balabanov’s 
depiction of another war veteran: the xenophobic and nationalist 
icon of the post-Soviet generation, Danila Bagrov (Sergei Bodrov Jr.) 
of Brat (Brother, 1997) and especially Brat 2 (Brother 2, 2000). As Iurii 
any society: ours are good, aliens are bad. Defend your own kind until your 
last breath; kill the others until they will kill you. A defender crazed in his 
defense . . .” (Tolstaya, ibid.).
5 This motif can be also interpreted as an indirect reference to the Monster from 
Whale’s Frankenstein. As Rick Worland vividly recounts in his analysis of the 
film, “A drawing of the monster’s eyes radiating beams of light as clawlike 
hands stretch toward the viewer dissolves into a field of slowly circling eyes, 
suggesting at once the Monster’s menace as well as its own terror of the 
existence it beholds” (2007, 162).
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Gladilʹshchikov argues, “In my view, Moi svodnyi brat Frankenshtein 
can be adequately understood only as an intentional polemics with 
Aleksei Balabanov’s film Brat, according to which the Chechnya war 
generates its own heroes who are invisible to the world, superfluous 
in it, but because of this no less real” (“Seansu otvechaiut. . .” 2005). 
“In fact, Moi svodnyi brat Frankenshtein refurbishes the plot of Brat, 
and revamps its ideology,” claims Andrei Plakhov, adding, “On the 
material of the war in the Caucasus Balabanov creates something 
like a tragic Western with a lone hero. Todorovsky, on the contrary, 
transforms the patriotic myth of the country, of brothers and 
sisters, into a farce” (ibid.). Balabanov presents his war veteran 
as the nation’s defender from the insults and offenses of various 
Others, ranging from Chechens to Americans, and paints his hero 
as the prophet of “Russian truth” and the living proof of Russian 
(spiritual!) superiority over the world. Todorovsky’s Pavlik, by 
contrast, emerges not as a hero of our time but rather as its ultimate 
victim; and the film portrays his aggression toward the universal 
Other not as a mission, but as a symptom of clinical paranoia.
Nonetheless, there is method in Pavlik’s madness. While 
perceiving the bulk of humanity as hostile and conspiratorial Others, 
he exempts from this roster of suspects those whom he designates as 
“his own.” This circle of relief includes not only former comrades-in-
arms such as Kurbatovich and the emotionally disturbed lieutenant 
housed at the military mental institution, to whom Pavlik gives 
helpful advice based on their comparable hallucinations, but also 
the members of his new family. Considering Pavlik’s paranoia, it 
is surprising how readily he forgives his father, not only for his 
inceptive abandonment but also after fresh betrayals. For instance, at 
the train station Iulik pretends not to recognize his son; he does not 
invite him into his home until Rita, seeing that the soldier has been 
waiting by their door, goads her husband to bring the boy inside; 
he continually refuses to acknowledge their kinship; and finally 
(following his wife’s demand that he get rid of the “monster”), 
he drives Pavlik out into the middle of nowhere and deserts him 
like an unwanted dog. Conceivably, Pavlik interprets his father’s 
various slights as tests of loyalty, or perhaps he subconsciously 
censors the notion of possible disloyalty from his “kin.” In the same 
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vein, when Pavlik is attacked by Egor’s friends at Egor’s behest, he 
perceives the assault as a provocation dealt by the Others, not as 
isolated bullying instigated by his brother: “They wanted to set me 
against you [Menia na tebia razvesti khoteli]. But I’m not who they 
think I am. . . . I’ll cover for you.”
The critic Viktor Matizen reminds us that the name of 
Todorovsky’s protagonist is associated “not only with Saul/
Paul but also with the three cult heroes of Soviet culture: Pavlik 
Morozov, Pavel Vlasov, and Pavel Korchagin” (“Seansu otvechaiut. 
. .” 2005). The parallels with, or counterpoints to, Pavlik Morozov 
and Pavel Korchagin are especially telling. For one, Todorovsky’s 
Pavlik vividly contrasts with Morozov, the thirteen-year-old 
who garnered Soviet adulation after betraying his father for the 
sake of the “Great Family”: in Moi svodnyi brat, Pavlik Zakharov 
considers blood kinship an absolute value, and his every action 
is explicitly committed for the safety of his father’s family (as he 
understands it, of course). Meanwhile, the likenesses between the 
movie’s hero and Pavel Korchagin are not limited to the former’s 
loss of an eye in the war and the latter’s mutilation and blinding as 
a result of his dedicated service to the Revolution: the Soviet cult of 
Korchagin, as a modern martyr cementing the self-sacrificial ethics 
of the Great Family, laid the foundation for the Stalinist cultural 
concept of “chosen sons,” who, in recognition of their extraordinary 
service, were admitted to the “higher order of reality” (Clark 
2000, 126–55). Thus, in a way, Pavlik Zakharov tries to mold his 
nuclear (if estranged) kin into a Great Family and attempts to 
restructure society into a circle of “proven [blood-related or war-
tested] ours,” thereby marrying the Soviet utopia to post-Soviet 
xenophobia.
It is significant that Pavlik includes in his Great Family his war 
buddy Vasia Tobolkin, for whom he patiently waits at the railway 
station, having repressed the friend’s martyr-like death before his 
own eyes. This detail demonstrates that Pavlik’s utopia can be built 
only in proximity to the land of death, since it necessitates a war 
with the entire world of the Others. It is quite logical, then, that 
when Pavlik approaches the realization of his utopia in the film’s 
finale, his master plan finds its ultimate fulfillment in the abduction 
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of his newfound brother and sister, which, in turn, leads to a hostage 
situation ending in Pavlik’s own death.
If the war trauma is to be held responsible for Pavlik’s distorted 
worldview, then the essential question arises: Why do his reactions 
so often and hauntingly mimic the attitudes of the so-called peaceful 
Muscovites? For instance, the cop who arrests Pavlik for assaulting 
a non-Slav cheerfully releases him to Iulik and assures the father, 
despite the victim’s protests, that no charges will be filed against 
Pavlik: “Your son did right. Should fuckin’ beat them. But by the 
book, right? [Syn u tebia molodets. Voobshche-to pizditʹ ikh nado. No po 
zakonu.]”
The mirroring between Pavlik and other characters in the film 
becomes especially obvious in the sequence that begins with Pavlik 
leering intently at the “suspicious” fruit vendor. Immediately 
following is the ambush organized by Egor and carried out by 
his friends, who between blows quite literally voice the same 
aggressive formulas of intolerance—“Hey, freak! Get out of here! 
We’re warning you: Don’t you ever come here again! Move out of 
here!”—that are typically used against ethnic Others, not unlike the 
fruit man in the preceding scene. At the same time, Spivakovskii’s 
physical acting during the melee somewhat imitates Boris Karloff’s 
performance as the Monster, and Pavlik’s hysterical feat of turning 
the tables, with strings of saliva dripping from his mouth onto the 
faces of his frightened and battered assailants, makes the supposed 
hero look really rather horrifying. This sequence, along with other 
scenes in Moi svodnyi brat Frankenshtein, suggests that, while the 
Krymov family and friends are appalled and alarmed by Pavlik and 
his actions, these representatives of the allegedly refined and liberal 
intelligentsia nonetheless abide by the same principle of othering, 
thereby making the “prodigal son” a true monster. If anything, they 
are only differentiated from Pavlik by their lack of consistency.
Two firm, antithetical attitudes toward Pavlik are embodied 
in the Krymovs’ children, Egor and Ania. Ania (Marianna Ilʹina) 
immediately embraces the scarred veteran as her brother, and 
everything about him that others perceive as strange and forbidding 
she finds marvelous. Even Pavlik’s phantom diamond eye occupies 
a place in her wonder-tale narrative about a brother who never 
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sleeps at night. She is not in the least afraid of Pavlik, as is evident in 
the scene where her parents frantically search for her at the railway 
station, fearing that she has been abducted by her stepbrother, but 
discover her cheerfully hopping around Pavlik and discussing 
the comparative features of different prosthetic eyes; the contrast 
between their panic and her playfulness is tremendously puissant.
Contrarily, Egor—whose name alludes to Igor, the hunchback 
and the Monster’s only friend in Son of Frankenstein (1939, dir. 
Rowland V. Lee), the second sequel to Whale’s classic, and later in 
Mel Brooks’s spoof Young Frankenstein (1974)—immediately snubs 
Pavlik as an Other. Following Dr. Astrov’s principle that “everything 
in a man should be beautiful,” which he ironically quotes during 
the film’s opening scene, the fifteen-year-old boy detests his 
disfigured, provincial, and menacing stepbrother so greatly that he 
invites his friends to watch the Frankenstein movie and make fun of 
the Monster’s real-life double. Furthermore, he lobbies his father to 
“make Pavlik go away,” and when his plea is ignored, demands that 
Pavlik be beaten, thereby, ironically, actualizing Pavlik’s paranoid 
fears. Notably, it is Egor’s perspective that is reflected in the film’s 
title, which suggests that this position is representative not for his 
character alone but for the entire future generation as well (and, 
perhaps, the viewers too).
The parents, Iulik and Rita, vacillate between these two stances 
of rejection and acceptance. Iulik, at first striving to deny Pavlik’s 
presence, gradually develops a sense of responsibility for his 
abandoned son as the film progresses. The acme of his attachment 
to the boy is hit during the scene set in the mental institution to 
which Iulik, prompted by Rita, attempts to have Pavlik admitted; 
at the last moment, he cannot bring himself to leave his son in such 
a “house of grief.” Yet Iulik’s sense of paternal duty and pity for 
Pavlik is affixed to his concurrent desire to permanently sever his 
life from that of his socially and emotionally errant child, which 
accounts for the father’s repeated abandonment of Pavlik—most 
notably in the sequence on the isolated roadside, where, without 
explanation, he hands the bewildered youth a few rubles and drives 
off. Of course, Pavlik reappears in no time at all, as the uncanny 
always does.
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A reverse trajectory marks Rita’s response to her stepson’s 
“invasion.” At the outset, Rita shows Pavlik more compassion than 
does her husband. It is she who persuades (that is, forces) Iulik to 
allow the boy into their house, she who urges Iulik to care for him. 
She becomes “maternal,” in a sense, but that maternal affection is 
challenged when she beholds the danger to her biological children, 
posed by a child who “belongs” to another woman and for whom 
she can act only as a surrogate mother. Rita’s shift from amity to fear 
is dramatically colored by her dream, in which she watches Pavlik 
tearing apart Egor’s eye. When she realizes the depth of Pavlik’s 
trauma, she herself develops a paranoid dread of him as the Other 
who can and inevitably will hurt her children.
Rita’s change of heart concerning Pavlik is noteworthy in several 
respects. First, despite the fact that the very organization of the 
Krymovs’ family (a typical post-Soviet post-intelligentsia family) 
presents a striking inversion of the patriarchal family roles, Pavlik’s 
appearance in the Krymovs’ household reinstates patriarchal 
stereotypes not only by emasculating Iulik but also by forcing Rita 
back into “maternal” and “domestic” roles: with Pavlik around, 
Rita cannot help but invest all her energy in protecting her children 
from the invader, paying only minimal and rather mechanical mind 
to running her real-estate business.
Second, while performing these traditional gender roles, Rita 
is nevertheless forced to break with the supreme value of the 
patriarchal family: a wife’s respect for and subordination to her 
husband. Her blood maternity (and blood is a hot-button issue in 
the film) masculinizes her; a threat to her own children galvanizes 
Rita into the tough head-of-household woman who commands 
her husband to eject Pavlik—again, a fascinating blend of “issuing 
orders” to the male yet being unable to act on them herself. 
Following the party scene, Rita directly and aggressively, with 
physical and verbal violence, assaults Iulik’s budding devotion to 
his newly recovered son. In the post-party spat, Rita undermines 
Iulik as a father (“You cannot protect your own family!”) and jeers at 
his social and professional failure (“Cannot write even a miserable 
article! Some great scientist!”). Iulik cannot defend himself rationally 
and employs the language of violence, hitting and shoving Rita in 
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response to her attack. Although in the next scene the heroes are 
reconciled—apparently united by something more important than 
patriarchal values—the scandalous squabble does not wane in 
significance. It illuminates that patriarchal gender roles, summoned 
by the “habitus” of war (epitomized, in turn, by Pavlik), can only 
conflict with each other, thus demonstrating the incompatibility of 
patriarchal models with the complexity of the present—indicative 
of the entire post-Soviet society as a “post-patriarchal” social 
family.
It is significant that the film’s optics largely favor Iulik and his 
family’s perception of Pavlik rather than explore and divulge Pavlik’s 
vision of the world. From the soldier’s arrival at the railway station, 
he is consistently rendered by the camera as a monstrosity—that 
is, as the Other. His forbidding visage encourages us as bystanders 
to align either with Rita’s hostility or with Iulik’s hesitance. By 
this means, the movie raises a powerful provocation: since its 
logic reveals the mirroring of Pavlik’s xenophobia in the Krymovs’ 
perception of him as Other, the ultimate effect of the film lies in 
the viewers’ recognition of the fact that we also desire to insulate 
ourselves from “my stepbrother Frankenstein,” who manifests our 
uncanny.
In keeping with Kristeva’s contention that the uncanny 
“teaches us to detect foreignness in ourselves,” Pavlik’s presence 
reveals xenophobic and paranoid attitudes toward the Other as the 
“foreignness” hidden deep inside the mind-set of the polite and 
caring intelligentsia. Veiled and inconsistent at first, this foreignness 
increasingly turns vigorous, aggravated by stressful conditions, 
until these othering predilections finally envelop not only the 
Krymovs but also us, the audience.
W h at  I s  t o  B e  D o ne?  T he  I nve r s io n  o f  Fa t he r i n g  
a n d  t he  L a n g u a ge  o f  V io l e nc e
“Pavlik says that he always knew that you’d find him,” Rita 
tells Iulik. The irony of her statement is double layered. To begin 
with, this is a neatly excavated quote from Mikhail Sholokhov’s 
Sudʹba cheloveka (and also from the film of the same title by Sergei 
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Bondarchuk). In the original, the words are spoken by the orphan 
Vaniushka when Andrei Sokolov, a Great Patriotic War veteran 
who has lost his family, identifies him as his son. In Todorovsky’s 
film, however, the line resurrects this father-war narrative only to 
subvert it: first, it is the son, not the father, who is deformed by war 
scars; and second, Iulik never searched for his son, was not even 
aware of the boy’s existence, and later argues that “according to the 
theory of probability,” the odds of his being Pavlik’s father are nil.
This “inside-outing” of the classic Soviet narrative reflects the 
inversion of father-son roles in the relationship between Pavlik 
and Iulik.6 Tellingly, Iulik and Pavlik, father and son, are bonded 
through the assonant echo of their names’ diminutive forms, which 
suggests their similarity rather than hierarchical relations of adult 
and youngster.
From the outset Iulik is depicted as a weak, or at least weakened, 
father figure. Seemingly an authoritative and caring dad, he, like 
many post-Soviet intelligentsia representatives, has irrevocably lost 
his social status during the preceding decade. A former physicist 
whose talent once augured a brilliant future, he is now virtually 
unemployed, eking out articles about great scientists of the past 
for popular magazines (“Or, for instance, Boyle Mariotte. Tell us 
about his life.” “They’re two different people.” “See, that’s already 
interesting!”). Rita, on the other hand, is a true breadwinner, and 
the Krymovs’ wealthy lifestyle relies entirely on her real-estate 
business. Though the patriarchal model of the father’s authority is 
clearly subverted, both Iulik and Rita maintain the appearance of 
its preservation. As the film critic Elena Stishova observes of Rita, 
“She is the leader, the head, the breadwinner, but she remembers 
to demonstrate her woman’s weakness, fragility, and fictitious 
dependence on what He will say and how He will behave” (2004). 
Pavlik’s unexpected arrival gives Iulik an opportunity to restore his 
authority. To the surfaced son, his father’s every word is sacred: the 
6 The same is true for some other films—such as Ivanovo detstvo (Ivan’s 
Childhood, 1962) by Andrei Tarkovsky or Koktebelʹ (2003) by Boris Khlebnikov 
and Aleksei Popogrebskii—in which the son is marked or aged by traumatic 
experience and therefore assumes the paternal function by default.
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boy admires everything about Iulik, down to his silly poems and 
his fictitious scientific discoveries—simply because he is the father.
However, it is Pavlik, despite his overengorged respect for Iulik 
as the paternal liege, who fathers Iulik; he only pretends to be the 
“obedient son,” much as Rita pretends to be the “obedient wife” 
(the mirroring effect, once again). The true nature of the father-son 
relationship becomes apparent in their first conversation, when 
Iulik tries to conceal under quasi-scientific jargon his fear of taking 
responsibility for this gruesome new addition to his family, while 
Pavlik calmly dismisses his father’s petty efforts with the simple 
reassurance, “Dad, don’t think about it, okay? Don’t worry. You 
have a lot of other things to deal with: your house, family, work. 
Everything’s fine [Vse normalʹno].” The image of Iulik dozing on 
his son’s shoulder, as Pavlik remains awake, alert, and “on guard,” 
becomes a visual hieroglyphic of the inversion they perform—this 
very image was used for the film’s poster.
Pavlik’s fatherly authority stems from the war myth, a myth 
in which war experience stands for true, transcendental knowledge 
about life. Iulik, untouched by war, can meanwhile only assume 
the role of a child, who follows the veteran’s wise leadership, 
F i g .  1 .  I u l i k  a n d  P a v l i k
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gratefully accepting his protection. According to this paradigm, it 
is Major Timur Kurbatovich—the former battlefield superior whom 
Pavlik saved from death—who fathered Pavlik during his army 
tenure. His war experience outweighs the boy’s, so he not only can 
relate to Pavlik’s traumas but also can serve as the youth’s father 
figure, which is why Iulik and Rita place such high hopes on the 
major’s influence over Pavlik. Yet according to their interests, this 
“alternative father” utterly flops: not only does he accompany 
Pavlik during his stakeout of “spooks” allegedly occupying the 
adjacent fifth-floor apartment, but in the final act, Timur gives the 
paranoid young man a pistol with two cartridges, despite having 
sensibly noted that the weapon is for war and not for “normal life.”
The failure of this surrogate, trauma-bonded father figure as 
the magnified manifestation of Pavlik’s paternalistic role ultimately 
exposes the false-bottom reality of the war myth as the basis of 
symbolic authority, especially when applied to the Chechen War 
and its veterans. In the post-Soviet mindscape, this conflict, unlike 
the mythologized Great Patriotic War, is not sanctified by victory, 
and its soldiers definitely do not match the archetype of victims 
of imperialistic aggression. Moreover, the traumatization that is 
regularly glossed over in the mythos of the Great Patriotic War is all 
too tangible in the figures of Pavlik, Timur, or any other Chechnya 
vet who appears in the film (such as the shell-shocked lieutenant 
in the mental institution). Deprived of these symbolic modifiers, 
the myth of war in Moi svodnyi brat Frankenshtein dwindles to its 
fundamental elements (as outlined by Gudkov) of xenophobia and 
the language of violence.
Pavlik is truly conversant in the language of violence. “Can you 
bash somebody’s mug in? [V mordu mozheshʹ komu-nibudʹ dvinutʹ?]” 
he asks his stepbrother genially during their first exchange. Egor, 
obviously taken aback, responds, “What for?” “Just for kicks,” 
explains Pavlik. “Whose face?” Egor asks, still confused. “Anyone’s. 
Mine, for instance.”
Especially indicative of communication through violence is the 
scene in the public bathhouse, where Iulik takes his long-lost son 
for a ritual of male bonding. At first they gab about boxing, and we 
learn that Iulik was once a champion in the sport, revealing a talent 
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of which Pavlik is especially enamored since his dislocated shoulder 
prevents him from participating in such activities. Following this 
conversation, Iulik discovers that another man, remarkably tall and 
thick, has surreptitiously appropriated their birch bunches (veniki). 
With a civil strategy of words, Iulik tries to make the thief confess 
his crime, only to be condescendingly ignored. When Pavlik enters 
the exchange, he instantly resorts to action: seizing a metal bowl, he 
unhesitatingly slams it down on the pilfering head until the stranger 
collapses. Pavlik’s violent course proves to be more effective than 
Iulik’s polite attempts at persuasion; though embarrassed by his 
son’s interference (they hurriedly depart the bathhouse), Iulik 
is undeniably impressed and influenced by Pavlik’s diatribe of 
violence.
This influence immediately manifests itself in the following 
scene, the dinner party at the Krymovs’. This is one of the crucial 
scenes in Moi svodnyi brat, largely because during this soirée, 
Pavlik, for the first and last time in the film, shares his memories 
of the war:
“Then they [spooks] ran into the village. Vasia and I chased them 
in the armored car. There were local folks there, running and 
shouting: don’t kill us, please don’t do this, what are you doing, 
we’re your own folk [my svoi]. We wiped out the whole village 
[My davai eto selo utiuzhitʹ].” 
“Who? Civilians?” 
“Who can tell one from the other? It was dark and scary. . . . We 
crushed about twenty of them with our vehicle [Shtuk dvadtsatʹ 
tochno podavili]. Vasia got a leave then. . . . And I was washing the 
blood off the wheels for three days.”
The recollection is so shocking that the Krymovs’ guests—all their 
close friends—are left speechless, despite having just before greeted 
Pavlik with standard salutations and praises habitual for the war 
myth (“We respect you very, very much,” “We are proud of you,” 
etc.). Iulik himself attempts to deploy this rhetoric, standing up 
for Pavlik to his friend Edik (Sergei Gazarov): “[He] risked his life 
for you and me, for the children.” Needless to say, this rhetoric 
is painfully inappropriate: stampeding and devastating an entire 
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village with an armored vehicle hardly corresponds to the image 
of a defender, nor to the image of a victim of aggression. Yet Edik’s 
definition of Pavlik as an “utter fascist” (zakonchennyi fashist) is no 
better, belonging to the same mythological discourse of the Patriotic 
War—if to its negative, rather than positive, verbal repertory. 
Having failed to find adequate words to defend Pavlik and his war 
experience, Iulik starts a scuffle with his best friend (“I’ll smash your 
light out!”) and then with Rita, thereby setting into action what he 
learned from his son at the bathhouse.
His education is further applied the next morning, when Iulik 
drives Pavlik away to desert him. The violence of this act is confirmed 
by Ania’s reaction to the news of it. She begins crying desperately 
when, after the safe “removal” of Pavlik, her father offers to buy 
her the puppy she has long dreamed of; Ania clearly recognizes 
a sinister intention in the bribe and intuitively refuses this procedure 
of othering, which means to equate her brother with a pet that can 
be bought at the market and thrown out at will.
The tension, however, appears to lie much deeper than 
Iulik’s personal failure to communicate with Pavlik. Pavlik’s 
monologue at the dinner bash describes an experience that cannot 
be accommodated by any binary structure at all, let alone by the 
one suggested by the war myth. In fact, his claim that one could 
not tell, in such bedlam, the difference between civilians and 
soldiers markedly erases binaries. Fear and panic fuse in Pavlik’s 
discourse with blind hatred and indifference to human life, self-
defense with bloodthirsty aggression, victimization with the seat 
of a mass murderer—this primal, hungry tar pit of dark feelings 
is the well that spouts the language of violence. What can Iulik or 
anyone else invoke to challenge its smoke and spray? The old and 
inadequate rhetoric of the Great Patriotic War? Or silence, quasi 
communication, as typified by Egor’s or Rita’s conversations with 
Pavel? It is no wonder that after failing to secure any discursive 
counterresponse to Pavlik’s violence, Iulik unconsciously learns 
from and emulates his son—thus confirming Pavlik’s role as father 
in their relationship. Especially worth noting is the attic scene, 
in which Iulik tries to convince Pavlik that the “spooks”, who he 
suspects lay hidden there, are only figments of his sick imagination. 
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Pavlik does indeed find and startle a man (who turns out to be just 
a bum), whom Iulik seizes; a fight begins, and Iulik beats the squatter 
so savagely that Pavlik has to intervene: “Stop, Dad, stop. . . . You 
really got going, Dad. [Vse, batia, vse. . . . Nu ty daeshʹ, batʹ.]”
Pavlik’s language of violence inexorably overcomes all discur-
sive attempts at rebuttal, not only because of the strength culled 
from its idolization of force but also because it is situated outside 
of any discursive field. It is completely performative and therefore 
immune to any rhetorical intercessions, oppositions, or resistance. 
Pavlik’s symbolic power, his paternal role, becomes most evident in 
the climactic passage when he abducts Egor and Ania and, through 
this act, establishes total control over Iulik and Rita as well. The 
orchestration and outcome of his hostage takeover compellingly 
invoke media and cinematic representations of terrorism. Although 
Pavlik, by his actions, demonstrates his unwavering care for his 
new family and his genuine desire to harbor them from the dangers 
of the world—crucial duties of the patriarchal father figure—such 
authority based on the logic of war can be nothing but an act 
of terror.
Furthermore, Pavlik’s policy of violent communication not only 
fails to protect “his own” but instead produces Others, engenders 
enemies, and thereby transforms phantoms of posttraumatic stress 
into deadly corporealities: almost immediately after locking himself 
and the Krymovs in their dacha, Pavlik finds himself surrounded 
by the police, whom he takes for the “spooks.” Spooks or no spooks, 
their determination to eliminate the deranged captor places them 
in a position from which they might easily hurt the Krymovs—that 
is, they literally threaten Pavlik with his own nightmare. When 
Rita screams in desperation to the police, “Don’t shoot! There are 
children here!” Pavlik responds, “Kids or no kids—they don’t care 
[dlia nikh tut detei net], like I didn’t back then. Period.” This judgment 
is not as senseless as it may seem, because Pavlik “back then” (i.e., 
in Chechnya) and the police “here” are both doing the same “job”—
“fighting terrorism.”
This dearth of effective dialogue via the language of violence, 
justified by the myth of war, underlines a profound problem in 
contemporary Russian culture: the crises of the liberal intelligentsia 
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who tried but ultimately failed to develop enlightened discourses 
of modernization that were opposed both to the Soviet rhetoric of 
power and to the post-Soviet performances of bloodshed. Boris 
Dubin describes this miscarriage as derivative of the post-Soviet 
intelligentsia’s “distancing from the present, conservation of cultural 
models, and the adoption of xenophobia as a defense mechanism. [. . .] 
Today’s Russian intelligentsia and its representatives, who pretend 
to leading positions, merely react to the situation, which they have 
no control of and no effect on, as it were” (Dubin 2001, 338). Lack 
of touch with the present, the sense of the intelligentsia’s isolation, 
in Dubin’s opinion, is behind a purely negative identification 
of post-Soviet intelligentsia: not unlike other social groups, the 
intelligentsia “identifies itself through negation and becomes 
consolidated around ‘the image of the enemy.’ Its own incapacity 
for self-realization, its suspiciousness and aggressiveness are 
projected onto the interpretation of the enemy and extrapolated to 
its imaginary constructed figure” (339).
This sociocultural collapse of the intelligentsia is exposed by 
Iulik’s failure as a father figure: he is symbolically bankrupt, and 
Pavlik and his war-sanctioned language of violence only make 
this bankruptcy agonizingly transparent. From this perspective, 
it becomes clear why Todorovsky’s film does not really promote 
the parallel between Iulik and Dr. Frankenstein, who of course, in 
Shelley’s novel is responsible for the purposeful and knowing creation 
of the Monster. Paradoxically, Iulik bears responsibility because 
he does not know and, moreover, does not want to know about the 
existence of Pavlik, and therefore tries to insulate himself and his 
family from Pavlik’s barbaric and demented world. In doing so, 
Iulik subjects Pavlik to the same procedures of othering and enemy-
production that normally appall him, as they do other liberal post-
Soviet intellectuals of his ilk.
After the Krymovs escape from the surrounded house, Pavlik 
vanishes; though it is implied that the police kill him, we do not see 
him die, nor is his body presented to the viewers. The anticlimactic 
nature of the finale is further underscored by the complete lack 
of any dialogue between the surviving family members or with 
the police. The silence—the muting of discourse by white noise—
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signifies a repeated cycle of repression of the uncanny, which would 
best be forgotten along with the traumas that produced it. The film 
ends on a long and high shot of the police force congratulating 
themselves and then of Iulik embracing his family. The image 
expresses yet another stifling of the uncanny. If one invokes, 
once more, Kristeva’s observation that the uncanny kindles the 
knowledge “that we are foreigners to ourselves, and it is with the 
help of that sole support that we can attempt to live with others” 
(1991, 170), then this tender, seemingly peace-restorative embrace 
signifies quite the opposite: the revealed and repressed vision of 
mutual foreignness among the members of the nuclear family unit. 
By extension this image can be interpreted as a powerful metaphor 
of a social family, the post-Soviet society, that tries desperately to 
deny its own unconscious, its Otherness, thus choosing repression 
over any forms of negotiation. Only the faint sound of military 
drums is perceptible in the background during this closing scene, 
and its beat provides a powerful herald of the uncanny that has just 
reared its perversely familiar mug, only to be once again wrestled 
into the darkness of nonrecognition.
The Soviet myth of the Great Patriotic War that was adopted 
by the post-Soviet rhetoric of national identity exemplifies the 
repression of the historical experience of terror as the source of the 
societal uncanny. However, it must be underscored that it is the 
son (a representative of the future generation, albeit in the paternal 
role) and not the father (normally representative of the past) 
who embodies the uncanny in Todorovsky’s film. This inversion 
suggests that not only the past but also the present and, moreover, 
the future are persistently repressed in the contemporary Russian 
mindscape. Thus, under the analytic eye of the film’s authors, the 
“stabilization” of the 2000s reveals its cultural fabric’s ticking bombs 
that will explode in the next decade—the 2010s.
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a  r o a D  o f  V i o l e n C e :  
M y  J o y  b y  s e r g e i  l o z n i t s a
After the Russian Ministry of Culture refused to finance the famed 
documentary director Sergei Loznitsa’s (b. 1964) debut feature film, 
it was realized under the coproduction of Germany, the Netherlands, 
and Ukraine. Schastʹe moe (My Joy, 2010) went on to receive the 
Best Director Prize and the award of the Film Critics’ Guild at 
the Kinotavr festival in Sochi and became the first-ever Ukrainian 
competitor in the Cannes festival program. Based on Loznitsa’s 
original script and filmed by Oleg Mutu, who shot Palme d’Or-
winner 4 Months, 3 Weeks and 2 Days (2007), among other headliners 
of the Romanian New Wave, Schastʹe moe was exuberantly praised 
for its sophisticated cinematic texture in the New York Times and 
other Western media.
In Russia, the film predictably caused a rift in opinions: some 
placed it among the supreme achievements of the new Russian 
cinema for its attention to the dark underside of the post-Soviet 
world (see Gulin 2011, Dolin 2010, Gusev 2011), while others 
like Karen Shakhnazarov, head of Mosfilm and chair of the 2010 
Kinotavr jury, have defined it as an openly anti-Russian film and 
summarized its message as “everyone living in Russia should be 
shot” (nado perestreliatʹ vsekh zhivushchikh v Rossii; Liashchenko 2011). 
Shakhnazarov’s indignation was seconded by Elena Iampolʹskaia, 
editor in chief of the newspaper Kulʹtura and a vehement adversary 
of all that does not fit the present iteration of the Orthodoxy-
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autocracy-folksiness triumvirate. She has accused Loznitsa of no 
less than political treason: “Considering the fact that the film is 
sponsored predominantly by Germans, it is amazingly harmonious. 
For the complete picture, Loznitsa would have to be delivered to the 
Moscow premiere of his film by a sealed train coach. Unfortunately, 
there will be no Moscow premiere” (Iampolʹskaia).
The film follows a truck driver called Georgy (Viktor Nemets) 
and his passage through a provincial territory (the film was shot 
in the Chernigov region of Ukraine), during which he encounters 
different, but predominantly vile, locals. First come corrupt road 
cops and an old man (Vladimir Golovin) who has lived in hiding 
since 1945 (his story constitutes the first World War II flashback in 
the movie); then an underage prostitute, whom the driver tries to 
help but is rebuffed with hostility; and finally village goons, who 
set sights on Georgy’s cargo, clunk him over the head with a log, 
and leave empty-handed when they find the truck to be loaded 
with flour.
After a second World War II flashback, defined by the director 
as the film’s turning point, “the film’s structure changes: in the 
film’s first half we have one day and the corresponding temporality. 
In the second half, the time moves with a different pace—we have 
fragments with long intervals between them” (Shakina 2010). In 
the second part of the movie, a different Georgy emerges: bearded, 
mute, and probably amnesic, he is hardly recognizable and has taken 
up residence with a Roma woman and her son. A substantial period 
of time seems to have elapsed since his traumatic confrontation 
with the thugs, as the setting has shifted from summertime to cold, 
gray winter. Tellingly, the direction of motion has changed as well: 
where in the first part the camera replicated Georgy’s gaze, with the 
world unfolding in front of him, in the second part either his eyes 
are closed or he is driven with his back turned to the road ahead. 
Eventually, his trajectory comes full circle in his return to one of the 
opening locations—the roadside police station.
In the second part, the Roma woman uses Georgy’s senseless 
body for sex and loots his flour to sell at the market. Eventually, 
pressed by police, she sells his truck and disappears, abandoning 
him without company or property. Arrested at the market and then 
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left to freeze by the road, Georgy is rescued by the old man from the 
first World War II flashback—the one he met at the film’s beginning. 
In the next scene two soldiers, trying in vain to deliver a serviceman’s 
corpse to his mother, stumble on the old man’s reclusive hut 
somewhere deep in the woods. The ensuing conversation between 
the old man and one courier is a fandango of misunderstanding: 
the soldier asks whether the hermit will sign papers confirming that 
the dead body was delivered to its destination, while the old man 
apparently thinks that they have come to arrest him for the murder 
he committed in 1945. Georgy arrives to find his host covered in 
blood, dead, with a pistol in his hands. He takes the gun and goes 
to the highway, where he stops a truck and hitches a ride to the 
police station featured in the beginning of the movie. There, cops 
are beating a cuffed driver—a police major from Moscow who 
refused to cope with their harassment. Dragged to the station as 
a supposed witness of the victim’s “resistance to authorities,” 
Georgy shoots first the cops, then the major and his wife, and 
finally the truck driver who also witnesses this scene. This done, he 
vanishes into the dark.
This rough plot summary certainly falls short of justice to 
the film’s complicated narrative design, which, as I will try to 
demonstrate, is essential to an adequate understanding of Schastʹe 
moe. Even on a superficial level, the film’s plot resonates with the 
New Drama. In our book Performing Violence: Literary and Theatrical 
Experiments of New Russian Drama (2009), Birgit Beumers and 
I argued that the central discovery of New Drama is associated 
with the focus on various forms of social violence that in the post-
Soviet period assumed the role of a social metalanguage, which 
has gradually replaced all other, insufficient and disintegrated 
languages inherited from the Soviet period.
Schastʹe moe is shot in a quasi-documentary manner—an aspect 
resonating with New Drama’s interest in verbatim and theatrical 
“nonfiction.” This effect in Loznitsa’s film is emphasized by 
numerous nonprofessional extras. (Especially impressive in this 
respect is the scene at the village marketplace where Georgy, in the 
New York Times reviewer’s words, is “almost engulfed in a sea of 
coarse faces and bodies” [Dargis 2011].) The film overwhelms the 
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viewer with various languages of everyday violence: obscenities spat 
zealously by thugs, old ladies, and youngsters; ubiquitous criminal 
songs (shanson) reproducing the prison subculture as normative; 
and, of course, incessant beatings and rapes (both figurative and 
literal), constituting “communication” both between authorities 
(cops) and the public and among ordinary people. Notably, the 
film begins with an “epigraph” in which the half-naked body of 
a man in a penitentiary uniform is lugged by two other inmates 
into a pit and then smothered with cement: references to Andrei 
Platonov’s Kotlovan (The Foundation Pit) aside, the normalized 
prison-style violence appears as the cemented foundation of the 
current condition (no pun intended). No wonder Georgy’s journey 
commences at the site of the first, “foundational,” murder.
Thus, one might perceive Schastʹe moe as a cinematic version 
of the Bildungsroman, in the course of which Georgy is instructed 
in the language of violence, with each episode of the film a lesson. 
Bakhtin argued in his analysis of the Bildungsroman that this 
genre, while situating at the center stage the figure of the changing, 
“becoming” person, at the same time radically departs from the 
cyclical representation of time that was typical for the premodern 
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depiction of human growth and transformation (see Bakhtin 1996). 
Contrarily, Loznitsa in his filmic gauntlet paradoxically adjoins the 
logic of the Bildingsroman with the emphatically circular model of 
time. One might even argue that time becomes cyclical as a result of 
the protagonist’s successful education in the school of violence.
The accumulation of violence logically culminates in the 
catastrophic finale, when Georgy indiscriminately kills both 
sadistic cops and their victims. This scene can be read as the ironic 
result of Georgy’s “education” in the process of his journey: if in the 
beginning he appears as a friendly and generous person, who avoids 
obscenities, lends a hand to underage prostitutes (tries to, at least), 
and trusts cunning thugs, in the second part we see a broken old 
man, a former subject, stripped of his memory, identity, and speech 
by a devastatingly intimate encounter with normalized brutality. 
The reformed Georgy can express his agency and his relationships 
to others only through violence. For the protagonist crippled by 
savagery and simultaneously infused with it, the climactic massacre 
stands both for his protest against the cops’ terror and his solidarity 
with its victims. In the director’s words, “I intentionally supercharge 
the situation in order to reach the finale with a very simple message: 
the society designed in such way is doomed to self-destruction” 
(Shakina 2010).
Obviously, for Loznitsa, much like for New Drama authors, 
violence serves as the basis of social fabrics, thus weaving 
a metalanguage. Yet, it seems, Loznitsa finds that this metalanguage 
isolates rather than connects, oppresses rather than expresses, thus 
becoming an antilanguage. It is noteworthy that after the life-changing 
assault of the thugs, Georgy becomes silent for the rest of the film, 
and more noteworthy that he is not alone in his silence: another 
mute victim of social violence is one of the thugs, who apparently 
lost his speech in childhood when his father was killed—this scene 
constitutes the content of the second World War II flashback. This 
commonality is quite significant as it reveals the aspect of Schastʹe 
moe that places the film beyond the context of New Drama.
According to the New Drama playwrights, the elevation of 
violence as the universal metalanguage results from the collapse of 
Soviet metanarratives and social norms. In other words, for them 
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the language of violence belongs exclusively to the post-Soviet 
domain, articulating both the cause and the effect of the historical 
trauma wreaked in the downfall of the Soviet social order. On the 
contrary, Loznitsa does not confirm the ascension of violence to the 
status of all-purpose metalanguage (or antilanguage); he inserts into 
his narrative two historical episodes that present the contemporary 
normalization of violence as a direct outcome of the entire Soviet 
experience. For him, social communication through violence is 
not a post-Soviet phenomenon but the product of Soviet history, 
concealed behind Soviet ideological myths and exposed when these 
screens collapsed.
The first of such episodes is inserted just after Georgy’s opening 
encounter with corrupt traffic cops. An old man, appearing in his 
cab from nowhere (and afterwards vanishing into thin air), tells the 
driver about an experience that has changed his life: when he, as 
a young lieutenant, was returning from Germany in 1945, a military 
patrol officer cunningly robbed him of his modest “trophies,” 
consisting of a red dress for his bride and a Leika photo camera for 
his future career. In response, the lieutenant shot the officer and fled 
from the world, socially died off, forgetting his name and living since 
then as a ghost. At first sight, this scene only superficially connects 
to the present, with the greedy patrol officer in 1945 prototyping 
today’s dirty cops—much like him, they are eager to shake down 
passing drivers, taking anything from money to sex and never 
hesitating to use violence to make their request irrefutable.
On the other hand, this ghoulish raconteur, in the greater 
scope of the film, appears as the embodiment of an important, 
and costly, life strategy: one may resist social violence by violent 
means at the expense of one’s personal identity. Paradoxically, in 
the realm of normalized violence, personal dignity can be defended 
only on the basis of personal anonymity. Furthermore, Loznitsa 
himself interprets this ominous encounter as foreshadowing the 
protagonist’s future: Georgy, too, will lose his name and identity. 
However, in comparison with “reformed Georgy” as he appears 
in the second half of the film, the old veteran looks every bit the 
winner: until his very end, he remains in control of any given 
situation and maintains his humanity. And it is he, we remember, 
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who saves helpless Georgy when all others either cynically abuse or 
ferociously shun him.
Yet even the composed hermit is eventually subsumed in the 
swell of violent death. The uncertainty surrounding his demise—
it remains unclear whether he slew himself or was killed by the 
soldiers—is essential to the presented vision of history. In the second 
half of the movie, the filmic time not only becomes fragmented 
but also begins to incorporate surreal elements. First, a lieutenant, 
one of the two officers accompanying the soldier’s corpse, sights 
a hangman on a tall tree in the woods—apparently a hallucination, 
as his subordinate can spot nothing of the like. Later, the lieutenant falls 
into delirium and recognizes the executioner in the old man. Even 
earlier in the movie, a wizened wanderer appears and maniacally 
assails the military truck with a stick, mumbling that he had “killed 
them all,” “put all those bitches in one grave,” and “fulfilled the 
general’s order.” Both the hangman and the meandering madman 
can be read as projections or spectral “flash-forwards” of Georgy 
beyond his shooting spree. Obviously, this interpretation presumes 
the temporal confusion of cause and effect, of events preceding 
and following the action, which becomes an important attribute of 
Loznitsa’s vision of history.
At the same time, these corporeal vagaries also function as ghosts 
of the past, who, in accordance with Etkind’s concept of magical 
historicism, manifest the unrecognized and repressed traumas of 
history. Loznitsa represents the scars of normalized violence not 
by references to the Great Terror but through imagery of the Great 
Patriotic War, which is much more radical, since this war has been 
glorified in late-Soviet and post-Soviet culture as the golden age of 
valor and the crowning heroic achievement in all of Russian history. 
In Loznitsa’s understanding (also informing his 2013 film V tumane 
[In the Fog], based on Vasilʹ Bykov’s novella), this very glorification 
solidifies and obfuscates the normalization of violence.
Through this lens, we can see why the old veteran confuses 
contemporary soldiers with agents of the state terror seeking to 
arraign him for a murder that happened sixty-five years ago. He 
mistakes them for ghosts of the past, and every eerie atom of the 
movie’s atmosphere justifies his mistake. Furthermore, his error 
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is absolutely logical, as it follows both from his own phantasmal 
being and from the ghost-like condition into which Georgy is thrust 
by present-day violence. Yet the inevitability of his misperception 
undermines the old man’s strategic defense of his dignity by the 
sacrifice of his identity. He might have succeeded if his ghostly 
existence were exceptional, but it is not. In the surreal historical 
time, when the traumatic past melds with the equally traumatic 
present and when cause and effect are indistinguishably fused, 
everyday violence normally turns people into ghosts; the old man’s 
position, then, is both vulnerable and unstable.
The status of the aged lieutenant is counterweighted by the 
equally, if not more, vulnerable position of the teacher in the second 
World War II flashback, which, as mentioned above, Loznitsa 
considers to be the crux of the filmic narrative. In this sequence, two 
retreating soldiers find shelter at the house of a teacher and his son. 
The teacher feeds them and invites them to spend the night under 
his roof. During the dinner, he admits that he works as an educator 
under the Germans, as he worked under the Soviets, and that he 
does not view the Soviet regime as preferable to German occupa-
tion, calling Germany a “civilized nation” (tsivilizovannaia natsiia). 
Most importantly, the teacher proclaims, “I can’t teach killing. 
I can teach love only.” His guests receive this confession as proof of 
his treason. In the morning they drag the sleeping teacher from the 
bed that he shares with his little son to a shed where they execute 
him. Then they rob the house and depart, leaving a scared child in 
a white nightshirt standing alone on the steps in silence.
This episode can be traced directly to the film’s present-day 
characters: the traumatized child, we may guess, will become the 
mute thug in the gang that sticks up and log-wallops Georgy, which 
feeds into his consecutive connection with the mauled and muted 
truck driver. Moreover, the creed of the teacher appears to be the 
most radical response to the normalization of violence as presented 
in Schastʹe moe: he chooses love over carnage, and by this dooms 
himself to ineludible victimization. The Christian overtones of his 
stance are obvious (the Teacher). However, this parallel has been 
overlooked by the most rabidly Orthodox critics, probably blinded 
by the teacher’s reference to Germans as a “civilized nation.” For 
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example, the aforementioned Elena Iampolʹskaia writes about this 
episode, “A treacherous pacifist does not cease being a traitor. In 
general, to maintain that paralyzed pacifism is better than crazed 
aggression is the same as to declare the advantages of an impotent 
before a sexual maniac. The impotent is harmless, but he is also 
deprived of any perspective” (2011). The critic obviously fails the 
test that Loznitsa proctors with his film: commendation of German 
society implies a direct reference to innumerable Soviet films and 
books where such approval served as an unquestionable warrant 
for one’s denunciation as a traitor, deserving a violent or lethal 
penalty. Those viewers whose reaction to the teacher’s Nazi praise 
in Schastʹe is dictated by a cultural reflex are intangibly swallowed 
into the domain of the film, becoming accomplices to the murder of 
the peaceable Teacher.
Loznitsa seems to maintain here that if you are prepared to 
justify the killing of a peaceful person because his principles do 
not match the Soviet stereotype of an agreeable character, then 
you too are implicated in the normalization of violence, in the past 
and present alike. In one interview, the director offers a similar 
interpretation of this episode:
When in the film we see such a situation [the episode with the 
teacher and soldiers], according to the laws of the genre we feel 
the need to identify with either this side or the opposite, although 
this is not necessary. In the process of watching, we are forced to 
switch sides, leaving the side of the hospitable host and taking the 
other—the side of people who are offended by their compatriot’s 
holding out for the enemy. We always identify with “ours.” [. . .] 
When the viewer is watching this scene, it works as a lance that 
separates the human features from those inserted into our heads 
by the ideology. The side of the soldiers—criminals, murderers—
can’t be accepted, but the camera mercilessly places the viewer 
into their position. The camera could have been located elsewhere, 
but it adopts their perspective, and this is why this episode is so 
provocative. (Tuula 2011)
This artistic provocation emphasizes the theme of culpability 
for violence that permeates the entire composition of Schastʹe moe. 
Between two radical responses to societal violence, as represented 
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by the unrepentant old man and the pacifist teacher, Loznitsa erects 
several variations on the theme of noninterference—observing 
without acting in situations in which others are violated—as a means 
of self-protection. As the filmmaker stresses in the same interview, 
“‘Do not interfere’—it’s not just a defense, it’s a contemporary 
ideology, a widespread concept of the world order” (Shakina 
2010). However, the film’s dialogic structure fledges full motivic 
correlations between the similar episodes in the first and second 
halves of the movie. These linkages serve a methodical undermining 
of faith in the protective power of noninterference. Basically, the 
scenes of the first part deliver the “lessons” of noninterference, 
while those of the second part ironically subvert these lessons by 
mirroring the tutorial scenario and twisting the “didactic” message 
into its opposite.
In the film’s beginning, Georgy takes his documents and leaves 
the police station unnoticed. Yet in the final episode, the police 
major, buoyed by his rank, tries to do the same and falls victim 
to his colleagues’ wrath. In the first part Georgy gets a hands-on 
education in noninterference from the underage prostitute who is 
appalled by his attempt to help her. But in the second half of the 
movie, he himself becomes essentially a prostitute for his hostess. 
This dialogic pattern is represented in the most concentrated form 
in the final sequence, which begins with the truck driver from 
whom Georgy hitches a ride preaching about the imperative of 
noninterference and ends with the same driver’s desperate attempt 
to aid the shackled major, his scuffle with cops, and his death from 
Georgy’s bullet.
Loznitsa obviously abhors didacticism as another, intellectual, 
form of violence. This is why a carefully balanced construction of 
the filmic narrative in Schastʹe moe (small surprise that Loznitsa is 
a mathematician by training) is emphatically antididactic. As one 
can see, it intentionally undercuts any attempt to distill a focused 
moral lesson from the film, to erect a binary opposition of any kind. 
At the same time, the film’s structure functions as a circular story 
arc, in which the execution of the teacher echoes through the murder 
of a prisoner in the movie’s epigraph—which may also be read as 
a possible portent of Georgy’s future. From this perspective, even the 
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enigmatic episode at the beginning of the film, depicting Georgy’s 
departure on his fateful journey while his wife (we assume) appears 
to be in mourning and oblivious to his presence, could be interpreted 
as retroactive proof of his ghostliness.
Thus, the road transforms into a circuital stream of historical-
cum-everyday violence. Through the Soviet past and post-
Soviet present, this cyclical movement envelops “lessons” of 
noninterference and their demonstrative deconstructions. From 
this standpoint, Schastʹe moe could be viewed as a reproduction of 
a typical New Drama discourse on violence, yet on a metalevel, as 
a self-mythologizing and self-reflexive narrative.
However, what ultimately contradicts this notion is the fact that 
Loznitsa does not explicitly show the circularity of the narrative. 
Why does he prefer presenting it only potentially, through the film’s 
structure? He could have easily returned at the end to the prelude, 
having us recognize Georgy in a poor prisoner’s body. In so doing, 
he would have openly validated his narrative as a myth unifying 
Soviet and post-Soviet violence. However, he chose a different strat-
egy. In my view, this comes about precisely because Schastʹe moe not 
only tenders a concentrated edition of New Drama but also aspires 
to transcend its limits and its symbolic tautologies, achieving this 
by a structural rather than representational effect of the narrative.
While inspiring the sensation of a self-repetitive and self- 
reflexive cyclical motion without expressly depicting it, the movie 
attempts to unleash this whirlwind of social self-destruction into 
the viewer’s imagination. If such an effect is indeed achieved by 
Schastʹe moe, it would inevitably engender the viewer’s acute 
emotional yearning to depart from this circular road movie and 
to seek alternatives to the life force founded on violence and 
feeding on noninterference into others’ violent business. This 
emotional outcome, it seems, is more important to Loznitsa than 
a straightforward mythologization of violence.
230
i n  D e n i a l :  t h e  g e o g r a P h e r  D r a n k  h i s  g L o b e  away 
b y  a l e k s a n D r  V e l e D i n s k y *
Before 2013, Aleksandr Veledinsky (b. 1959) was best known for his 
films Russkoe (The Russian, 2004) and Zhivoi (Alive, 2006), and for his 
scriptwriter credit on the famed miniseries Brigada (2002, dir. Aleksei 
Sidorov). His 2013 work Geograf globus propil (The Geographer Drank 
His Globe Away) superseded the success of all his previous projects: 
the film not only won the Grand Prix at the Kinotavr film festival 
(additional awards included Best Actor and Best Music) but also 
generated laudatory, almost ecstatic responses among viewers and 
the majority of critics. While audiences raved over the rehabilitation 
of the intelligentsia and the arrival of a “normal” and “humane” 
movie “about us,” critics declared Geograf the best film of the year, 
ranking Konstantin Khabenskii’s leading performance among the 
peak achievements of his career. Since its release in November 
2013, the movie grossed $4 million (with an overall budget of $2.5 
million) and half a million viewers in Russian theaters alone, figures 
that testify to the profound resonance that Geograf struck with the 
educated public’s cultural expectations.
The film is based on Aleksei Ivanov’s 1995 novel and is set 
(and was shot) in Permʹ, a city that in preceding years became the 
petri dish for a massive experiment in radical cultural innovation. 
Faint reminders of the short-lived cultural renaissance tumble 
* Coauthored with Tatiana Mikhailova.
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raspily through Geograf, but only a scant few: namely, the slogan 
“Happiness isn’t behind the mountains” (an art object by Boris 
Matrosov), the job affiliation of one of the characters, and the album 
of contemporary art in Permʹ that the hero receives as a birthday 
gift. The scarcity of these echoes is not overly confounding—first, 
because the novel was written prior to these events, though the 
screenwriters decided to situate the story in present-day Permʹ 
rather than the 1990s. Second, and more significantly, despite the 
designation of protagonist Viktor Sluzhkin (Khabenskii), a former 
biologist and current teacher of geography in an ordinary high 
school, as a modern intelligent, his actual interests are limited to 
alcohol, friends, and, of course, tourism—more specifically, rafting 
the perilous rivers of the Urals. Cultural novelties and politics 
are altogether nonexistent for him. At the same time, his constant 
drinking and meager salary (in the beginning of the film, he 
pretends to be deaf in order not to pay the train fare) do not impede 
his status as a man-star, attractive to many women, excepting his 
wife Nadia (Elena Liadova), who feels disheartened by the poverties 
of their life.
Sluzhkin’s profile quickly reminded critics of such films 
from the late-Soviet era as Roman Balaian’s Polety vo sne i naiavu 
(Flights in Dreams and Reality, 1982) and Vitalii Melʹnikov’s Otpusk 
v sentiabre (Vacation in September, 1979, released in 1987; based on 
Aleksandr Vampilov’s Utinaia okhota [The Duck Hunt]). Veledinsky 
directly alludes to Balaian’s film through paraphrases of its 
memorable scenes: Sluzhkin’s teetering on a children’s swing and 
his “disappearance” from the balcony in the finale recall Makarov 
(Oleg Iankovskii) swinging on the tarzanka (a primitive bungee-
jumping rope), ending in his faked death and disappearance. 
Another important point of reference for Geograf is American Beauty: 
a recurring photograph of a sinking love letter distinctly reminds 
of the flying plastic bag in Sam Mendes’s film. This reference is 
especially meaningful since Sluzhkin’s story is also one of love 
toward a teenage girl. The arc of his romance ends in similar waters 
as Lester Burnham’s in Beauty: Sluzhkin does not seize the chance 
to have sex with his beautiful student Masha Bolʹshakova (Anfisa 
Chernykh), though he plainly is in love with her, and though the girl 
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eagerly offers herself to him. These references cement the context in 
which the authors situate their film.
However, in a seeming contradiction to this system of 
coordinates, Aleksei Ivanov has insisted on a parallel between 
Sluzhkin and Dostoevsky’s Prince Myshkin. As the novelist said in 
an interview,
He [Sluzhkin] is ideal, but not in the sense of “the best” or “flaw-
less.” He lives according to an ideal. Sluzhkin as a culturological 
type—this is a type of the harmonious man, which harks back 
not to “superficial men” of Russian literature (Zilov from Utinaia 
okhota, Makarov from Polety vo sne i naiavu), but to Prince Myshkin. 
As a teacher, he is a complete failure. But he is a true human being, 
he teaches not through pedagogical techniques, but through his 
own existence in given circumstances. He is confused neither in 
his relationships with women, nor in life in general. He clearly 
knows what is good and what is bad. He won’t be reaching his 
goal by walking on human heads, he won’t betray, and won’t be 
arrogant about his morals, because pride is a mortal sin. He is not 
an alcoholic, he drinks when he has to do something improper, 
perform a small everyday betrayal that would improve his life. 
When drinking, he replaces this meanness by misbehavior, 
without reproaching others by his righteousness. (Kulʹchitskii 
2013)
Frankly, this interpretation produces more questions than 
answers. First of all, what is that ideal according to which Sluzhkin 
lives? In one of the film’s scenes, he explicitly describes his position 
as that of a secular saint who wants to depend on no one and wants 
no one to depend on him, while preserving love for everyone. 
However, in the film (as well as in the novel) this profession is 
ironically corroborated by an immediately ensuing cheerful tryst 
with his former classmate Vetka (Anna Ukolova), who remains 
pleased by Sluzhkin’s sexual virility but more so amazed by his 
rejection of personal pleasure. More seriously, his moral bearing can 
be seen in his nonobjection to his wife’s affair with his best friend 
Budkin (Aleksandr Robak); yet as another character suggests, this 
might be also read as Sluzhkin’s strutting of his “moral superiority” 
over both adulterers—coupled, we might add, with his reluctance 
to provide for the family. From a practical standpoint, Sluzhkin’s 
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principle means that he feels liberated from any responsibilities to 
his wife and daughter and would readily leave Nadia to her own 
devices if her needs brought too much pressure on his freedom. If 
he is a saint, then he has managed to elevate cynicism to the state of 
sainthood; this, to be sure, is a seminal achievement.
As to alcohol, Ivanov’s description is best illustrated by a scene 
in which Sluzhkin drinks himself into oblivion and passes out in 
a bathtub when he could be sleeping with his beautiful colleague 
Kira (Evgeniia Brik), seductively and cynically offering herself to 
him. A pattern seems to emerge: Sluzhkin also opts for liquor over 
Vetka’s invitation to spend the night at her place after his birthday 
party, although this sacrifice is somewhat devalued by their later 
sex in the scene described above.
Diverging from Ivanov, the film director suggests a different 
pedigree for Sluzhkin:
We thought a lot about classical characters closest to our Sluzhkin. 
We recalled Oblomov, Prince Myshkin—“the idiot.” Shukshin’s 
“oddballs,” Vampilov’s characters, Balaian’s film. [. . .] We 
decided that he has to be a jester [shut gorokhovyi], the holy fool 
who through his misbehavior exposes to us our sins. He is like 
a mirror reflecting our society—this is probably why those who 
watched the movie liked him so much. (Kichin 2013)
This appraisal (also supported by Dmitry Bykov) invites the concept 
of the trickster, which appears even more relevant for today’s 
cultural climate (as discussed earlier in the case of Pussy Riot).
However, the practical application of this approach to Sluzhkin 
is disappointing at best. Admittedly, just about everyone around 
him acts as a seasoned cynic: even tender Sashenʹka (Evgeniia 
Kregzhde), a kindergarten instructor who spends all her time at 
the gym, instantly metamorphoses from nymph into merciless 
boss in conversation with her subordinate, exhibiting a cynical 
multiplicity of personae. Even an unnamed schoolgirl articulates 
her first impression of the new geographer with a simple “I’d blow 
him.” Sluzhkin blends effortlessly into this milieu with his constant 
drinking, card playing with students, and instructorship in a subject 
about which he knows nothing—“teaching” by dictations from 
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a textbook. However, his eccentricities are so mild and unmemor-
able that they can hardly qualify as those of a trickster: his supposed 
holy foolishness is indistinguishable from the other characters’ 
cynicism.
Imbibing with his unruly student Gradusov (Andrei Prytkov) 
and afterward improvising rap bars instead of guiding the class 
during the first leg of their field trip on the river, is probably the 
sole episode that might merit the trickster seal. This scene (minus 
the rapping) also appears in the novel but carries there a tactical 
meaning that is lost in the film. Ivanov’s Sluzhkin develops 
a particular pedagogical program manifested most clearly during 
the river excursion: he eschews his own authority as teacher and 
intentionally unseats himself from the position of power—what 
better method of self-sabotage is there than getting sloshed at the 
start of their journey, compelling his students to usurp him? He 
wants to teach his pupils to act as free, and therefore self-sufficient, 
persons, and while placing utter responsibility for the expedition 
and their survival onto them, he tactfully aids his kids when a lack 
of knowledge or practical skills arises. This strategy proves to be 
soaringly effective, up to and through the novel’s climax, when the 
students, without Sluzhkin, manage to traverse a dangerous batch 
of rapids. Dmitry Bykov accurately described Sluzhkin’s method: 
“This is a cruel but effective technique—just to place them [the 
students] into a situation when they will have to decide. When 
they have one choice only: either to cross the rapid, or to stay in the 
woods and die. He does not have to be a lonely hero anymore—
now his students have to make a heroic effort” (Bykov 2013).
However, Bykov unwittingly mixes up the novelistic and filmic 
representations of the drunkard-geographer. His words match 
Ivanov’s rendition of Sluzhkin, who primes the students’ success 
by his honest, though not didactic, communication with “fathers” 
(as he calls his students) throughout the entire narrative. This is not 
true of Veledinsky’s Sluzhkin, whose pedagogical program remains 
completely imperceptible in the movie. Everything that transpires 
between Sluzhkin and his pupils in the film happens by accident, 
and his communication with them is reduced to muted lectures 
and angry, yet banal, philippics. Even the students’ final triumph 
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is prepared by a lecture (also muted) about this particular rapid and 
the ways to cross it. In other words, the cinematic Sluzhkin, unlike 
his literary counterpart, remains within a conventional teacher-
student paradigm; the driving theme of the novel is obfuscated in 
adaptation, lost in transmediation.
Tellingly, while endorsing the analysis of Sluzhkin as a secular 
saint, Ivanov did not participate in sculpting the script, which was 
coauthored by Veledinsky, Rauf Kubaev, and Valery Todorovsky 
(also one of the film’s producers). Probably, the writer reinterpreted 
his own novel (after all, it was written about twenty years ago), but 
having reread the book recently, we cannot help noticing some other 
significant differences between characterizations of the protagonist 
on the screen versus on the page.
The novel endows Sluzhkin with far greater complexity than 
Veledinsky’s film does. On the one hand, it does not hide his 
irresponsible infantilism. He drinks with his favorite students, 
and while being drunk, he breaks his leg sliding down a snow 
hill. His pedagogical repertoire includes repeat beatings of the 
most obnoxious students—in the film we see only Sluzhkin’s very 
moderate (and justified!) physical reprimand of the unruly student 
Gradusov. His flirtation with Masha is not limited to a tender yet 
restrained embrace as in the movie but also involves sticking his 
hands under her jeans, groping, and so on. Furthermore, his risky 
behavior during the river trip results in a number of life-threatening 
situations that befall his wards, including confrontations with 
inebriated locals.
On the other hand, the harbors of Sluzhkin’s sensitivity and 
artistry are deeply plumbed in the novel. Unlike his Khabenskii-
helmed on-screen embodiment, in Ivanov’s vision he sparkles 
with quotations from his and others’ poetry, and his speech is 
oversaturated with diverse cultural and historical references, while 
in the film he recites ad nauseam one and the same stanza from 
Pushkin’s Skazka o mertvoi tsarevne (Tale of a Dead Princess), which 
supposedly expresses his free spirit but in fact belongs to the toddlers’ 
reading list. The novel has him truly enraptured with the Urals’ 
history and nature (much as Ivanov himself is), while the movie’s 
Sluzhkin stands by impassively as Masha responds to his lecture 
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about the Kama docks: “This is not interesting to you either . . .” 
Across the pages of the novel, he vividly transfigures the white-
water field trip into his pupils’ immersion in the deep currents of 
history, retracing with them a journey from the forgotten ancient 
life of native tribes to the Gulag; the frames of the film preserve only 
his banalities and a crude joke about mammoths’ petrified shit.
This complexity could have justified the representation 
of Sluzhkin as a “superfluous man” who is too bright to fit into 
a new repressive social condition, beneficial for more primitive souls 
like Budkin, who plainly introduces himself as “Corruptioner.” 
The movie, in contrast, mercilessly flattens the central character, 
retaining from the “superfluous man” dossier only references to 
Balaian and Mendes. What’s more, these references apparently 
operate in Veledinsky’s film as decorative replacements for the 
protagonist’s missing “depth.” In Inna Denisova’s words,
The principal difference between the character played by 
Khabenskii and Ivanov’s hero (as well as Iankovskii’s Makarov) 
is that the latter travels along a certain [intellectual] path. Ivanov 
describes his character’s internal journey in the second part of 
the book, when the teacher with the students takes a river trip. 
During this trip, Sluzhkin performs immense internal work, 
making his way from the lack of love to true love. [. . .] But the 
[filmic] protagonist amazes not only by the fact that he doesn’t 
evolve but also by the fact that the idea of the character’s internal 
development didn’t cross the minds of either the director or the 
scriptwriters. (Denisova, Koretskii, and Ruzaev 2013)
Following suit with the hero’s flattening, other characters in the 
film are also sheared of any strand of complexity. This is especially 
evident in the representation of Sluzhkin’s wife, Nadia. The novel 
depicts her as a woman fatigued not only by a life of limited means 
and a deficiency of perspective but also by Sluzhkin’s ceaseless 
drinking, womanizing, and general infantilism. Elena Liadova 
reduces this character to an irate bitch, a nag who iniquitously 
berates her husband for not having the money to buy a car and 
penalizes him by withholding sex and cheating with his best friend. 
Such a portrayal of Nadia obviously paints Sluzhkin as the victim 
and grants him a mother lode of viewers’ empathy. (Notably, 
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Ivanov’s novel presents all its female characters besides Nadia as 
one-dimensional stereotypes: nymph, vixen, calculating user, etc.; 
in this respect, the film duly follows the original.) Similarly, if in 
the novel each student in Sluzhkin’s crew has a unique face and 
persona, the film allocates some individuality only to Masha and 
Gradusov, the rapping urinator. The purpose of this simplification 
is the same as with Nadia: contrasted with an indistinguishable 
mass of coarse teenagers Sluzhkin can pose as Hamlet.
Naturally, the question arises, why is this film, with its relentless 
pancaking of characters, so successful among critics and educated 
viewers? Or, to put it another way, why is Geograf’s representation 
of the contemporary intelligent so comforting to the contemporary 
Russian audience? Anzhelika Artiukh, in her review article “Losers 
and Patriots,” identifies in Veledinsky’s film a bitter verdict laid 
on the entire present generation of Russian intelligentsia—the one 
to which Sluzhkin, Khabenskii, Veledinsky, and Ivanov, born in 
the 1960s, brought up and educated in the late-Soviet days, and 
reaching the stride of their mature years in the post-Soviet age, 
together belong: “Veledinsky’s artistic and personal honesty lies 
in the following: through the protagonist of his ‘school movie’ 
he demonstratively explicates that his generation cannot teach 
anybody anything. [. . .] The post-Soviet period with its shift from 
the cult of education to the cult of money signified an absolute 
failure of the Enlightenment project, for which intelligentsia was 
responsible in Soviet society. The descendants of intelligentsia either 
have degraded to Sluzhkins or become petty bourgeois completely 
forgetful about their social origins” (Artiukh 2013). Inna Denisova 
is more specific: she detects in Sluzhkin the reflection of a particular 
stratum of intelligentsia—namely, the scientific-technological 
intelligentsia, who encompassed avid readers of the Strugatsky 
brothers and ardent fans of the modern bards; thus Geograf appears 
as a recent installment in the ITR culture, which was discussed 
above:
Much like many film viewers, I first read Ivanov’s book, from 
which becomes perfectly clear what milieu has formed the 
protagonist. He is a former scientist, who is left unemployed, 
because in the 1990s research institutions have closed. And he 
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gives up. He loses identification in the time of social troubles 
and cataclysms. In other words, we are observing his tragedy. 
In the movie, the action takes place in our days, which produces 
a disorienting effect—it appears that the protagonist gives up for 
no reason, because he is an egotist, eternal child, antihero, who 
does not give a damn about anybody. What is this film about 
then? (Denisova 2013)
Echoing Denisova, we wish to stress once again that all these 
imperative social contexts—the broad intelligentsia’s and its 
scientific representatives’ crises—are omitted from Veledinsky’s 
Geograf globus propil. We believe, however, that their invisible 
presence in the audience’s perception serves as the chief predicate 
for the film’s positive effect. By cutting off all direct lines to these 
contexts from the cinematic representation (the sole remaining 
trace being the movie’s title), its creators tried to achieve a very 
clear aim: to refigure the defeat of Sluzhkin, of the entire stratum 
of intelligentsia symbolically tethered to him, as the victory; hence, 
his name—Viktor. This is why Sluzhkin is ultimately beatified as 
the one who does not betray himself, being a “true human being” 
(in Ivanov’s words), indeed a new Prince Myshkin and a holy fool, 
although, as mentioned above, it remains ultimately unclear what 
values and, most importantly, what deeds his “victory” does entail.
In this light, the discrepancy between the novel and the film is 
quite telling. The novel, written in the 1990s, remained hopeful; in 
a nutshell, its message was yes, we, the intelligentsia, are 
economically and socially marginalized—but we manifest freedom 
and can teach the next generation to be free. The film, portraying 
today’s Sluzhkin, is thoroughly hopeless, despite its seemingly 
upbeat atmosphere and despite its creators’ intentions. The picture is 
hopeless because Sluzhkin’s freedom cannot be distinguished from 
his peers’ cynicism, because instead of analyzing the intelligentsia’s 
failed post-Soviet mission, it recommends that we accept and admire 
the protagonist for what he is. In lieu of questioning, it substitutes 
a nonentity for an idealist.
Khabenskii in his performance as Sluzhkin essentially faces 
one key challenge: to make this static nobody lovable. The actor, 
unfortunately, succeeds, and his Sluzhkin oozes charm. No wonder 
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so many viewers have excitedly claimed to recognize themselves 
in Sluzhkin: this hero’s delightful vagueness and shapelessness 
expressly invite us to project our own insecurities onto him. 
Undoubtedly, such representation is flattering to intelligentsia 
viewers; it offers a soothing indulgence for being what they are, 
not apologizing, not problematizing their social and cultural 
functions. This flattery also befuddles the flatness of the cinematic 
representation of the intelligentsia. In this respect, Geograf is a truly 
historical film: it has tangibly and vividly captured the gloomiest 
symptom of the post-Soviet intelligentsia’s defeat—the state of 
denial.
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l o s t  i n  t r a n s l a t i o n :  
s h o r t  s t o r i e s  b y  m i k h a i l  s e g a l
After the events of March 2014, many things appear not exactly 
as before. Mikhail Segal’s (b. 1974) renowned film Rasskazy (Short 
Stories, 2012) is no exception. When the picture was released, it was 
prevailingly received as a witty, well-crafted absurdist comedy. 
Now, a change in political context has imbued this charming 
comic flick with new meaning and refigured it to reveal something 
deeper—probably despite its author’s intentions.
Rasskazy brought Mikhail Segal, already known for his 
understated war drama Franz + Polina (2006, based on Boris Vakhtin’s 
famous novella Odna absoliutno schastlivaia derevnia [One Absolutely 
Happy Village]), the reputation of a dazzling creator of “(sm)art 
mainstream” (Abdullaeva 2012), one of those rare talents whose 
work is equally captivating to an undergraduate audience as to 
a sophisticated viewer equipped to detect its carnivalesque motifs 
and Foucauldian epistemology (Nemchenko 2013). Rasskazy’s 
accretion of prizes and awards looks mammoth but consists mainly 
of critics’ commendations and a Grand Prix from only a second- 
(if not third-) rate festival. This is of course with the exception 
of Kinotavr, which discovered Segal by virtue of his short Mir 
krepezha (The World of Fixtures, 2011; Grand Prix for Best Short), 
later resubmitted as the first segment of Rasskazy, where it helped to 
secure the 2012 Kinotavr Prize for Best Screenplay and the diploma 
of the Guild of Film Critics and Film Scholars.
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Many critics linked the alʹmanakh structure of Rasskazy, consisting 
of four “novellas,” to the director’s previous experience in music-
video production, alleging that the film inherits the notorious “clip-
based consciousness.” Zara Abdullaeva has expressed this thought 
in the most nuanced manner: “This card-film is composed of 
fragments and splinters (of a mirror). The fragment is a respectable 
genre of Romanticism, but not the only correct way (as is often 
believed) to reflect on stereotypes or just visualize the superficiality 
of the contemporary ‘clip-like’ or ‘mosaic’ consciousness. Segal tells 
of these stereotypes, of this consciousness and even of the ‘collective 
unconscious’ lucidly, bitingly, and from a distance” (2012).
Instead of chiding Rasskazy for its “clip-based consciousness,” 
I would like to argue that Segal masterfully emulates the fragmen-
tary structure as one of the key justifications for his artistic logic, 
while at the same time furtively unraveling his vision in a single 
coherent thread, from the movie’s first episode to its last. Segal 
presents his fragmented composition as a replacement to a “big and 
totalizing form,” about which, in the frame narrative of the movie, 
the publishing house’s editor in chief dreams aloud while rejecting 
the young author’s book of titular short stories.
In an interview that accompanied the screening of Rasskazy at 
Kinotavr in 2012, Segal said that the entire film had already been 
shot in his head when he was making Mir krepezha. (This explains 
how he managed to spin a fifteen-minute short into a feature-length 
picture within two summer months.) The director emphasized that 
he did not envision Rasskazy as an alʹmanakh but as a “whole” work. 
Yet Segal also argues that each installment toys with its own film 
genre—comedy, satire, thriller, and melodrama. The dissimilarity of 
the novellas in style and in genre serves the same purpose: to effect 
the condition of multiple overlapping and coexisting dimensions as 
the setting for the filmic narrative.
The first (“seed”) novella, “The World of Fixtures,” intoned 
with a deadpan black humor, plays with the “European/Russian” 
dichotomy and is set to a brilliant performance of “Fly Me to the 
Moon” by Polina Kasianova with a baian accompaniment. This 
opposition has a tangential relationship to the next segment, the 
satirical parabola “Circular Movement” (“Krugovoe dvizhenie”), 
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which illustrates the motion of bribes in Russian society and bears 
no relation whatsoever to the mock-mystical thriller “Energy Crisis” 
(“Energeticheskii krizis”), about a clairvoyant from a provincial 
library who conveys her revelations through verses stylized along 
the lines of Pushkin’s poetry. Then one can sense the opposition 
resurfacing in the final novella, “Inflamed” (“Vozgoritsia plamia”), 
among the most elegant of the four installments in terms of its plot: 
here, the love affair of two new “Russian Europeans” displays 
a deep generational conflict that eventually leads to Rasskazy’s most 
frequently quoted line, “What do we have to fuck about?!” (O chem 
s toboi trakhatʹsia?!).
The dim interior of the café that becomes the stage for plotting 
out one’s entire life in the first novella contrasts with the next 
segment’s motley transformations of the backdrop, from a dirty 
labyrinth of garages to the shining decorum of the president’s 
vast estate. The mystical provincial coloring of the third novella 
is likewise irreconcilable with the Moscow milieu favored by the 
“creative class” in the fourth. These are not just different stories; 
these are also disparate Russias, which exist without noticing each 
other, in parallel, yet inevitably overlapping. Thus, the formal 
structure of Rasskazy manifests the film’s thematic crux: multiple 
realities, or more precisely, multiple post-Soviet realms, each with 
its own language (or lack thereof) or, at least, its own semiotics.
In Lilya Nemchenko’s words, “All the characters of Rasskazy 
are formally united through the location, and conceptually through 
the absence of a common language, not on the level of semantics 
and syntax, but on the level of contextual memory. No fixtures 
will help here: ‘The link of time is out of joint’” (2013). I’d rather 
engage a more optimistic characterization: Rasskazy is, altogether, 
a film about attempted translations and transactions between these 
manifold realms and dissimilar semiotics.
In “The World of Fixtures,” an unflappably professional 
organizer of family events (Andrei Merzlikin), hired to plan the 
wedding and the entire subsequent life of a young couple, appears 
as a superb translator who connects the present with the future and 
weds an imaginary “European” style and recognizably “Russian” 
traditions of wild celebration. In “Circular Movement,” a stack of 
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bills serves as the universal translator, crossing hands toward ever-
higher planes of authority until a modest editor who pays a bribe for 
his car to pass technical inspection is linked to the surreal president 
(brilliantly played by Igorʹ Ugolʹnikov). The president doubles the 
operation of universal conversion: first, he elegantly “translates” 
cynical political manipulations into lofty quotations from Lev 
Tolstoy, Vasily Kliuchevsky, or Nikolai Karamzin, and vice versa. 
Second, he translates Russian “cultural tradition” into a malleable 
virtual reality: during his conversation with the governor who has 
delivered a bribe for his “reelection,” the president angelically 
strolls against the background of a shining green landscape, most 
reminiscent of Microsoft Windows’ preprogrammed desktop 
wallpaper, and at the end of his heartfelt monologue transmutates 
into a TV broadcast. In the third novella, “Energy Crisis,” 
the film’s unifying principle is presented in its most obvious 
form: here, the police major Oleg Ivanovich (Viktor Molchan) 
“translates” Anna Petrovna’s (Tamara Mironova) stylized, versified 
visions into a “normal human language”—that is, a stream of 
obscenities.
Indeed, the procedures of translation between “European” 
and “Russian,” between present, past, and future, constitute the 
essence of the post-Soviet epoch. Yet in Rasskazy the only successful 
translation appears to be the one associated with money: this is the 
sole universal language that functions effectively. However, the 
destructive effect of this successful communication leaves no doubts. 
All other attempts, based on the languages of rationality, culture, or 
historical memory, either hopelessly fail or will inevitably fail (as in 
“The World of Fixtures”).
This becomes painfully obvious in the fourth novella, 
“Inflamed,” where an inspired love affair between the middle-aged 
editor Max (Konstantin Iushkevich) and the stunning young beauty, 
tellingly deprived of a name (Liubovʹ Novikova), ends with the 
man’s disappointment in his female lover: it turns out that the girl 
has never heard of the Cheka, thinks that Dzerzhinsky was a writer, 
believes that Lenin lived until 1940, and minimizes the number of 
victims during Soviet history. Striking scenes of intimacy (probably 
among the best in contemporary Russian cinema) testify that the 
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heroes are perfectly compatible sexually, but they fail to find a mu-
tually understandable language of communication.
Max’s representation is a trap set by the filmmaker for the 
viewer. (Segal’s aptitude for such traps revealing the viewers’ 
misjudgment is even more obvious in his next feature, A Film about 
Alekseev [Filʹm pro Alekseeva, 2014].) The majority of critics and 
viewers enthusiastically took Max’s side, detecting in this character 
their own frustrations with the post-Soviet generation, governed 
by consumerist rather than cultural or historical signifiers. For 
some reason, however, many of Max’s fans failed to notice that his 
wisdom is an agglomeration of the intelligentsia’s clichés (including 
criminal songs, as sardonically noted by Abdullaeva [2012]) and 
that his girlfriend sincerely wants to learn from him, which he 
finds rather irritating. “We should talk more!” (Nam nuzhno bolʹshe 
razgovarivatʹ), she repeats as a mantra after each séance of their 
sensational sex.
The culminating scene in the car and afterward, when Max 
conflates sexual pleasure with an increasingly cruel examination of 
his lover’s knowledge of Soviet history, is almost painful to watch. 
In fact, he amplifies his sexual domination by the assumed position 
F i g .  3 .  M a x  a n d  h i s  n a m e l e s s  y o u n g  l o v e r 
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of a strict and unforgiving teacher, when—with obvious pleasure—
he first humiliates and then dumps his lover on the grounds of her 
intellectual inferiority. Max’s arrogance in these scenes borders on 
sadism, which admittedly only increases his pleasure.
Max is a member of the “creative class,” an editor and, possibly, 
a writer, who obviously sees himself as the heir to the Russian 
intelligentsia. He only prefers to forget that the Russian intelligentsia 
held itself responsible for translations between social languages 
and for (pardon my pathos) the enlightenment of those who need 
to be enlightened. So it is also Max’s fault that his girlfriend does 
not understand his values. He could have taught her: she was eager 
to learn. He forgets about these banalities not by accident: it’s just 
much more pleasant to feel angry and disappointed. His noble 
anger effectively proves—and even more effectively embodies—his 
cultural and social superiority over post-Soviet consumerist “bydlo” 
(trash). And this is the key to his character: wearing the clout of 
the Russian intelligentsia, he has exchanged obligations associated 
with this affiliation for the position of symbolic power nicely fused 
with hedonism.
In “Energy Crisis,” the librarian Anna Petrovna perishes in 
flames together with a book, which a girl lost in the woods has 
burned in the hope of keeping warm. This is also a signification 
of the intelligentsia’s failure—in this case stemming from the cult 
of classical tradition, the identification with “sacred” literature. But 
at least Anna Petrovna tried to provide a translation, through her 
comically and lofty pseudo-Pushkinian revelations. On the contrary, 
Max’s refusal to be patient, his anger at the girl who does not know 
the basics of the intelligentsia’s lexicon but looks into his eyes with 
trust and admiration, in the view of recent Russian history reads as 
an unforgiving explanation of the yawning gap between the liberal 
intelligentsia and the notorious 86 percent of Russian citizens who 
applaud the annexation of Crimea, the war against Ukraine, rabid 
anti-Americanism, nationalist hysteria, and other niceties of the 
current political situation.
The abandonment of attempts to translate and adapt the 
intelligentsia’s language and values to the worldview of the rest of 
the population has left a vacuum that has promptly been filled by 
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“fixtures” in the form of quotations from Russian classics adapted 
to immediate political needs and, especially, by the nationalist 
rhetoric about “CrimeaIsOurs,” the aggressive United States, and 
the decaying “Gayrope.”
With its title and its framework setting in a publishing house 
specializing in fiction, Rasskazy places literature at the center of 
cinema. Oddly enough, nobody seemed to notice this splendid 
paradox. All of the film’s parts are about the power of literature—or 
at least they include such a motif. The main character in “The World 
of Fixtures” presents a perfect writer for contemporary Russia, 
albeit of a new kind: one who has already absorbed the symbolist-
futurist-Socialist Realist Pelevin-vs.-Baudrillard lessons of live 
creation, life construction, and hyperreality of simulacra. Indeed, 
he masterfully imagines the future in minute detail, extracting the 
psychological profile of a client and instantly casting actors for 
roles in the future play of life. Correspondingly, the president in 
“Circular Movement” epitomizes a perfect reader and cocreator, 
who with virtuoso artistry utilizes decontextualized fragments of 
the sacred classics to justify a cynical regime of universal corruption. 
Anna Petrovna and Max appear as the professional priests of the 
cult of literature: a librarian and an editor. However, they present 
contrasting scenarios: the former implements her dedication in an 
archaic way more fitting to the nineteenth than the twenty-first 
century, while the latter abandons his intelligentsia duty for the 
sake of hedonism. Although both fail, they do not fail to enjoy the 
position of symbolic power and superiority over their “folk.”
How did we rejoice in the end of Russian logocentrism and 
literature-centrism in the 1990s, how many tears were shed about it 
in the 2000s (some, especially advanced Western analysts, seem to 
be catching up with this trend only now—see Brooks 2015). Yet all 
in vain. Rasskazy clearly demonstrates that the Russia of the 2010s 
remains a literature-centric country. Literature-centrism certainly 
has its obvious cultural benefits (one may call them culture-
specific), along with less palpable political disadvantages. Segal’s 
film is about the latter.
Rasskazy proves that literature-centrism, as a version of much-
maligned logocentrism in its post-Soviet incarnation, has become 
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more savvy and more ubiquitous, albeit less obvious than before. 
Yet like any form of logocentrism, it feeds the illusion of the 
intelligentsia’s innate superiority and lends itself to corrupt power 
as a respectable outfit (remember “writers” dancing around their 
desks at the opening ceremony of the Sochi Olympics?). In other 
words, it secures positions of authoritarianism, political or symbolic, 
which in today’s world does not help cultural communication, but 
interrupts it; does not translate but preserves the untranslatability 
of authoritative languages as the foundation of power. This is why 
the “Internationale” reworked into rap in the finale of Rasskazy is 
not such a silly idea as at first it might seem. After all, Segal has 
made a truly anti-authoritarian film that not only foreshadows 
failures of the liberal intelligentsia but also suggests the direction 
of a further quest that might revoke the triumph of logocentric 
authoritarianism.
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